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                         Abstract 
The striatum, the input region of the basal ganglia, has been shown to mediate many cognitive 
functions.  The striatum itself can be functionally segregated into dorsal (DS) and ventral 
striatum (VS).  For more than 60 years, DS has been reported to mediate stimulus-response 
learning, though evidence has been accruing pointing to a role in decision making.  These 
literatures have been growing independently and an aim of this thesis was to bridge these two 
bodies of knowledge.  We directly investigated the role of DS in stimulus-response learning 
versus decision making using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in patients with 
Parkinson’s disease (Chapter 2) and obsessive compulsive disorder (Chapter 3).  In Chapter 4, 
the role of DS in stimulus-response habit learning was tested in healthy individuals using fMRI.  
In three separate experiments (Chapters 2-4), all of the results strongly support the notion that 
DS mediates decision making and not learning.  DS is implicated in many disorders ranging 
from Parkinson’s disease, obsessive compulsive disorder and addiction, and clarifying the role 
of DS in cognitive function is paramount for understanding substrates of disease and 
developing treatments.   
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Chapter 1  
1 Literature Review 
1.1 Striatum and the Basal Ganglia 
The basal ganglia (BG) are a collection of sub-cortical nuclei responsible for the generation 
of motor movements, and increasingly, in cognitive functions (Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 
2009; Monchi, Petrides, Petre, Worsley, & Dagher, 2001).  The BG are comprised of four 
interconnected structures: the striatum, globus pallidus, substantia nigra (SN), and 
subthalamic nucleus (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986; Bonelli & Cummings, 2007).   
The striatum is the main input nuclei, receiving glutamatergic afferents from all cortical 
areas except for primary visual and primary auditory cortices, as well as dopaminergic 
afferents from SN pars compacta (SNc) and ventral tegmental area (VTA).  Striatal 
efferents project to either the internal globus pallidus (i.e., direct pathway) or to the external 
globus pallidus; which, in turn, projects to the subthalamic nucleus and then the internal 
globus pallidus (i.e., indirect pathway).  Subsequently, both pathways project to the 
thalamus; which, in turn, project to the cortex (Koob, Balcom, G.J., Meyerhoff, & 
Meyerhoff, 1975).  An illustration of the basic cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuit 
is presented in Figure 1.1.  One of the functions of dopamine in the striatum is to regulate 
the balance between the indirect, and the direct pathways (Newton & Price, 1975).   
The role of dopamine in balancing between direct and indirect pathways has been modelled 
by Cohen and Frank (2009) with respect to approach and avoidance learning, also referred 
to as Go/No-Go learning.  Dopamine is viewed as playing a modulatory role in the basal 
ganglia, interacting with different dopamine receptors that populate the direct and indirect 
pathways.  In the direct pathway, dopamine receptor type 1 and 5 (DRD1 and DRD5, 
respectively) are expressed and subsequently facilitate an increase in cortical activity 
(Kravitz, Tye, & Kreitzer, 2012).  Conversely, the indirect pathway expresses DRD2, 3, 
and 4 and activation of this pathway results in attenuated cortical activity (Kravitz et al., 
2012).  Dopamine pulses that arrive after receiving a reward facilitate activity through the 
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direct pathway and inhibit the indirect pathway, leading to a Go response.  When negative 
feedback or punishments are received, dopamine levels decrease resulting in activity 
through the indirect pathway and inhibition of the direct pathway, leading to a No-Go, or 
absence of that particular response.  When the concentration of dopamine is altered greatly, 
as in Parkinson’s disease (PD), a variety of motor and cognitive symptoms develop.     
 
Figure 1.1 Schematic diagram of the basal ganglia and its afferents and efferents 
Lines that terminate in arrowheads are excitatory connections; lines that terminate in circles are inhibitory 
connections; purple lines are dopaminergic connections; grey solid lines represent the direct pathway and 
grey dotted lines represent the indirect pathway.  VTA – Ventral tegmental area; SN – Substantia nigra.  
1.2 Cytoarchitecture of the Striatum 
The cytoarchitecture of the striatum is different compared to the other nuclei in the basal 
ganglia.  The most common neuronal type is 𝛾-aminobutyric acid (GABAergic) medium 
spiny neuron (MSN).  These neurons receive inputs from the thalamus and cortex via 
glutamatergic neurons, dopaminergic afferents from the SNc and VTA, and inter-neuronal 
connections via GABAergic and cholinergic neurons (Gonzales & Smith, 2015).  Whereas 
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glutamatergic neurons synapse on the dendrites of the MSNs, dopaminergic neurons are 
uniquely positioned mainly on the necks of MSN dendritic spines (Difiglia, Pasik, & Pasik, 
1978).  The location of dopaminergic neurons allows dopamine to modulate the cortico-
striatal connections needed for striatum function, such as voluntary motor movements, and 
reinforcement learning (Ashby, Ennis, & Spiering, 2007; Kravitz et al., 2012).  Cholinergic 
interneurons have recently been under intense investigation.  Originally thought to just be 
a class of tonically-active neurons with no behavioural role (M. Kimura, Rajkowski, & 
Evarts, 1984), the current hypothesis indicates a role in responding to salient environmental 
stimuli.  Specifically, the firing frequency of cholinergic neurons decreases in response to 
salient stimuli (e.g., noxious, rewarding environmental stimuli) and this change in activity 
may prime MSNs of the presence of the stimulus (Bohnen et al., 2012; Calabresi, Picconi, 
Parnetti, & Di Filippo, 2006; Gonzales & Smith, 2015).  Subsequently, dopaminergic 
inputs may assign a value to the stimulus (Gonzales & Smith, 2015). 
1.3 Divisions of the Striatum 
The striatum can be subdivided in many different ways, such as anatomically into the 
caudate nucleus, putamen, and nucleus accumbens (NAcc), and functionally into dorsal 
striatum (DS), and ventral striatum (VS; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; Wickens, 
Horvitz, Costa, & Killcross, 2007; see Figure 1.2).  A brief discussion of the common 
divisions is below along with a rationale of our chosen method. 
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Figure 1.2 The functional and anatomical divisions of the striatum 
The striatum can be subdivided functionally and anatomically.  A. The striatum can be subdivided functionally 
into the dorsal and ventral striatum.  The dorsal striatum is composed of the bulk of the caudate nucleus and 
putamen, shown in blue, whereas the ventral striatum is composed of ventral aspects of the caudate nucleus, 
putamen as well as the NAcc.  B. The anatomical subdivisions of the striatum: caudate nucleus (shown in 
red), putamen (shown in green), and NAcc (shown in orange).  Figure adapted from Haber and Knutson 
(2010). 
1.3.1 Caudate, Putamen, and Nucleus Accumbens 
Reported in hundreds of studies over the past 50 years, and represented in most 
neuroscience and neuroanatomy textbooks, the striatum is said to be composed of two 
structures, the caudate nucleus and putamen (G E Alexander, M R DeLong, & Strick, 1986; 
Hewitt, 1961; Künzle, 1975).  Occasionally, the NAcc is also included in the striatum 
proper (Szabo, 1980; Voorn, Vanderschuren, Groenewegen, Robbins, & Pennartz, 2004).  
In humans and non-human primates, the caudate nucleus appears to be anatomically 
separated from the putamen by a large bundle of ascending axons called the internal capsule 
(see Figure 1.2).  There is no gross anatomical division between the caudate nucleus and 
putamen, and the NAcc but it is generally denoted as the region that connects the caudate 
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and putamen located inferior to the internal capsule (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Postuma 
& Dagher, 2006; Voorn et al., 2004). 
From the work of Künzle, DeLong and Alexander in the 1970’s and 1980’s, we began to 
understand that the striatum is organized into semi-discrete cortico-basal ganglia-
thalamocortical circuits, each responsible for a different function (G E Alexander et al., 
1986).  Künzle (1975) used autoradiography in adult monkeys to trace axonal pathways 
from the cortex to the striatum.  Specifically, radiolabeled amino acids were injected into 
specific areas of the primary motor cortex (M1) and the axon terminals within the caudate 
nucleus and putamen were visualized and mapped.  Künzle (1975) found that nearly all 
projections from M1 terminated in the putamen and were topographically organized, such 
that neurons originating from the face region of M1 were mapped separately from those 
originating from the leg-tail region of M1.  Additionally, there was very little input to the 
caudate nucleus, supporting the notion of an anatomically separate caudate and putamen. 
Alexander and DeLong (1985) used microstimulation to identify connections between the 
striatum and cortex.  Neurons within the caudate and putamen were stimulated and motor 
responses were measured in awake monkeys.  They replicated Künzle in showing the 
topographic map of the putamen resulting in motor movements.  Interestingly, stimulating 
the caudate did not result in any motor movement.  Similar stimulations were conducted 
on other areas of the caudate nucleus, putamen and NAcc resulting in five non-overlapping 
functional loops: motor, oculomotor, dorsolateral prefrontal, lateral orbitofrontal, and 
anterior cingulate.  The motor loop passed through the putamen, oculomotor, dorsolateral 
prefrontal and lateral orbitofrontal traversed through different areas of the caudate nucleus, 
and the anterior cingulate loop included the NAcc (G E Alexander et al., 1986).  The lack 
of overlap between the circuits resulted in the classification of the caudate nucleus, 
putamen and NAcc as separate structures, anatomically connected to different cortical 
partners. 
The division of the striatum into the caudate nucleus, putamen and NAcc is pervasive; it 
exists in many current textbooks such as the recently published 5th edition of  Principles of 
Neural Science (Kandel, Schwartz, Jessell, Siegelbaum, & Hudspeth, 2013) but it may not 
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be the most apt division.  This division begins to break down in recent studies utilizing 
modern neuroimaging techniques and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) that show functional 
divisions may not be separated by the internal capsule but rather follow a ventromedial to 
dorsolateral gradient where the same functional loop can implicate both the caudate 
nucleus and putamen (Choi, Yeo, & Buckner, 2012; Tziortzi et al., 2014; see Section 1.2.3 
below).      
1.3.2 Dorsomedial and Dorsolateral Striatum 
In rodents, distinctions between caudate nucleus and putamen are not typically made as 
these regions merge into one another and form a unitary structure referred to as DS (Voorn 
et al., 2004), and VS is typically defined as the NAcc (Burton, Nakamura, & Roesch, 2015).  
Instead, divisions are made along the anterior to posterior, and medial to lateral axes and 
are based on function rather than anatomy (Burton et al., 2015).  For example, dorsal medial 
striatum (DMS) is often reported to mediate early, goal directed learning, whereas dorsal 
lateral striatum (DLS) is recruited during habit learning (Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Learning 
is a main focus of this thesis and will be defined later on.     
In the rodent literature, NAcc is often reported to respond to the value of an outcome.  
Specifically, neurons in the NAcc will increase firing frequency when presented with a 
high value reward and will reduce activity when faced with a small reward or punishment 
(Burton et al., 2015). This change in firing frequency of the NAcc is utilized by DMS in 
goal-directed learning (Burton et al., 2015; Wolfram Schultz, 1998; W. Schultz, Apicella, 
Scarnati, & Ljungberg, 1992). 
1.3.3 Dorsal and Ventral Striatum 
In humans, caudate and putamen appear to be separate structures and many studies report 
these two regions perform different functions (Chiu, Jiang, & Egner, 2017; Minoru 
Kimura, 1992; Rolls, Thorpe, & Maddison, 1983; Seger & Cincotta, 2005; Thompson, 
1959; Thompson RL, 1963; Yanike & Ferrera, 2014), however there is a lot of structural 
and functional data suggesting the opposite; that these regions are a unitary structure.  
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If caudate nucleus and putamen were functionally and anatomically separate structures, 
one would expect non-overlapping cortical, subcortical connections, facilitating the 
various functions, as we see in other areas with various nuclei like the thalamus (Angeles 
Fernandez-Gil, Palacios-Bote, Leo-Barahona, & Mora-Encinas, 2010).  However, this is 
not the case.  Neuronal connections to and from the striatum are not segregated into caudate 
and putamen connections, but rather form an anterior to posterior gradient that transcends 
the internal capsule, the bundle of axons that ‘separate’ the striatum into the caudate and 
putamen.  The anterior to posterior gradient of connectivity has been confirmed by a variety 
of methods, including DTI and functional connectivity for both cortical connectivity (Choi 
et al., 2012; Janssen, Jylanki, Kessels, & van Gerven, 2015; Jung et al., 2014; Tziortzi et 
al., 2014), and brainstem, dopaminergic connectivity (Chowdhury, Lambert, Dolan, & 
Duzel, 2013; Haber, 2014; Roeper, 2013). 
The anterior to posterior pattern of connectivity is highly supported in the literature and 
there is much overlap between the varying methodologies and tractography seeds used.  
Generally, areas of the prefrontal and frontal cortex are reciprocally connected to the 
anterior portions of the striatum (including NAcc, caudate nucleus and putamen) and as 
you move posteriorly through the striatum, more posterior cortical regions connect to the 
striatum.  Choi et al. (2012) discerned the functional organization of striatal subregions 
using resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with 1000 subjects.  The 
authors were able to parcellate the striatum into five distinct networks using cortical seeds 
chosen from other studies including tractography studies in monkeys.  A limbic network 
that included NAcc and most ventral portions of caudate and putamen, a ventral attention 
network connected predominantly to anterior putamen, a motor network that concentrated 
on lateral regions of the posterior putamen, and two association networks (i.e., fronto-
parietal and default-mode) that included regions of both caudate nucleus and putamen.  The 
five broad networks, specifically the association networks were then further parcellated 
into smaller networks.  The five networks correlate highly with tractography studies done 
in monkeys, as well as other methods parcellating the human striatum (Janssen et al., 2015; 
Jung et al., 2014; Tziortzi et al., 2014).    
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Studies that report a functional or structural divide between caudate and putamen often 
examine connectivity using striatal-based (i.e,. caudate and putamen derived) seeds 
(Janssen et al., 2015).  Choosing striatal-based seeds biases the results and interpretation 
towards examining the caudate nucleus and putamen as separate structures.  Similar to Choi 
et al. (2012), Janssen et al. (2015) investigated striatal connectivity using resting state fMRI 
but chose seeds within caudate nucleus and putamen instead of cortical regions.  The six 
resulting functional subdivisions were divided along the internal capsule into, dorsal 
caudate, ventral caudate, rostral/caudate accumbens, rostral putamen, caudal putamen, and 
dorsal putamen.  The authors used a correlation matrix to examine inter-hemispheric cluster 
correlations and similarities between neighbouring clusters.  An interesting finding that is 
not discussed are the intermediate correlations between non-neighbouring clusters.  For 
example, the ventral caudate cluster is moderately correlated with the rostral putamen and 
dorsal putamen clusters, indicating that they may share aspects of their respective 
networks.  Applying this result to the Choi et al., 2012 framework, the ventral caudate and 
rostral putamen clusters, together resemble the limbic or default network. Taken together, 
the literature points more to functional subdivisions that differ on an anterior to posterior 
axis, rather than a caudate/putamen anatomical axis.   
Similar to cortical connections to the striatum, the dopaminergic connectivity also has an 
anterior to posterior gradient that does not discriminate between caudate and putamen.  
Haber (2014) reviewed the dopaminergic connectivity to the striatum and their role in 
integrating information processing across limbic, cognitive and motor functions.  The 
striatum is innervated by dopamine neurons that originate primarily from the SNc and 
VTA.  The VTA and SNc are not wholly separate structures and therefore merge into one 
another and have overlap in the striatal areas they innervate.  VTA-innervated structures 
consist mainly of VS or the limbic networks (Choi et al., 2012).  The SNc can be subdivided 
into two populations based on the presence of calbindin, a group of calcium-binding 
proteins.  Calbindin-positive dopamine cells are situated in the dorsal aspect of the SNc 
and merge into the VTA, which are also calbindin-positive.  The ventral region of SNc is 
composed of calbindin-negative dopamine cells.  Respectively, these regions of dopamine 
cells are referred to as dorsal tier and ventral tier SNc cells. The presence or absence of 
calbindin allows for the visualization of the dorsal and ventral tier SNc neurons and 
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correlates highly with striatal connectivity.  Dorsal tier SNc neurons are reciprocally 
connected to caudate nucleus and putamen along the middle of the striatum that are part of 
the association networks.  Ventral tier SNc neurons, conversely, are connected to dorsal 
lateral regions of the striatum, specifically in the motor network (Chowdhury et al., 2013; 
Haber, 2014).  
Interestingly, SNc and VTA have been implicated in reinforcement learning, with SNc 
involved in response selection and decision-making whereas, VTA is recruited during 
reward signalling and motivation (Roeper, 2013). 
It is based on the dopaminergic segregation of the striatum—VTA innervating ventral areas 
of the caudate nucleus, putamen and NAcc (i.e., VS), and SNc projecting to the rest of the 
caudate and putamen (i.e., DS)—that we and others have chosen to divide the striatum 
(Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 2013; Hart, Leung, & Balleine, 2013; Helie, Roeder, & 
Ashby, 2010; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; J. 
O'Doherty et al., 2004; Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Owen, & MacDonald, 2015). 
Anatomically, slight cytoarchitectural differences, as well as divergent glutamatergic 
afferents, and non-anastomosing blood supplies separate DS and VS.  On a macroscopic 
level, there is no wholly agreed upon point of division.  Pragmatic division often use 
different anatomical landmarks, such as the internal capsule (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011), 
or fMRI slices along the z-axis have been used (Postuma & Dagher, 2006).  
1.4 Dorsal Striatum 
1.4.1 Anatomy 
DS is comprised of the bulk of the caudate nucleus and putamen and is vascularized by the 
lateral lenticulostriate arteries, off of the middle cerebral artery (Feekes & Cassell, 2006).  
The main neuronal type in the striatum is the MSN.  Through a wide range of firing 
frequencies, dopamine stimulation from SNc is rapid and maximal in DS (Wickens et al., 
2007; Zhang et al., 2009).  This is a result of a high concentration of dopaminergic afferents 
to these MSNs.  Dopamine Transporter (DAT), a membrane-spanning protein responsible 
for the synaptic clearance of dopamine, is in high abundance in DS, resulting in rapid 
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clearance, and therefore, short stimulation periods (Wickens et al., 2007).  The anatomical 
makeup of DS, with high concentrations of dopaminergic afferents and DAT, results in 
almost binary responding, with maximal stimulation at a range of dopamine firing 
frequencies, followed by rapid clearance of synaptic dopamine.  Through reciprocal 
glutamatergic afferents, DS is connected to the primary, supplementary, and pre-motor 
cortex, as well as to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, parietal association cortex, and 
somatosensory cortex (Leh, Chakravarty, & Ptito, 2008).  As a result of the rapid binary 
responding of DS, coupled with reciprocal connections to effector areas such as the motor 
cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, it is well-adapted to perform functions such as 
deciding among alternatives and response selection.    
1.4.2 Function 
DS has been implicated in a multitude of functions including selective attention (Agnoli & 
Carli, 2011), both explicit (Benke, Delazer, Bartha, & Auer, 2003) and implicit retrieval 
(Boyd & Winstein, 2004), complex planning (Su, Chen, Kwan, Lin, & Guo, 2007), and 
task switching (i.e., switching between response strategies; Aarts et al., 2014; Aarts et al., 
2010; Cameron, Watanabe, Pari, & Munoz, 2010).  Most notably however, DS has been 
implicated in learning (Waldschmidt & Ashby, 2011; Yin & Knowlton, 2006), and decision 
making (Atallah, Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 
2008), which will be discussed in depth below.   
1.4.3 Dorsal Striatum in Learning 
DS has long been implicated in learning situations, both early goal-directed learning 
(Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005; Brovelli, Laksiri, Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2008; 
Delgado, Miller, Inati, & Phelps, 2005; Foerde, Knowlton, & Poldrack, 2006; Brian Lau 
& Glimcher, 2007; B. Lau & Glimcher, 2008; R. A.  Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & 
Gabrieli, 1999; Thompson, 1959; Thompson RL, 1963; Xue, Ghahremani, & Poldrack, 
2008), and late-stage, habit learning or automaticity (Helie et al., 2010; R. A. Poldrack et 
al., 2005; Soto, Waldschmidt, Helie, & Ashby, 2013; Yamamoto, Kim, & Hikosaka, 2013; 
Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Much of the literature implicating DS in learning involves 
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different versions of a stimulus-response task (explained in depth in 1.6).  Briefly, stimulus-
response learning is a form of implicit learning where responses (e.g., button presses) are 
associated, typically through trial and error, with a certain stimulus (e.g., abstract image).  
Stimulus-response learning typically involves reinforcement learning or instrumental 
conditioning.  Below is an in-depth discussion of several models implicating DS in 
learning. 
1.4.3.1 DMS- and DLS-mediated Learning 
Briefly discussed in section 1.3.2, DMS- and DLS-mediated learning theories originated 
in the rodent literature and have subsequently been investigated in humans.  Experiments 
often involved lesioning areas of DMS or DLS of rodents and investigating subsequent 
impairments on goal-directed or habit learning.  This theory ascribes early, goal-directed 
learning to DMS with the bulk of later-stage learning occurring in DLS, during which 
habits are formed (Hernandez, Redgrave, & Obeso, 2015; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012; 
Macpherson, Morita, & Hikida, 2014; Redgrave et al., 2010; Voorn et al., 2004).  Habit 
learning is variously defined as reflecting stimulus-specific responses that a) persist even 
when feedback is omitted or is reversed, generalizing across situations (Myers et al., 2003; 
Shohamy & Wagner, 2008), b) are unaffected by distracting information or tasks (Foerde 
et al., 2006), and c) interfere with enacting new incongruent responses (C. M. MacLeod & 
Dunbar, 1988).  Roughly, the homologous structures in humans for DMS and DLS are the 
anterior, dorsomedial DS (i.e., head of the caudate nucleus) and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, versus dorsolateral putamen respectively (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Yin & 
Knowlton, 2006).  Some views further claim that DLS, in addition to being implicated in 
forming stimulus-response habits, mediates and sustains habitual or automatic responding 
once these associations are acquired and well entrenched, so-called action control (Balleine 
& O'Doherty, 2010; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Tricomi, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2009) but 
see (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie et al., 2010).  
Many studies in this area aim to differentiate the neural correlates characterizing goal-
directed and habit learning.  One main technique utilized is outcome devaluation.  Adams 
and Dickinson (1981) trained rats to press a lever by providing them with a sucrose solution 
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reward after each lever press.  After a period of training, lithium chloride, a mild poison 
resulting in illness, was added to the sucrose solution, devaluing the reward.  This lead to 
a reduction in lever pressing until the behaviour was extinguished.  The change in 
behaviour suggests that rats initially learned a lever-press-sucrose association and this 
association was altered with the addition of illness and the devaluing of the outcome.  
Learning what actions will most likely yield rewards is termed goal-directed learning.  
Since this form of learning is facilitated through receiving rewards, the learned associations 
are sensitive to the changing value of the outcome.  If the outcome is no longer rewarding 
the organism will terminate the behaviour (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; de Wit, Barker, 
Dickinson, & Cools, 2011; Redgrave et al., 2010; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  In the same 
study, Adams and Dickinson (1981) found that outcome devaluation could be influenced 
by the length of training, such that if the association was overtrained, it was no longer 
sensitive to devaluation and the rat would continue to press the lever while being made ill.  
This type of learning is referred to as habit learning.  The association has progressed 
beyond the reward, and the response will be continued irrespective of the outcome 
(Thorndike, 1898; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Without intervention, stimulus-response 
learning typically proceeds through a goal-directed learning phase, transitioning into habit 
learning once the association is overtrained (Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  
DMS is reciprocally connected to the prefrontal cortex, specifically the prelimbic region, 
and lesions of either of these areas abolish goal-directed behaviour in early learning, with 
animals relying on previously-formed habitual behaviour.  Lesions to DLS—a region of 
the striatum reciprocally connected to areas of the motor and pre-motor cortex—results in 
an association that is perpetually goal-directed (Yin & Knowlton, 2006) and reliant on 
outcome information. 
Tricomi et al. (2009) investigated the role of DLS in habit learning using humans and fMRI.  
A free-operant task was developed from rodent literature and involved self-paced button-
presses in response to an abstract image.  There were two groups, one group received 16 
minutes of training and the other group received 48 minutes of training.  Briefly, an image 
would appear on the projection screen that included an abstract image and an indication of 
what button to press.  Participants could press this button as often as desired and after each 
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button press would appear a grey circle indicating no reward, or an image of an M&M or 
Frito, indicating a reward.  The proportion of rewards given was based on a variable-
interval schedule that averaged one reward every 10 seconds.  Rewards accumulated during 
the task were given to the participants after the scanning session.  Following training, one 
food reward was devalued through satiation.  Participants were instructed to eat one of the 
rewards (either M&Ms or Fritos) until further consumption was no longer pleasurable.  
Subsequently, participants were scanned during an extinction task, identical to the training 
sessions but no rewards were given.  If the stimulus-response associations formed habits, 
it was expected that the number of button-presses would be similar between the devalued 
and pleasurable reward.  If the associations did not form habits and still exhibited a goal-
directed nature, it was expected that participants would make fewer button-press responses 
for the devalued reward.  Participants in the short-training group retained goal-directed 
behaviour and responded less often to the devalued reward, whereas participants in the 
long-training group exhibited habitual responding.  FMRI data revealed that an area of the 
ventral putamen, indicated to be a region of the DLS was active more in habitual responders 
compared to those who were goal-directed, and this activity increased across the training 
session.  The authors concluded that this area in the ventral putamen must be involved in 
stimulus-response habit learning.    
1.4.3.2 COVIS Model 
The competition between verbal and implicit systems, or COVIS model, asserts that 
category learning, another version of stimulus-response learning, involves two competing 
systems, (1) a verbal system that classifies stimuli into categories that can be verbalized, 
and (2) an implicit system that uses procedural learning (Ashby, 1998).  For example, 
categorizing rectangles that are taller than they are wide into one category and rectangles 
that are wider then they are tall into another category, would be an example of a rule that 
is easily verbalized.  Learning in this case is explicit and involves frontal and temporal 
language areas, among others.  Rules that are not easily verbalized tend to involve attributes 
that differ in units and are therefore difficult to explicitly describe.  For example, it would 
be difficult to verbalize the categories if you need to categorize objects that differ in the 
diameter of a circle as well as the angle of a radial line that spans the diameter of the circle.  
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The difficulty arises because circle diameter and line angle have different units.  Learning 
in this latter case is implicit, or procedural and linked to the motor and supplementary 
motor areas.  Both learning systems intersect with DS, and it is here where the competition 
takes place.  Ashby (1998) references the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits and 
assert that verbal category learning involves a frontal circuit including the frontal language 
areas, anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex.  The implicit system, rather, is mediated by 
a striatal loop that passes through the extrastriate visual areas, as well as the prefrontal 
cortex.  In any categorization task, Ashby (1998) contends that only one of the two systems 
will dominate and the DS is responsible for mediating and switching between the two 
systems. More importantly, the DS is claimed to mediate the stimulus-response association 
learning.     
1.4.3.3 Actor-Critic Model 
The actor-critic model, first hypothesized by Sutton and Barto (1998) and later supported 
by J. O'Doherty et al. (2004), states that reinforcement learning consists of two separate 
components, a critic which utilizes feedback to learn to predict future rewards, and an actor 
which uses the information from the critic to make better decisions.  The critic uses a 
prediction error signal generated by the phasic firing of midbrain dopaminergic neurons.  
A prediction error signal is generated whenever an unexpected reward is given (Rutledge, 
Dean, Caplin, & Glimcher, 2010; W. Schultz et al., 1992).  J. O'Doherty et al. (2004) 
scanned healthy participants using 3 Tesla (T) MRI while they completed a stimulus-
response learning task.  The experiment consisted of two tasks, one instrumental and the 
other Pavlovian.  In the instrumental conditioning task, two abstract images appeared on 
the screen, one left- and the other right-of-centre, and the participant made a button-press 
response choosing one of the two images.  In the reward trials of the task, one image was 
more likely to produce a juice reward compared to the other and the participants were 
required to learn the most rewarding images.  In the neutral version, the outcome was a 
neutral solution, not deemed to be rewarding.  In the Pavlovian task, the same trial structure 
was used, however the computer made the responses and the participant indicated which 
image the computer chose.  The rationale for using an instrumental and Pavlovian task was 
to examine value predictions by the critic in the presence (i.e., instrumental task) and 
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absence (i.e., Pavlovian task) of action selections by an actor.  The results showed that VS 
correlated strongly with the prediction error signal in both tasks, whereas DS correlated 
with prediction error only during the instrumental task.  Authors concluded that VS is the 
critic, coding for the prediction error signal and sending this information to the DS, or 
actor, where this information is used to learn the stimulus-response association and 
perform rewarding future responses.  In other words, VS is implicated in reward processing 
and motivation and DS is implicated in stimulus-response learning and decision-making.   
1.4.3.4 SPEED Model 
The formation of habits requires many trials, often several hundred or thousands of trials, 
compared to studies examining early learning.  Additionally, the associations learned after 
so many trials are less reliant on feedback and are in fact, often resistant to changes in 
feedback (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010).  The subcortical pathways enable expertise 
development (SPEED) was postulated by the same group that hypothesized the COVIS 
model and thus many similarities are apparent (Ashby et al., 2007).  SPEED relies on 
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits, as does COVIS, but SPEED focuses on 
posterior circuits that involve the body and tail of the dorsal caudate.  SPEED postulates 
that the role of DS is to acquire stimulus-response associations and to train cortical-cotrical 
connections between higher order sensory and pre-motor areas (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie 
et al., 2010; Soto et al., 2013).  The theory maintains that the head of the caudate nucleus 
mediates early learning, and as the associations become more practiced progressing toward 
automaticity, more posterior regions of the striatum, namely the body and tail of the 
caudate nucleus, underlie late stage learning.  Once automaticity has been achieved, 
involvement of dorsal caudate nucleus ceases, and stimulus-specific, automatic behaviours 
become mediated by cortical regions (i.e., pre-motor, motor and visual cortices; Ashby, et 
al., 2007). 
Helie et al. (2010), cited as support for the SPEED model, investigated automatization of 
responses in a rule-based categorization learning paradigm that included over 10,000 trials, 
across 20 separate learning sessions, with fMRI data obtained in Sessions 1, 4, 10, and 20.  
They found that activity in DS was increased throughout Session 1, at the end of which 
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high levels of response accuracy were ultimately achieved (i.e., 89.6%).  In subsequent 
sessions, DS activity was significantly attenuated (i.e., after Session 1) whereas cortical 
activation continued to correlate with accurate categorization even after extensive training.  
1.4.4 Dorsal Striatum in Decision Making 
Within the last 10-15 years, the claim that DS mediates decision making and response 
selection has gained traction with a large literature now bolstering this contention (Atallah 
et al., 2007; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014; Brian Lau & Glimcher, 2007; B. Lau & 
Glimcher, 2008; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014; P. A. 
MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; Smittenaar et al., 2012; Wunderlich, Dayan, & Dolan, 2012).  
Decision-making in this context is defined as the process of representing and assigning 
values to different response possibilities, then selecting and executing the most appropriate 
action (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008; Ryterska, Jahanshahi, & Osman, 2013).  The 
claims regarding DS’s role in learning versus decision making are inconsistent and their 
respective literatures have been developing independently from one another. 
In examinations of DS in early learning, results often do not confer on this regions attributes 
that one would expect for a learning region.  In naïve participants who are learning novel 
stimulus-response associations, learning regions are expected to be most active early on, 
when much of the learning is occurring (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), and to decrease 
their activity once the associations have been learned.  The frequent finding that DS activity 
remains significantly increased above baseline after sequences (Reiss et al., 2005), 
categorization rules (Helie et al., 2010, Seger et al., 2010), or stimulus-reward (Daw and 
Doya, 2006, Seger et al., 2010), and response-reward (Delgado et al., 2005, Ohira et al., 
2010) associations have been acquired should challenge the notion that DS underlies 
learning, yet has not instigated such a revision.  The alternative interpretation that DS 
mediates response selection, which predictably improves once stimulus-response 
associations are learned, accounts for both the pattern of brain-behaviour relations and the 
observation that DS activity changes with exposure to learning events.  Using single-cell 
recording in a go/no-go reversal learning paradigm in rats, Takahashi, Roesch, Stalnaker, 
and Schoenbaum (2007) found increased DS activity for rewarded odour cues only after 
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behavioural learning criteria were achieved.  These findings support the view that DS 
mediates decision making, not learning per se. 
Not only is there evidence that DS mediates decision making, but it seems to be specifically 
implicated in decision making that requires a degree of deliberation, before responses are 
enacted with little reflection or automatically (R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Robertson et 
al., 2015).  In fMRI studies, DS activity correlates with degree of uncertainty in category 
(Daniel et al., 2010), response-reward (Ohira et al., 2010), and stimulus-response decisions 
(Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, & Price, 2010; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011).  Further, 
investigations in patients with DS deficits reveal significant impairments for decisions 
requiring consideration and often superior performance relative to healthy controls for 
choosing more automatic responses (Ali et al., 2010; Coderre & van Heuven, 2013; 
Robertson et al., 2015). 
1.4.5 DS mediates learning or decision making? 
Decision-making and learning processes are often confounded in experimental designs 
looking at learning (Garrison et al., 2013; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011).  In stimulus-
response learning experiments, for example, trials typically proceed as follows: a) a 
stimulus is presented and participants decide among a set of responses, and b) feedback 
regarding accuracy is provided, shaping stimulus-response associations.  Learning is 
generally measured by the accuracy in selecting responses.  Consequently, failing either to 
acquire stimulus-response associations or to select responses based on these learned 
associations could lead to impaired performance in these paradigms.  In this way, learning 
and response selection are confounded.  Further, in fMRI studies, a) deciding upon and 
enacting a response, and b) learning from feedback regarding response accuracy, are 
typically treated as a single event with all significantly-activated brain regions ascribed a 
role in learning per se (Dobryakova & Tricomi, 2013; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011).  For 
example, Delgado et al. (2005) examined learning to associate cards with concepts of 
‘high’ versus ‘low’ via feedback.  As is typical, they considered response selection (i.e., 
high vs. low decisions) and feedback portions of each trial (i.e., high vs. low feedback) as 
a single event.  Compared to baseline, they found significant peaks in dorsal caudate 
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nucleus and VS, concluding that both regions mediate learning.  Combining decision-
making and feedback events caused ambiguity.  Consequently, concluding that preferential 
DS activation was related to the response selection operation, whereas VS activity reflected 
learning through feedback is an alternative explanation for these data that is equally 
plausible. 
Accordingly, some brain regions that might underlie decision processes guided by learned 
associations could erroneously be assigned a role in learning.  Given that these processes 
are temporally intertwined and functionally interdependent, distinguishing them is very 
challenging, requiring novel experimental designs and nuanced interpretations.  Learning 
and decision selection are entirely different processes phenomenologically, however, and 
distinguishing neural substrates of these different operations is important, with 
implications for understanding cognition in health and disease.  
The small number of authors who also attempt to separate learning and decision-making 
find results that concur with this rationale.  Wunderlich et al., 2012 provide a great example 
of a study that nicely distinguishes between learning and planning (a component of decision 
making), concluding that dorsal caudate is involved in planning whereas the posterior 
putamen (along the border between VS and DS) is recruited during habit learning.  There 
are few papers that attempt to make this distinction between decision making and learning.  
In Liljeholm and O’Doherty (2012) and many of the studies outlined in Yin and Knowlton 
(2006), lesions in DS seem to impair different forms of learning, usually suggested from 
impaired performance on learning tasks involving selections.  To perform these tasks 
correctly, the rodent must select the correct response using specific cues or feedback 
provided.  Deficits in either selecting the response or learning from feedback will result in 
equally impaired performance on the task.  What tends not to be discussed is the possibility 
that the DS lesions impair the ability to select the correct response even if the association 
might have been accurately learned.  In an elegant study, Atallah et al., 2007 investigated 
the role of DS in learning versus selecting responses relying on learned associations.  In a 
Y-maze task using odour cues, Atallah and colleagues observed impairment in rats’ ability 
to consistently select a rewarded versus unrewarded arm for animals receiving infusions of 
inhibitory GABA agonist into DS compared to a saline solution during the learning phase 
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of the experiment.  Initially, this seemed to suggest that animals receiving inhibitory 
infusions to DS were learning associations between odour cues and rewards more poorly.  
When both groups were later tested once the infusions were stopped, however, both 
experimental and control groups performed the selection task similarly.  This demonstrated 
that associations were learned equally well for both experimental and control (i.e., saline-
infused) groups during the learning session and suggested that inhibition of DS impaired 
the animal’s ability to use learned associations to perform selections reliably.  To 
complement this interesting finding, in another study, they found that GABA infusions to 
DS, at test phase, resulted in impaired selection performance compared to saline infusions 
to DS, although both groups had previously shown identical learning of these odour-reward 
associations during the training phase.  
Taken together, these studies challenge the direct involvement of DS in learning and 
instead suggest a more specific role in performing selections based on previously-learned 
associations.  
1.5 Ventral Striatum 
1.5.1 Anatomy 
VS is vascularized by the recurrent artery of Heubner, a branch of the anterior cerebral 
artery (Feekes & Cassell, 2006), and is composed of the NAcc and ventral portions of the 
caudate nucleus and putamen.  As in DS, VS is populated by MSNs. However, MSNs in 
VS are smaller, and the dopaminergic input to VS is less dense compared to DS.  
Consequently, a dopamine pulse from VTA will stimulate VS more slowly, and with more 
variable intensity (Wickens et al., 2007).  In an experiment by Zhang and colleagues 
(2009), neurons in rats were stimulated by nicotine, and firing frequency was monitored in 
both the dorsolateral striatum, and NAcc, homologous to DS and VS respectively in 
humans.  In NAcc, dopamine responses to nicotine were graded and incremental, 
depending on the frequency and intensity of the stimulation.  This is in stark contrast to the 
maximal (i.e., plateau) stimulation of DS in response to even the lowest frequency and 
intensity.  In addition, VS stimulus durations are longer due to lower DAT concentration 
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(Wickens et al., 2007).  These characteristics of VS suggest that it is adapted to a different 
function than DS, and perhaps that these attributes suit it to associating events or stimuli 
over time, for example in associative learning.  The presence of specific glutamatergic 
connections aids in confirming this function.  VS is connected, reciprocally, to the 
orbitofrontal, anterior cingulate, anterior temporal, as well as several limbic areas including 
the hippocampus, amygdala and hypothalamus (Kincaid, Zheng, & Wilson, 1998).  These 
areas are heavily involved in encoding and associating salient environmental events as well 
as in motivating behaviour.  
1.5.2 Function 
VS is the downstream receiver of midbrain dopaminergic neurons from the VTA.  
Dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain are modulated by rewards and punishments  
(Redgrave & Gurney, 2006; Wolfram Schultz, 1998).  Specifically, when a reward is 
received, a burst of dopamine is sent to VS, and when the organism receives punishing or 
negative feedback (i.e., no reward or lesser reward than was expected), dopamine tone is 
decreased in VS (Redgrave & Gurney, 2006; Wolfram Schultz, 1998).  Therefore, the 
traditional role of the VS was to anticipate and respond to feedback via the midbrain 
dopamine signal (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; B. Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & 
Hommer, 2001).  This was then expanded to include a role in reward learning (R. Cools, 
Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; R. Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, & Robbins, 2007; Daw & 
Doya, 2006; Delgado et al., 2005; J. P. O'Doherty, 2004) and even general feedback-based 
learning in the absence of an overt reward (Atallah et al., 2007; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et 
al., 2014; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011)   
A result often reported is that VS and DS are both ascribed a role in feedback-based 
learning. For example, in a recent meta-analysis of 35 fMRI studies of reinforcement 
learning through feedback—the majority of which confounded neural activity for response 
selection and feedback phases—found both VS and DS to be equally strongly associated 
with performing feedback-based learning.  We argue that combining decision-making, and 
feedback events causes ambiguity.  A plausible alternative explanation, consequently, is 
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that preferential DS activation could relate to the response selection operation, whereas VS 
activity reflected learning through feedback.  
1.6 Striatum-mediated disorders 
The striatum is central to many neurological and psychiatric disorders such as Parkinson’s 
disease (Kish, Shannak, & Hornykiewicz, 1988), Huntington’s disease (Bano, Zanetti, 
Mende, & Nicotera, 2011), addiction (Volkow, Wise, & Baler, 2017), bipolar disorder 
(Clark & Sahakian, 2008), schizophrenia (Barch & Ceaser, 2012), depression (Arnone, 
McIntosh, Ebmeier, Munafo, & Anderson, 2012), autism spectrum disorder (Park et al., 
2017) and obsessive compulsive disorder (Jung et al., 2011), to name a few.  Basic science 
research into the functions of the DS and VS is integral to understanding and developing 
effective treatments for striatum-mediated disorders.  Two disorders, Parkinson’s disease 
and obsessive compulsive disorder are discussed in depth below as these disorders will be 
central to later chapters. 
1.6.1 Parkinson’s disease 
1.6.1.1 Pathophysiology  
PD is a neurodegenerative disorder affecting 1% of the population over 60 years of age and 
3% of the population over 80 in industrialized countries (Tanner & Goldman, 1996).  It is 
mainly characterized by the motor symptoms of bradykinesia, or slow movement, rigidity, 
and tremor.  The cardinal motor symptoms of this disorder are caused by the degeneration 
of dopamine-producing neurons in the SNc.  This degeneration is caused by the 
accumulation of alpha-synuclein, a protein regularly found in healthy neurons that may 
function in neurotransmitter vesicle trafficking (Diao et al., 2013).  It is thought that 
aggregation of alpha-synuclein negative impacts other cell processes ultimately leading to 
programmed cell death (Dauer & Przedborski, 2003; Jellinger, 2012). When enough 
degeneration occurs in the SNc, delivery of dopamine to the DS, declines causing the 
balance between the direct and indirect pathways of the cortico-basal ganglia-
thalamocortical motor circuit to increase signaling through the indirect pathway releasing 
DRD2, 3, 4 from dopaminergic inhibition, and decrease signaling through the direct 
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pathway (Wichmann, DeLong, Guridi, & Obeso, 2011).  These changes result in increased 
activity in the internal segment of the globus pallidus, inhibiting the thalamus, and 
ultimately, regions of the motor cortex.  When between 50-80% of the SNc dopaminergic 
neurons degenerate, the hypokinetic features seen in PD begin to emerge.       
1.6.1.2 Treatment Strategies  
At all stages of the disease, dopamine replacement is an effective treatment for improving 
motor symptoms.  Dopamine replacement therapy can be prescribed in a variety of forms, 
namely dopamine precursors such as ι-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (ι-dopa), or dopamine 
agonists.  Dopamine precursors are often prescribed in conjunction with a dopamine 
decarboxylase inhibitor to prevent the conversion of ι-dopa to active dopamine in the 
peripheral circulation, thereby increasing the availability of ι-dopa within the brain.  
Dopamine precursors elevate dopamine levels in the brain, alleviating the motor symptoms 
associated with PD.  Dopamine agonists are chemical substrates with a similar structure to 
dopamine, and can bind to and activate dopamine receptors directly.   
1.6.1.3 Cognitive Deficits 
Cognitive dysfunction is now an undisputed, non-motor symptom of PD that leads to 
significant impairment in quality of life (Barone et al., 2009; Schrag, Jahanshahi, & Quinn, 
2000).  In PD, some cognitive deficits relate to dopamine depletion in DS, and are 
remediated, at least partially, by dopaminergic therapy.  Other cognitive deficits arise as a 
consequence of dopaminergic therapy.  Increasingly, it is understood that impairment can 
occur due to overdose of brain regions that receive dopamine from VTA (see R. Cools, 
2006; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011 for reviews).  These regions include VS, 
prefrontal, and limbic cortices.  Unlike SNc, the VTA is relatively spared throughout the 
course of PD, and as a result, regions innervated by VTA retain near-normal levels of 
dopamine (R. Cools, 2006).  Therefore, it has been proposed that dopamine replacement 
therapy overdoses VTA-innervated regions, impairing functioning.  As the disease 
progresses alpha-synuclein accumulates in cortical cells throughout the cortex leading to 
broader cognitive symptoms (Pereira et al., 2012).   Finally, other transmitter systems 
23 
 
including acetylcholine and serotonin also deteriorate in patients with PD leading to 
cognitive dysfunction as well as mood and anxiety (Calabresi et al., 2006; Ray & Strafella, 
2012; Scatton, Javoy-Agid, Rouquier, Dubois, & Agid, 1983). 
The most common method in testing the effect of dopaminergic therapy on cognition is 
through the use of the exogenous dopamine withdrawal procedure.  Patients are instructed 
to abstain from taking dopamine precursors for a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 18 
hours, and dopamine agonists for a minimum of 16 to a maximum of 20 hours before 
testing begins, constituting the OFF state.  Performance in this state is then compared to 
the ON state where the patient takes the medication as prescribed.  Another method for 
investigating this effect involves comparing performance of medicated PD patients with 
patients who have never been medicated, or de novo PD patients.  The advantage of the 
former method is that it removes the confounds related to receptor changes due to chronic 
dopaminergic therapy as well as disease progression.  Severity can differ significantly 
across patients at the time of clinical diagnosis and as the disease progresses (Postuma et 
al., 2015).  By comparing performance in ON and OFF states in a single patient, within-
subject differences can be examined without the likelihood of comparing patients who have 
different disease durations.   
1.6.1.4 Dopamine Overdose Hypothesis 
The dopamine overdose hypothesis attempts to explain the cognitive impairments seen in 
PD as a function of varying concentrations of endogenous dopamine in different brain 
regions.  Those that are dopamine depleted at baseline are improved; whereas, brain regions 
that are dopamine replete are impaired by dopaminergic therapy.  DS is a brain region that 
is improved by dopamine replacement therapy; whereas, those mediated by a VTA-
innervated regions are impaired.   
Gotham, Brown, and Marsden (1988) were among the first to propose the overdose 
hypothesis.  They investigated cognitive function in patients with PD both on and off 
dopaminergic medication using a series of tasks including the Paced Auditory Serial 
Addition Task, Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, Visual-visual Conditional Associative 
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Learning Test, Word Fluency Tasks, and Subject-ordered Pointing Task.  A short 
description of each task is presented below. 
1) The Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task is a measure of general attention, and 
working memory.  Participants hear a series of numbers and are instructed to add 
the most recent number to the number that followed it in the series.  For example, 
in the series one, two, three, the participant would be required to add the number 
two with one, resulting in three and then add the next number, three, to the previous 
numbers, resulting in six.   
2) The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task is a measure of set-shifting, or the ability to 
flexibly update changing rules.  Briefly, participants are told to match sample cards 
containing objects of various shapes, colours, and numbers to a probe card.  They 
are not told on what dimension (i.e., colour, shape, or number) to match sample 
cards to the probe card, however, and need to determine this using a trial-and-error 
approach.  The category matching rules change throughout the task.   
3) The Visual-visual Conditional Associative Learning Test involves learning 
associations between arbitrary visual stimuli.  Before the test, one of six cards with 
geometric designs is randomly paired to one of six colours.  Participants are shown 
cards with geometric designs and are instructed to choose the colour that the card 
belongs to, and are given feedback.  Through trial and error, participants learn to 
associate a particular colour to each geometrical design.   
4) In the Word Fluency Tasks, participants are instructed to generate words based on 
a category cue, in a defined period of time (i.e., animals or boys names).   
5) Finally, the Subject-ordered Pointing Task involves initiating a series of responses 
whilst monitoring their execution.  Briefly, a series of stimuli are arranged on a 
sheet of paper.  On several successive sheets of paper, the stimuli are presented in 
a different order.  The participant is instructed to point to one stimulus per page, 
aiming to point to each different stimulus without pointing to the same one twice.  
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Stimuli include representational drawings, abstract images, and words that evoke a 
low amount of imagery. 
All participants completed all of these measures and were tested both on and off dopamine 
replacement therapy.  The delay between the two testing sessions was approximately one 
week.  PD patients were randomly divided into two groups with order of testing 
counterbalanced across patients such that one group began the first testing session on 
dopaminergic medication, and the other first performed testing off medication.  Each 
testing session involved a different version of the tasks listed above, and the order of the 
tasks was further counterbalanced with half of the participants beginning with one version, 
and the other half with the other version.   
When tested in the OFF state, PD patients made more errors in the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task, and generated fewer words per category on the Word Fluency Tasks compared to 
their ON state.  When tested on their medication, they performed more poorly on the 
Visual-visual Conditional Associative Learning Task, as well as the Subject-ordered 
Pointing Task.  At its most basic level, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, and the Word 
Fluency Tasks are measures of decision-making, or response selection.  Conversely, the 
Visual-visual Conditional Associative Learning Test and the Subject-ordered Pointing 
Task involve learning and working memory.  Studies of decision-making and response 
selection have implicated DS, a result that is entirely in line with the results of Gotham and 
his colleagues.  In addition, VS and the pre-frontal cortex, two regions that are innervated 
by VTA, have been shown to mediate association learning and working memory, 
respectively.   
Since the overdose hypothesis was first proposed in 1988, few functional neuroimaging 
studies in PD have confirmed increased activity related to dopamine therapy in DS and/or 
in cortical regions reciprocally connected to DS.  Even fewer studies demonstrate 
behavioural improvements and associated neural changes related to dopaminergic therapy 
in PD.  Mattay et al. (2002) found that activations in motor regions during a simple motor 
response (i.e., supplementary motor area, cerebellum, lateral premotor, sensorimotor, and 
parietal cortical regions) were larger on compared to off dopaminergic therapy in PD 
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patients measured with fMRI.  Keypress responses to single-digit stimuli were neither 
improved nor impaired by dopamine replacement in this study, however.  Similarly, Feigin 
et al. (2003) found that ι-dopa increased activation in premotor cortex, a region reciprocally 
connected to SNc-innervated DS, though motor learning performance was not altered.  
Finally, Fera et al. (2007) reported medication-induced behavioural improvements in 
interference in a modified, colour-word Stroop task involving key-presses.  Stroop-related 
interference has been shown previously to be mediated by DS (Ali et al., 2010).  Though 
neural activity in DS was not increased, it was in cortical regions reciprocally connected to 
DS (i.e., dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex, and parietal lobe) on compared to off medication 
corresponding to improved performance when print colour and colour word were 
incongruent.   
Using functional neuroimaging, a small number of investigations support or at least 
partially bolster the dopamine overdose hypothesis (Argyelan et al., 2008; R. Cools et al., 
2007; Feigin et al., 2003; Kwak, Müller, Bohnen, Dayalu, & Seidler, 2012; Van Eimeren 
et al., 2009).  R. Cools et al. (2007) examined the effect of dopaminergic therapy on 
regional brain activity with fMRI in PD patients while they learned stimulus-reward 
associations and reversals through trial-and-error and probabilistic feedback.  ι-dopa 
attenuated regional brain activity in the VTA-innervated NAcc on the final error during 
stimulus-reward contingency reversals, just before patients began correctly responding to 
the updated stimulus-reward association.  Arguably, this is the point at which patients 
learned the new stimulus-reward relationship, guiding correct responses on the subsequent 
trial.  Despite fMRI signal differences, however, dopaminergic therapy did not 
correspondingly impair learning of the stimulus-reward contingency reversal.  Argyelan et 
al. (2008) investigated the effect of dopaminergic therapy using positron emission 
tomography (PET) on default mode network (DMN).  DMN normally deactivates during 
externally-oriented and goal-directed cognition (Di & Biswal, 2014).  They found that parts 
of the DMN that are VTA-innervated—the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and insula—
deactivated as expected during motor sequence learning in healthy controls and PD patients 
tested off dopaminergic therapy but not in PD patients following an ι-dopa infusion.  
Though there were no corresponding ON-OFF performance differences, absence of 
deactivation could be interpreted as abnormal processing in VTA-innervated brain regions 
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in PD patients related to dopaminergic therapy.  Van Eimeren et al. (2009) found that 
dopamine agonists and ι-dopa reduced the reward prediction error-related neural response 
(i.e., the response related to the difference between expected and actual rewards received) 
in VS, whereas only dopamine agonists reduced the reward prediction error-related neural 
response in the VTA-innervated orbitofrontal cortex.  These responses were not correlated 
with online behavioural changes, though the reward prediction error response in 
orbitofrontal cortex on dopamine agonists correlated with risk-taking behaviour in a task 
performed once patients were out of the scanner.  Feigin et al. (2003) found that ι-dopa 
reduced occipital association cortical activity measured with PET in PD patients during 
motor sequence learning.  Trial-by-trial motor sequence learning efficiency and accuracy 
was not worsened by an ι-dopa infusion, though PD patients had less accurate explicit 
report of final motor sequences suggesting some learning impairment.  Finally, Kwak et 
al. (2012) found that ι-dopa reduced fMRI activation in ventral putamen in PD patients 
while they explicitly learned motor sequences and this reduction in neural signal correlated 
with decreased early phase learning.  This study directly supported the dopamine overdose 
hypothesis.    
At odds with the prefrontal, peri-cingulate, anterior cingulate, and parietal cortical regions 
dopamine overdose hypothesis, Mattay et al. (2002) used fMRI to investigate the effect of 
ι-dopa on working memory.  In an n-back task, PD patients indicated when the current 
stimulus matched the stimulus from n trials earlier.  Similar cortical regions were engaged 
during this task in PD patients in the ON and OFF states, though activations of VTA-
innervated brain regions were larger in the OFF condition, consistent with notions of 
dopamine overdose.  However, greater ON-OFF differences in fMRI activations correlated 
with poorer accuracy in the OFF relative to ON states.  These findings were most easily 
interpreted as poorer working memory performance related to less efficient function of 
VTA-innervated brain regions in the OFF state.  Van Eimeren et al. (2009) found that 
dopamine agonists increased feedback-related activation in orbitofrontal cortex in PD 
relative to testing on ι-dopa or off dopaminergic therapy.  This activation in orbitofrontal 
cortex correlated positively with a measure of risk-taking.  Finally, Shiner et al. (2012) 
investigated the effect of dopaminergic therapy in PD patients on a) stimulus-reward 
discrimination learning through probabilistic feedback in the Learning Session and 
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subsequently on b) selecting the most probabilistically-rewarded stimuli in the 
Performance Session.  In the Performance Session, a) all pairs from the Learning session 
and b) novel pairs formed by coupling the most-rewarded and least-rewarded stimuli and 
all stimuli with which they had not previously been paired during the Learning session 
were tested.  Contrary to previous findings, (Ghilardi et al., 2007; A. A. MacDonald et al., 
2014; Seo, Beigi, Jahanshahi, & Averbeck, 2010; Vo et al., 2014), and there were no ON-
OFF fMRI signal differences (R. Cools et al., 2007) dopaminergic therapy had no 
detrimental effect on efficiency or accuracy of stimulus-reward association learning.  In 
the Performance Session, greater accuracy in choosing the most probabilistically rewarded 
stimuli was achieved in the ON relative to OFF state for newly-created stimulus pairs only, 
when greater integration of information was required, though no ON-OFF fMRI signal 
differences were noted.  The dopamine overdose hypothesis was not supported and though 
dopaminergic therapy improved response selections that have previously been shown to be 
DS-mediated (Grahn et al., 2008; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), corresponding neural 
signal changes did not occur in this study.   
PD and dopaminergic therapy are expected to simultaneously have opposing effects on 
neural activation in, and functions associated with, SNc- versus VTA-innervated brain 
regions.  Recognizing an evidence gap, Aarts et al. (2014) aimed to critically test this 
concept using a rewarded task-switching paradigm.  Task-switching refers to the ability to 
shift strategies, adapting to changing situational demands (R.  Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & 
Robbons, 2001).  It has been shown to depend upon the SNc-supplied DS (R.  Cools et al., 
2001; Robertson et al., 2015).  Reward processing and anticipation of reward have been 
shown to engage VTA-innervated VS and orbitofrontal cortex (B.  Knutson & Cooper, 
2005).  Aarts et al. (2014) investigated the effect of a) cued-switching between responding 
to simultaneously-appearing word stimuli (i.e., left or right) and arrows (i.e., pointing left 
or right), and b) reward anticipation.  As predicted, PD patients’ abilities to switch between 
responding to simultaneously appearing word or arrow stimuli, based on a preceding cue, 
was improved in the ON state.  This correlated with greater DS blood-oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) signal on relative to off dopaminergic therapy.  In contrast, anticipating 
a high versus low reward, based on a cue that preceded each trial, had no effect on accuracy 
or response time (RT) though previous research has shown that higher relative to lower 
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anticipated rewards results in greater errors and longer RTs, a so-called reward cost (Aarts 
et al., 2010).  Further, dopaminergic therapy had no effect on behaviour based on reward 
anticipation.  Despite no behavioural differences, signal in the VTA-innervated VS ROI 
was lower on relative to off dopaminergic therapy during reward anticipation.  
Investigating individual differences through correlational analyses, PD patients with 
greater ON relative to OFF VS region of intrest (ROI) activation evidenced greater ON 
more than OFF reward costs (i.e., poorer behaviour).  That is, medication-induced 
increases in VS ROI activation correlated with poorer performance, not fully consistent 
with the dopamine overdose hypothesis.  
Especially in early PD, a) endogenous dopamine levels in SNc- versus VTA-innervated 
brain regions, and b) replenishing versus overdosing effects of exogenous dopamine in 
these brain regions respectively, are proposed to be important determinants of the cognitive 
profile (R. Cools, 2006; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011).  This framework is prevalent 
and effectively accounts for behavioural patterns across numerous PD studies (R. Cools, 
2006; Dirnberger & Jahanshahi, 2013; Vaillancourt, Schonfeld, Kwak, Bohnen, & Seidler, 
2013).  Studies that fully support these concepts are lacking, however.  In fact, 
demonstrations of simultaneous but opposite effects of dopaminergic therapy on both 
behavioural and neural measures of SNc- versus VTA-innervated brain regions to this point 
are not found in the literature.  Previous studies included only small numbers of PD 
patients, in some cases ten or fewer (Feigin et al., 2003; Mattay et al., 2002; Van Eimeren 
et al., 2009), possibly contributing to the lack of strong support to date.  In some cases, the 
behavioural measures potentially resulted from combined operations ascribed to both SNc-
innervated brain regions (e.g., response selection, retrieval processes) and VTA-supplied 
areas (e.g., stimulus-response learning) accounting for patterns that were not 
straightforward (Feigin et al., 2003; Mattay et al., 2002; Shiner et al., 2012). 
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1.6.2 Obsessive compulsive Disorder 
1.6.2.1 Pathophysiology 
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric disorder prevalent in 1.2% of adults 
and is described by the National Institute of Mental Health as typically chronic with a 
gradual onset (Bokor & Anderson, 2014).  OCD is characterized by two major symptoms: 
obsessions and compulsions (Bokor & Anderson, 2014).  The former is defined as 
disturbing thoughts, urges, or impulses, such as thoughts of harm and death of a loved one, 
fears of contamination, persistent doubting, counting and the need for symmetry (Bokor & 
Anderson, 2014; Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2005).  
Compulsions are repetitive behaviours or mental acts that individuals affected by the 
disorder feel driven to perform, including repeatedly checking locks and appliances, 
excessive hand-washing, and organizing objects symmetrically (Bokor & Anderson, 2014; 
Chamberlain et al., 2005). 
The disorder exhibits diversity in severity, however, the symptoms tend to follow a general 
pattern: obsessive thoughts, anxiety, compulsions, and temporary relief (Bokor & 
Anderson, 2014).  For example, with respect to sanitization, patients may have an irrational 
fear of being contaminated by germs, resulting in illness or death.  Anxiety often ensues 
and patients feel driven to carry out certain tasks to reduce their distress.  The individual 
may wash or clean repetitively until a “feeling” of cleanliness is achieved, whereas a typical 
individual may wash until observing that they are clean.  Completion of the respective 
compulsions result in temporary relief and the cycle repeats.  Patients spend a substantial 
amount of time with their obsessions and carrying out compulsions, and this can be costly 
to maintaining jobs and relationships.  Anxiety is at the core of OCD and the disorder was 
in fact classified as an anxiety disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders IV (DSM-IV).  In the current iteration, DSM-V, OCD is now classified as a 
separate disorder. 
Recently, OCD has been linked to deficits in the striatum using evidence from structural 
and functional MRI.  Structural MRI studies utilizing voxel-based morphometry have 
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consistently found volumetric differences within the striatum with the consensus being 
reduced volume of DS (Piras et al., 2015; Riffkin et al., 2005) and increased volume of VS 
(Piras et al., 2015; Pujol, Soriano-Mas, Alonso, & et al., 2004; Yoo et al., 2008; Zarei et 
al., 2011).  The volumetric abnormalities in OCD are also reflected in resting state basal 
activity.  PET and resting fMRI have found increased glucose metabolism and increased 
activity in regions of VS compared to controls (Baxter et al., 1987; de Vries et al., 2017; 
Del Casale et al., 2011; Gursel, Avram, Sorg, Brandl, & Koch, 2018; Le Jeune et al., 2010; 
Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 1997).  Conversely, resting state activity in DS is reduced 
compared to controls (Del Casale et al., 2011; Rubin, Villanueva-Meyer, Ananth, Trajmar, 
& Mena, 1992).  Interestingly, activation in VS increased compared to rest in response to 
symptom-provoking stimuli (Figee et al., 2011; Mataix-Cols et al., 2004; Rauch, Jenike, 
Alpert, & et al., 1994).  Mataix-Cols et al. (2004) categorized OCD patients based on their 
subtype, either contamination, checking, or hoarding subtype, and conducted a block 
design symptom-provocation task where patients with OCD and healthy controls viewed 
blocks of images pertaining to each of those subtypes as well as neutral images.  
Interestingly, different OCD-subtypes evidenced dissimilar brain activity patterns in the 
striatum.  Contamination-subtype patients had higher activity in ventral caudate nucleus 
compared to controls, whereas ventral putamen was increased compared to control in 
patients with the checking-subtype.  Hoarding-subtype did not result in changes in the 
striatum.  This study supported the notion that OCD is a multifaceted psychiatric disorder 
that may involve different brain regions depending on subtype.  Taking everything 
together, OCD patients seem to have increased volume and baseline activity in VS, and 
diminished volume and activity in DS. 
1.6.2.2 Treatment Strategies  
The first line pharmacological therapy for the treatment of OCD, as it is for anxiety 
disorders and depression, is selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which inhibit 
serotonin transporters (SERT or 5-HTT) impairing the removal of serotonin from synapses 
and prolonging their effects (Chamberlain et al., 2005; Hirschtritt, Bloch, & Mathews, 
2017; Seibell & Hollander, 2014).  Unfortunately, between 40-60% of patients do not 
respond to SSRI treatment suggesting that augmenting serotonin may not be addressing the 
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underlying pathology and instead masking it by reducing the anxiety associated with the 
disorder (Atmaca, 2016; Chamberlain et al., 2005; Seibell & Hollander, 2014).  SSRIs are 
typically used as adjunct therapy with cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) focusing on 
exposure and response prevention (ERP; Chamberlain et al., 2005; Hirschtritt et al., 2017; 
Seibell & Hollander, 2014).  Patients with OCD undergoing ERP first create a hierarchy 
of triggers related to their symptoms.  For example, if a patient suffered from the 
contamination-subtype of OCD, he or she may rank using a public water fountain as less 
anxiety-provoking than touching a public bathroom doorknob.  Patients then carry out 
controlled exposures, working up their hierarchy.  An example of an exposure from the 
instances above would be using a public water fountain until the level of anxiety diminishes 
significantly.  Using ERP in conjunction with developing strategies to understand and resist 
compulsions typically constitutes the psychological therapy component (Hirschtritt et al., 
2017; O'Neill & Feusner, 2015).  Even with CBT and pharmacological intervention, 
between 30-40% of patients do not respond to treatment (Atmaca, 2016), stimulating 
research into non-serotonergic medications and other treatment options.    
1.6.2.3 Cognitive Deficits 
Structural and functional changes in patients with OCD could be linked to cognitive 
dysfunction related to OCD symptomatology.  Deficits in VS and DS could lead to 
dysfunction in reward processing, error detection, decision making, and cognitive 
flexibility. 
VS has been implicated in reward processing (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; W. Schultz et 
al., 1992) stimulus-response learning through feedback (Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, Vo, 
Ganjavi, & MacDonald, 2014; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014; Vo et al., 2014), and 
reversal learning (i.e., behavioural adaptations in response to changing stimulus-reward 
contingencies; R. Cools et al., 2002; R. Cools et al., 2007; Remijnse, Nielen, van Balkom, 
& et al., 2006; Swainson et al., 2000).  It appears that reversal learning (Remijnse et al., 
2006) and reward learning (Nielen, den Boer, & Smid, 2009)  are diminished in OCD 
patients, coupled with decreased VS activity compared to healthy controls.  Remijnse et al. 
(2006), ascribe striatal deficiencies that contribute to impairments in task-switching and 
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reversal learning to be the neurological foundations of cognitive inflexibility and 
ineffective behavioural adaptation to changing stimuli in OCD patients, which manifest as 
compulsive behaviours.  As discussed above, obsessive-compulsive behaviours have been 
linked to hyperactivity in the reward-processing circuitry, as evidenced by augmented 
striatal metabolism in OCD patients at rest and in response to symptom-provoking stimuli 
(Baxter et al., 1987; de Vries et al., 2017; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Gursel 
et al., 2018; Le Jeune et al., 2010; Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 1997).  Figee et al. (2011), 
contend that this hyperactivity of the VS occurs by surrendering the regular responsiveness 
of VS to natural rewards (e.g., food, water, sex).  Augmented baseline VS activity in 
patients with OCD hinders performance on VS-mediated tasks and may play an integral 
role in OCD symptomatology. 
As discussed above, DS has been reported to mediate cognitive flexibility (P. A. 
MacDonald & Monchi, 2011), selective attention (A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014), and 
decision making (Atallah et al., 2007; N. M. Hiebert, Owen, Seergobin, & MacDonald, 
2017; Robertson et al., 2015).  OCD patients have shown impaired executive functions in 
tasks examining cognitive flexibility (Del Casale et al., 2011; Vriend et al., 2013), and 
response inhibition (Del Casale et al., 2011; van Velzen, Vriend, de Wit, & van den Heuvel, 
2014).  As cognitive flexibility and response inhibition appear to be impaired in OCD 
patients, this may be linked to the inability to choose naturally rewarding behaviours over 
compulsive actions (Vriend et al., 2013).  Nakao et al. (2005) conducted a colour-word 
Stroop task, where colour words (i.e., Red, Blue, Green), are presented in font colours that 
are either congruent with the colour word (i.e., Red, Blue, Green), or incongruent with the 
colour word (i.e., Red, Blue, Green).  Patients with OCD and healthy controls were 
instructed to name the colour of the font, rather than read the colour word while brain 
activity was simultaneously recorded using fMRI.  Patients with OCD took longer to 
complete the Stroop task and did not exhibit significant activity in DS, as did the healthy 
controls.  In this task, the role of DS has been shown to mediate inhibiting the response 
that is more salient (i.e., colour word) and outputting the visual, font colour information 
(Ali et al., 2010; Coderre & van Heuven, 2013; Djamshidian, O'Sullivan, Lees, & 
Averbeck, 2011; Fera et al., 2007; Larson, Clayson, Primosch, Leyton, & Steffensen, 2015; 
C. M. MacLeod, 1991; C. M.  MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000; Nakao et al., 2005; Wright 
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& Wanley, 2003).  Impaired cognitive flexibility and response inhibition could be related 
to deficits in OCD which in turn might lead to compulsive actions. 
A present model of OCD based on data discussed above suggests that obsessions and 
compulsive behaviours may be linked to a disproportion between hyperactivity in the VS 
and hypoactivity in the DS while processing incoming information.  Dysfunctional reward 
circuitry centred in the VS is expected to result in an ability to respond to natural rewards 
and instead is modulated by stressful, obsession-related stimuli (Baxter et al., 1987; de 
Vries et al., 2017; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Gursel et al., 2018; Le Jeune 
et al., 2010; Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 1997).  Hypoactivity in DS producing deficits in 
cognitive flexibility and response inhibition might produce difficulty switching away from 
thinking of obsessions, and performing adaptive actions over maladaptive compulsions 
(Del Casale et al., 2011; van Velzen et al., 2014; Vriend et al., 2013). 
1.7 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
MRI is a non-invasive technique that allows for the visualization of brain structures using 
a large electromagnet and radio waves.  While in the magnet, all water molecules inside 
the tissues become aligned.  During data collection, radio waves are introduced causing the 
water molecules to increase in energy and spin away from this alignment.  After the radio 
wave is stopped, these molecules release this energy and relax back to alignment.  The rate 
at which these molecules relax depends on many factors including tissue type. What MRI 
measures is the different relaxation times allowing for the visualization of different tissues 
within the brain.  Generally, the larger the electromagnet, the higher spatial resolution of 
the images.  At 3T, the spatial resolution of the images ranges from 1-3mm in most studies.  
In higher field strength, such as 7T, the resolution increases to around 500µm (Glover, 
2011).  Functional MRI uses an electromagnet to visualize differences in oxygenated and 
deoxygenated blood, referred to as BOLD in the brain.  This BOLD response in different 
brain regions can be correlated with various functions relative to rest or other control 
functions.  The theory behind fMRI is that areas of the brain that recruit more oxygenated 
blood, stored as oxyhemoglobin, are more active than areas that do not.  All processes 
involved in neural signaling from action potential propagation, neurotransmitter vesicle 
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binding to the synaptic junction, and release and reuptake of neurotransmitters, require 
energy in the form of adenosine triphosphate (Glover, 2011).  To utilize this energy 
effectively requires oxygen absorbed from the bloodstream.  Oxygen uptake by neurons 
results in an increased local concentration of deoxyhemoglobin and waste products 
resulting in vasodilation and increased blood flow containing oxygenated blood (Glover, 
2011).  This process is called the hemodynamic response and is what is most often 
modelled in fMRI experiments.  Changes in blood oxygenation and blood flow, referred to 
as Blood-Oxygenation Level Dependent responses, are visualized and measured in fMRI.  
Specifically, it is the difference in magnetic characteristics between deoxygenated and 
oxygenated blood that allow for visualization.  Deoxyhemoglobin is highly paramagnetic 
compared to oxyhemoglobin and this paramagnetism creates magnetic fields that change 
the relaxation rates of the water molecules that can be visualized (Glover, 2011).  An 
important feature of fMRI is temporal resolution which refers to ability to measure changes 
in BOLD over time.  Action potentials are very fast, on the order of milliseconds, whereas 
the hemodynamic response function is sluggish, peaking approximately 5 seconds after the 
neural stimulus, and returning to resting levels after 8-16 seconds (Glover, 2011).  By 
taking great consideration when stimuli or responses occur, and using sophisticated 
analysis methods, clearer pictures of BOLD activity can be obtained and correlated with 
neural responses (Glover, 2011).  
While in the fMRI scanner, subjects complete tasks, or just simply rest, and active brain 
areas can be visualized during these processes.  Using healthy participants, fMRI-generated 
BOLD responses can suggest brain regions that are preferentially correlated with certain 
functions.  Once the cognitive functions have been mapped in healthy individuals using 
fMRI, testing functions of interest in patient populations that have demonstrated 
impairment in the target brain regions can better assess whether these regions are critical 
for the function under investigation.  
1.8 Stimulus-response Learning 
Stimulus-response learning, discussed in sections 1.4 and 1.5, has been an area of intense 
research for a multitude of reasons.  (1) Stimulus-response learning forms the basis for how 
36 
 
organisms interact and thrive in their environments due to its role in adaptive behaviour 
(Thorndike, 1898), (2) stimulus-response learning is easily tested with tasks adaptable for 
non-human primate and rodent animal models as well as for humans, and (3) stimulus-
response learning is mediated by the striatum, a region implicated in many disorders.  Many 
models of reinforcement learning and instrumental conditioning, have been created using 
stimulus-response tasks.  Here, we adapt a stimulus-response learning and decision-making 
task to address the controversy regarding DS’s role in learning versus decision-making 
(Chapter 2).  Additionally, we implement this task in patients with striatum-mediated 
disorders, namely Parkinson’s disease (Chapter 3), and obsessive compulsive disorder 
(Chapter 4) to investigate the neural mechanisms of cognitive deficits and symptoms in 
these disorders.  Our stimulus-response learning task was designed to individually 
investigate, and tease apart, decision making and learning, as well as to identify the brain 
regions that mediate them.  Briefly, participants learned to associate abstract images with 
button-presses while brain activity was recorded in 3T fMRI.  We modeled a) the phase 
during which participants decided amongst options and selected responses, separately from 
b) the stage when participants learned about associations through feedback regarding the 
accuracy of their choices (Figure 1.3; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).  In some 
experiments, we further tested participants’ ability to select and enact responses that they 
learned during the first phase of the study, investigating the brain regions that mediated 
these decisions. 
 
Figure 1.3 Schematic of the stimulus-response task used 
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The stimulus-response task used in in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), as well as in Chapters 2-4.  The 
task was designed to allow for separate investigation of decision making and learning.  In each trial there is 
a Decision Making Event and a Learning Event.  In the Decision Making Event, an abstract image appears 
on the screen and the participant chooses a response out of multiple response options.  After the response 
is made, the Learning Event occurs, during which participants receive and process feedback as to whether 
their response was correct or incorrect.  Participants use this feedback to learn image-button press pairings 
(i.e., stimulus-response associations). 
Using this task in healthy, young adults (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), we found 
activation in DS only during the Decision Making Event, not during learning through 
feedback (i.e., the Learning Event).  Further, DS activity during the decision stage of our 
trials only occurred for trials occurring later in the learning session, when the slope of 
learning was shallower, as participants were already selecting responses guided by 
associations that they had acquired in earlier trials.  In contrast, activity in VS correlated 
with the Feedback Event of our stimulus-response learning trials as has been shown by 
others (R. Cools et al., 2007; W. Schultz et al., 1992).  Further, feedback-related VS 
activation was greatest in the earliest phase of learning when the slope of behavioural 
change was steepest, indicative of greatest stimulus-response association learning.   
In addition to the fMRI experiment in healthy adults described above (Nole M. Hiebert, 
Vo, et al., 2014), we have previously tested behaviour only in patients with PD on and off 
dopaminergic therapy completing a similar task (Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, et al., 2014; 
Vo et al., 2014).  Learning stimulus-response associations in patients with PD was 
comparable to controls at baseline and impaired with dopaminergic therapy.  This pattern 
suggests that learning stimulus-response associations is not mediated by the dopamine-
deficient DS in PD but rather a VTA-innervated brain region.  
All results support the original investigation in that DS does not mediate stimulus-response 
learning.  Given the robustness and replicability of the results, this task was chosen to 
investigate the role of DS in patients with PD on and off dopaminergic therapy (Chapter 
2), in patients with OCD (Chapter 3) and DS in habit learning (Chapter 4).  Combining 
fMRI with our stimulus-response task on and off dopaminergic therapy in PD, as well as 
in patients with OCD provides an extremely powerful paradigm for testing the neural 
substrates of learning and decision making.  Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014) provided 
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fMRI data that was correlational making it impossible to definitively state the necessity of 
brain regions for various functions.  Conversely, in our behavioural studies investigating 
stimulus-response learning in patients with PD on and off dopaminergic medication, allow 
us only to speculate regarding the brain regions mediating these functions using 
behavioural and pharmacological effects.  Testing patients with PD on and off 
dopaminergic therapy while measuring brain activity using fMRI allows us to make causal 
inferences rather than just correlational.  To reiterate, in unmedicated PD patients, DS 
functions and neural activity are depressed, whereas VS operations and activation levels 
are spared.  Dopaminergic therapy remediates DS dopamine depletion and improves 
function (R. Cools, 2006; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011).  Additionally, exogenous 
dopamine distributes non-selectively, increasing dopamine even to the relatively-replete 
VS.  As a consequence, dopaminergic medications have been shown to attenuate neural 
activity and worsen functions performed by VTA-innervated brain regions, presumably 
due to dopamine overdose (R. Cools, 2006).  In this way, comparing the OFF and ON 
states, a double dissociation in terms of behaviour and neural activity is observed 
comparing DS and VS.  In OCD, we will test for the first time both learning and decision 
making in the same patients within the same scanning session to truly understand deficits 
in OCD.  Finally, we will modify this task by pre-training participants on stimulus-response 
association learning to investigate DS’s role in late-stage learning to the point of 
automaticity.   
1.9  Hypotheses 
We hypothesize that DS does not mediate stimulus-response learning—either goal-directed 
or habit learning—but rather underlies selections among response options, referred to as 
decision making.  VS, on the other hand, mediates feedback-based stimulus-response 
learning but only in the early stages.  In three experiments, DS and VS will be probed using 
similar stimulus-response paradigms in patients with PD on and off dopaminergic therapy, 
in patients with OCD, and in healthy, young controls testing later-staged stimulus-response 
learning. 
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Chapter 2 explored the role of DS and VS in goal-directed, stimulus-response learning in 
patients with PD tested on and off dopaminergic medication.  To review, functions 
mediated by DS have been shown consistently to be impaired off dopamine replacement 
therapy, and improved with medication.  However, functions mediated by VTA-innervated 
regions, such as VS, are expected to be impaired on medication due to dopamine overdose, 
and normal off medication.  Much of the data supporting this hypothesis is behavioural 
only with speculation that these are the brain regions that are affected by dopamine.  We 
have a task that contrasts, in contiguous experimental conditions, functions of DS and of 
VTA-innervated brain regions.  Contrasting PD patients on and off dopamine replacement 
therapy, while brain activity is estimated with fMRI, we predict a double dissociation of 
function that can be related to neural activity in different brain regions because we are 
pairing tests of PD patients off and on dopaminergic therapy with fMRI.  This method 
allows us to directly test whether behavioural effects arise because of changes in activity 
in brain regions that differ in their dopaminergic innervation depending on whether the 
patient is off or on dopaminergic therapy.  For example, this will allow us to fully refute 
DS’s role in learning if we see dopaminergic therapy worsens learning efficiency but 
simultaneously increases DS activation in fMRI.  In contrast we expect that when learning 
slope declines, VS activity will parallel this.  These predicted double dissociations in terms 
of behaviour and brain function would be compelling evidence that DS is a decision 
making brain region rather than a region that mediates learning.  Further, this paradigm 
allows for fully testing the dopamine overdose hypothesis.  The effect of exogenous 
dopamine on VTA-innervated regions will be directly investigated.  We hypothesized that 
decision making would be impaired and correspondingly activity in DS would be 
diminished at baseline and improved with dopaminergic medication in PD patients.  In 
contrast, we predict that stimulus-response learning and activity in VS will be near-normal 
at baseline and impaired with dopaminergic therapy.  In this way, we are using PD as a 
model to answer basic science questions about the neural substrates of cognitive functions.  
With this approach, we can separately investigate the role of DS and VS in decision making 
and stimulus-response learning by modulating the level of dopamine in the brain regions 
that we expect to mediate these separate functions, causing changes in the functioning and 
fMRI signal in these regions.  Understanding DS- and VS-mediated cognitive functions 
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additionally informs cognitive symptoms present in patients with PD, and has implications 
for treatment.  Currently, dopaminergic therapy is titrated to relieve DS-mediated motor 
symptoms, without taking into account the potential overdose of VTA-innervated regions.  
Ultimately, this greater understanding will prompt clinicians to formulate medication 
strategies that consider both motor and cognitive symptoms, as well as individual patient 
needs.  This further provides a critical test for the prevalent dopamine overdose hypothesis 
discussed in section 1.6.1.4.  
Chapter 3 investigated the cognition related to changes in DS and VS activation in patients 
with OCD using a similar version of the stimulus-response learning task previously applied 
in healthy young controls (Hiebert et al., 2014) and in PD patients (Chapter 2 of this current 
thesis).  Though the literature focusing specifically on the separate functions of VS and DS 
in OCD is relatively sparse, there is some evidence that in OCD VS is hyperactive and DS 
is hypoactive at baseline.  During striatal-mediated tasks however, DS and VS are both 
impaired, with respect to behaviour and activity (Remijnse et al., 2006; Vriend et al., 2013).  
We speculate that these baseline levels of VS and DS activity adversely impact VS- and 
DS-mediated cognitive functions, such as reward learning (Remijnse et al., 2006) and 
cognitive flexibility (Vriend et al., 2013), respectively.  We hypothesize that OCD patients 
will exhibit stimulus-response learning and decision making impairments and that these 
effects will correlate with VS and DS task-related activation respectively.  The stimulus-
response task allows for simultaneous investigation of DS and VS function within-subject.  
Within-subject, and within the same testing session is essential in patient populations like 
PD and OCD, where severity of symptoms and medication levels can fluctuate from day 
to day, and even during different time points throughout the day that can impact 
behavioural performance and brain activity compared to healthy controls.  Using our 
paradigm removes these confounds.  The overarching aim of this study was to further our 
investigations of DS- and VS-mediated cognitive functions and to better understand how 
various disease states impact them.  Further, this research has the potential to clarify the 
cognitive deficits that arise in OCD and how they might be better treated, based on an 
improved understanding of their neural basis.  
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Chapter 4 investigated the role of DS in late-stage, stimulus-response, so-called habit 
learning in the animal literature.  Young, healthy participants learned to associate abstract 
images with right or left button presses explicitly before strengthening these associations 
through stimulus-response trials with (Session 1) and without (Session 2) feedback.  In 
Session 1, trials were divided into response-selection and feedback events to separately 
assess decision versus learning processes.  In Session 2, trials consisted only of response-
selection with no feedback.  Session 3 evaluated the degree to which stimulus-response 
associations had achieved automaticity using a location Stroop task.  We hypothesized that 
DS-dependent decision making occurs specifically when deliberation is required.  We 
hypothesized that DS would only be recruited when associations still required some 
consideration before responding.  Critically, we expected that DS activation would cease 
before stimulus-response automaticity arose, which would refute the role of DS in this 
process.  The overarching aim of this investigation was to address the controversy that DS 
mediates late-stage stimulus-response automaticity versus decision making.      
1.10 Objectives  
The objectives of the studies were to: 
1. Delineate the function of DS and VS in early goal-directed, and late stimulus-
response association learning 
2. Determine how dopaminergic therapy affects behavioural performance and brain 
activity in stimulus-response learning and decision making in PD. 
3. Directly test the dopamine overdose hypothesis within-subject, assessing different 
brain regions at the same time, within the same task. 
4. Investigate how different patterns of DS and VS activity in OCD relate to 
decision making and stimulus-response learning functions, as well as how they 
might mediate different symptoms of this disorder.  
 
 
42 
 
1.11 References 
Aarts, E., Nusselein, A. A., Smittenaar, P., Helmich, R. C., Bloem, B. R., & Cools, R. 
(2014). Greater striatal responses to medication in Parkinsons disease are 
associated with better task-switching but worse reward performance. 
Neuropsychologia, 62, 390-397. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.05.023 
Aarts, E., Roelofs, A., Franke, B., Rijpkema, M., Fernandez, G., Helmich, R. C., & 
Cools, R. (2010). Striatal dopamine mediates the interface between motivational 
and cognitive control in humans: evidence from genetic imaging. 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(9), 1943-1951. doi:10.1038/npp.2010.68 
Adams, C. M., & Dickinson, A. (1981). Instrumental Responding following Reinforcer 
Devaluation. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section B, 
33(2b), 109-121. doi:10.1080/14640748108400816 
Agnoli, L., & Carli, M. (2011). Synergistic interaction of dopamine D(1) and glutamate 
N-methyl-D-aspartate receptors in the rat dorsal striatum controls attention. 
Neuroscience, 185, 39-49. doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2011.04.044 
Alexander, G. E., & DeLong, M. R. (1985). Microstimulation of the primate neostriatum. 
II. Somatotopic organization of striatal microexcitable zones and their relation to 
neuronal response properties. J Neurophysiol, 53(6), 1417-1430. 
doi:10.1152/jn.1985.53.6.1417 
Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R., & Strick, P. L. (1986). Parallel Organization of 
Functionally Segregated Circuits Linking Basal Ganglia and Cortex. Annu Rev 
Neurosci, 9(1), 357-381. doi:10.1146/annurev.ne.09.030186.002041 
Ali, N., Green, D. W., Kherif, F., Devlin, J. T., & Price, C. J. (2010). The Role of the Left 
Head of Caudate in Suppressing Irrelevant Words. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 22(10), 2369-2386.  
Angeles Fernandez-Gil, M., Palacios-Bote, R., Leo-Barahona, M., & Mora-Encinas, J. P. 
(2010). Anatomy of the brainstem: a gaze into the stem of life. Semin Ultrasound 
CT MR, 31(3), 196-219. doi:10.1053/j.sult.2010.03.006 
Argyelan, M., Carbon, M., Ghilardi, M. F., Feigin, A., Mattis, P., Tang, C., . . . Eidelberg, 
D. (2008). Dopaminergic Suppression of Brain Deactivation Responses during 
Sequence Learning. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(42), 10687-10695. 
doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2933-08.2008 
Arnone, D., McIntosh, A. M., Ebmeier, K. P., Munafo, M. R., & Anderson, I. M. (2012). 
Magnetic resonance imaging studies in unipolar depression: systematic review 
and meta-regression analyses. Eur Neuropsychopharmacol, 22(1), 1-16. 
doi:10.1016/j.euroneuro.2011.05.003 
43 
 
Ashby, F. G. (1998). A neuropsychological theory of multiple systems in category 
learning. Psychol Rev, 105(3), 442-481.  
Ashby, F. G., Ennis, J. M., & Spiering, B. J. (2007). A neurobiological theory of 
automaticity in perceptual categorization. Psychol Rev, 114(3), 632-656. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.114.3.632 
Atallah, H. E., Lopez-Paniagua, D., Rudy, J. W., & O'Reilly, R. C. (2007). Separate 
neural substrates for skill learning and performance in the ventral and dorsal 
striatum. Nat Neurosci, 10(1), 126-131. doi:10.1038/nn1817 
Atmaca, M. (2016). Treatment-refractory obsessive compulsive disorder. Prog 
Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry, 70, 127-133. 
doi:10.1016/j.pnpbp.2015.12.004 
Balleine, B. W., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2010). Human and rodent homologies in action 
control: corticostriatal determinants of goal-directed and habitual action. 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(1), 48-69. doi:10.1038/npp.2009.131 
Bano, D., Zanetti, F., Mende, Y., & Nicotera, P. (2011). Neurodegenerative processes in 
Huntington's disease. Cell Death Dis, 2, e228. doi:10.1038/cddis.2011.112 
Barch, D. M., & Ceaser, A. (2012). Cognition in schizophrenia: core psychological and 
neural mechanisms. Trends Cogn Sci, 16(1), 27-34. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.015 
Barone, P., Antonini, A., Colosimo, C., Marconi, R., Morgante, L., Avarello, T. P., . . . 
group, P. s. (2009). The PRIAMO study: A multicenter assessment of nonmotor 
symptoms and their impact on quality of life in Parkinson's disease. Mov Disord, 
24(11), 1641-1649. doi:10.1002/mds.22643 
Baxter, L. R., Jr, Phelps, M. E., Mazziotta, J. C., Guze, B. H., Schwartz, J. M., & Selin, 
C. E. (1987). Local cerebral glucose metabolic rates in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder: A comparison with rates in unipolar depression and in normal controls. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 44(3), 211-218. 
doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1987.01800150017003 
Benke, T., Delazer, M., Bartha, L., & Auer, A. (2003). Basal ganglia lesions and the 
theory of fronto-subcortical loops: neuropsychological findings in two patients 
with left caudate lesions. Neurocase, 9(1), 70-85. doi:10.1076/neur.9.1.70.14374 
Boettiger, C. A., & D'Esposito, M. (2005). Frontal networks for learning and executing 
arbitrary stimulus-response associations. J Neurosci, 25(10), 2723-2732. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3697-04.2005 
Bohnen, N. I., Muller, M. L., Kotagal, V., Koeppe, R. A., Kilbourn, M. R., Gilman, S., . . 
. Frey, K. A. (2012). Heterogeneity of cholinergic denervation in Parkinson's 
44 
 
disease without dementia. J Cereb Blood Flow Metab, 32(8), 1609-1617. 
doi:10.1038/jcbfm.2012.60 
Bokor, G., & Anderson, P. D. (2014). Obsessive-compulsive disorder. J Pharm Pract, 
27(2), 116-130. doi:10.1177/0897190014521996 
Bonelli, R. M., & Cummings, J. L. (2007). Frontal-subcortical circuitry and behavior. 
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 9(2), 141-151.  
Boyd, L. A., & Winstein, C. J. (2004). Providing Explicit Information Disrupts Implicit 
Motor Learning After Basal Ganglia Stroke. Learn Mem, 11(4), 388-396. 
doi:10.1101/lm.80104 
Brovelli, A., Laksiri, N., Nazarian, B., Meunier, M., & Boussaoud, D. (2008). 
Understanding the neural computations of arbitrary visuomotor learning through 
fMRI and associative learning theory. Cereb Cortex, 18(7), 1485-1495. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhm198 
Burton, A. C., Nakamura, K., & Roesch, M. R. (2015). From ventral-medial to dorsal-
lateral striatum: neural correlates of reward-guided decision-making. Neurobiol 
Learn Mem, 117, 51-59. doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2014.05.003 
Calabresi, P., Picconi, B., Parnetti, L., & Di Filippo, M. (2006). A convergent model for 
cognitive dysfunctions in Parkinson's disease: the critical dopamine–acetylcholine 
synaptic balance. The Lancet Neurology, 5(11), 974-983. doi:10.1016/s1474-
4422(06)70600-7 
Cameron, I. G., Watanabe, M., Pari, G., & Munoz, D. P. (2010). Executive impairment in 
Parkinson's disease: response automaticity and task switching. Neuropsychologia, 
48(7), 1948-1957. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.03.015 
Chamberlain, S. R., Blackwell, A. D., Fineberg, N. A., Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, B. J. 
(2005). The neuropsychology of obsessive compulsive disorder: the importance of 
failures in cognitive and behavioural inhibition as candidate endophenotypic 
markers. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 29(3), 399-419. 
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2004.11.006 
Chiu, Y. C., Jiang, J., & Egner, T. (2017). The Caudate Nucleus Mediates Learning of 
Stimulus-Control State Associations. J Neurosci, 37(4), 1028-1038. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0778-16.2017 
Choi, E. Y., Yeo, B. T. T., & Buckner, R. L. (2012). The organization of the human 
striatum estimated by intrinsic functional connectivity. J Neurophysiol, 108(8), 
2242-2263.  
Chowdhury, R., Lambert, C., Dolan, R. J., & Duzel, E. (2013). Parcellation of the human 
substantia nigra based on anatomical connectivity to the striatum. Neuroimage, 
81, 191-198. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.05.043 
45 
 
Clark, L., & Sahakian, B. J. (2008). Cognitive neuroscience and brain imaging in bipolar 
disorder. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 10(2).  
Coderre, E., & van Heuven, W. (2013). Modulations of the executive control network by 
stimulus onset asynchrony in a Stroop task. BMC Neuroscience, 14, 79.  
Cohen, M. X., & Frank, M. J. (2009). Neurocomputational models of basal ganglia 
function in learning, memory and choice. Behav Brain Res, 199(1), 141-156. 
doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2008.09.029 
Cools, R. (2006). Dopaminergic modulation of cognitive function-implications for L-
DOPA treatment in Parkinson's disease. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 30(1), 1-23. 
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.03.024 
Cools, R., Barker, R. A., Sahakian, B. J., & Robbons, T. W. (2001). Mechanisms of 
cognitive flexibility in Parkinson's disease. Brain, 124, 2503-2512.  
Cools, R., Clark, L., Owen, A. M., & Robbins, T. W. (2002). Defining the Neural 
Mechanisms of Probabilistic Reversal Learning Using Event-Related Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging. The Journal of Neuroscience, 22(11), 4563-4567.  
Cools, R., & D'Esposito, M. (2011). Inverted-U-shaped dopamine actions on human 
working memory and cognitive control. Biol Psychiatry, 69(12), e113-125. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.03.028 
Cools, R., Lewis, S. J., Clark, L., Barker, R. A., & Robbins, T. W. (2007). L-DOPA 
disrupts activity in the nucleus accumbens during reversal learning in Parkinson's 
disease. Neuropsychopharmacology, 32(1), 180-189. doi:10.1038/sj.npp.1301153 
Daniel, R., Wagner, G., Koch, K., Reichenbach, J. R., Sauer, H., & Schlösser, R. G. M. 
(2010). Assessing the Neural Basis of Uncertainty in Perceptual Category 
Learning through Varying Levels of Distortion. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 23(7), 1781-1793. doi:10.1162/jocn.2010.21541 
Dauer, W., & Przedborski, S. (2003). Parkinson's Disease: Mechanisms and Models. 
Neuron, 39(6), 889-909. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00568-3 
Daw, N. D., & Doya, K. (2006). The computational neurobiology of learning and reward. 
Curr Opin Neurobiol, 16(2), 199-204. doi:10.1016/j.conb.2006.03.006 
de Vries, F. E., de Wit, S. J., van den Heuvel, O. A., Veltman, D. J., Cath, D. C., van 
Balkom, A., & van der Werf, Y. D. (2017). Cognitive control networks in OCD: 
A resting-state connectivity study in unmedicated patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder and their unaffected relatives. World J Biol Psychiatry, 1-13. 
doi:10.1080/15622975.2017.1353132 
46 
 
de Wit, S., Barker, R., Dickinson, A., & Cools, R. (2011). Habitual versus Goal-directed 
Action Control in Parkinson's Disease. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(5), 
1218-1229.  
Del Casale, A., Kotzalidis, G. D., Rapinesi, C., Serata, D., Ambrosi, E., Simonetti, A., . . . 
Girardi, P. (2011). Functional neuroimaging in obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Neuropsychobiology, 64(2), 61-85. doi:10.1159/000325223 
Delgado, M. R., Miller, M. M., Inati, S., & Phelps, E. A. (2005). An fMRI study of 
reward-related probability learning. Neuroimage, 24(3), 862-873. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.10.002 
Di, X., & Biswal, B. B. (2014). Identifying the default mode network structure using 
dynamic causal modeling on resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
Neuroimage, 86, 53-59. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.07.071 
Diao, J., Burre, J., Vivona, S., Cipriano, D. J., Sharma, M., Kyoung, M., . . . Brunger, A. 
T. (2013). Native alpha-synuclein induces clustering of synaptic-vesicle mimics 
via binding to phospholipids and synaptobrevin-2/VAMP2. Elife, 2, e00592. 
doi:10.7554/eLife.00592 
Difiglia, M., Pasik, T., & Pasik, P. (1978). A Golgi study of afferent fibers in the 
neostriatum of monkeys. (0006-8993 (Print)).  
Dirnberger, G., & Jahanshahi, M. (2013). Executive dysfunction in Parkinson's disease: a 
review. J Neuropsychol, 7(2), 193-224. doi:10.1111/jnp.12028 
Djamshidian, A., O'Sullivan, S. S., Lees, A., & Averbeck, B. B. (2011). Stroop test 
performance in impulsive and non impulsive patients with Parkinson's disease. 
Parkinsonism Relat Disord, 17(3), 212-214. doi:10.1016/j.parkreldis.2010.12.014 
Dobryakova, E., & Tricomi, E. (2013). Basal ganglia engagement during feedback 
processing after a substantial delay. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci. 
doi:10.3758/s13415-013-0182-6 
Everitt, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2005). Neural systems of reinforcement for drug 
addiction: from actions to habits to compulsion. Nat Neurosci, 8(11), 1481-1489. 
doi:10.1038/nn1579 
Feekes, J. A., & Cassell, M. D. (2006). The vascular supply of the functional 
compartments of the human striatum. Brain, 129(Pt 8), 2189-2201. 
doi:10.1093/brain/awl158 
Feigin, A., Ghilardi, M. F., Carbon, M., Edwards, C., Fukuda, M. D., Dhawan, V., . . . 
Eidelberg, D. (2003). Effects of levodopa on motor sequence learning in 
Parkinson's disease. Neurology, 60, 1744-1749.  
47 
 
Fera, F., Nicoletti, G., Cerasa, A., Romeo, N., Gallo, O., Gioia, M. C., . . . Quattrone, A. 
(2007). Dopaminergic modulation of cognitive interference after pharmacological 
washout in Parkinson's disease. Brain Res Bull, 74(1-3), 75-83. 
doi:10.1016/j.brainresbull.2007.05.009 
Figee, M., Vink, M., de Geus, F., Vulink, N., Veltman, D. J., Westenberg, H., & Denys, 
D. (2011). Dysfunctional reward circuitry in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biol 
Psychiatry, 69(9), 867-874. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.12.003 
Foerde, K., Knowlton, B. J., & Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Modulation of competing memory 
systems by distraction. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 103(31), 11778-11783. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0602659103 
G E Alexander, M R DeLong, a., & Strick, P. L. (1986). Parallel Organization of 
Functionally Segregated Circuits Linking Basal Ganglia and Cortex. Annu Rev 
Neurosci, 9(1), 357-381. doi:doi:10.1146/annurev.ne.09.030186.002041 
Garrison, J., Erdeniz, B., & Done, J. (2013). Prediction error in reinforcement learning: a 
meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 37(7), 1297-
1310. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.03.023 
Ghilardi, M. F., Feigin, A. S., Battaglia, F., Silvestri, G., Mattis, P., Eidelberg, D., & Di 
Rocco, A. (2007). L-Dopa infusion does not improve explicit sequence learning in 
Parkinson's disease. Parkinsonism Relat Disord, 13(3), 146-151. 
doi:10.1016/j.parkreldis.2006.08.006 
Glover, G. H. (2011). Overview of functional magnetic resonance imaging. Neurosurg 
Clin N Am, 22(2), 133-139, vii. doi:10.1016/j.nec.2010.11.001 
Gonzales, K. K., & Smith, Y. (2015). Cholinergic interneurons in the dorsal and ventral 
striatum: anatomical and functional considerations in normal and diseased 
conditions. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1349, 1-45. doi:10.1111/nyas.12762 
Gotham, A. M., Brown, R. G., & Marsden, C. D. (1988). 'Frontal' Cognitive Function in 
Patients with Parkinson's Disease 'On' and 'Off' Levodopa. Brain, 111, 299-321.  
Grahn, J. A., Parkinson, J. A., & Owen, A. M. (2008). The cognitive functions of the 
caudate nucleus. Prog Neurobiol, 86(3), 141-155. 
doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2008.09.004 
Grahn, J. A., Parkinson, J. A., & Owen, A. M. (2009). The role of the basal ganglia in 
learning and memory: neuropsychological studies. Behav Brain Res, 199(1), 53-
60. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2008.11.020 
Gursel, D. A., Avram, M., Sorg, C., Brandl, F., & Koch, K. (2018). Frontoparietal areas 
link impairments of large-scale intrinsic brain networks with aberrant fronto-
striatal interactions in OCD: a meta-analysis of resting-state functional 
48 
 
connectivity. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 87, 151-160. 
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.01.016 
Haber, S. N. (2014). The place of dopamine in the cortico-basal ganglia circuit. 
Neuroscience, 282C, 248-257. doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2014.10.008 
Haber, S. N., & Knutson, B. (2010). The reward circuit: linking primate anatomy and 
human imaging. Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(1), 4-26. 
doi:10.1038/npp.2009.129 
Hart, G., Leung, B. K., & Balleine, B. W. (2013). Dorsal and ventral streams: The 
distinct role of striatal subregions in the acquisition and performance of goal-
directed actions. Neurobiol Learn Mem. doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2013.11.003 
Helie, S., Roeder, J. L., & Ashby, F. G. (2010). Evidence for cortical automaticity in rule-
based categorization. J Neurosci, 30(42), 14225-14234. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2393-10.2010 
Hernandez, L. F., Redgrave, P., & Obeso, J. A. (2015). Habitual behavior and dopamine 
cell vulnerability in Parkinson disease. Front Neuroanat, 9, 99. 
doi:10.3389/fnana.2015.00099 
Hewitt, W. (1961). The development of the human internal capsule and lentiform 
nucleus. Journal of Anatomy, 95(Pt 2), 191-199.  
Hiebert, N. M., Owen, A. M., Seergobin, K. N., & MacDonald, P. A. (2017). Dorsal 
striatum mediates deliberate decision making, not late-stage, stimulus-response 
learning. Hum Brain Mapp. doi:10.1002/hbm.23817 
Hiebert, N. M., Seergobin, K. N., Vo, A., Ganjavi, H., & MacDonald, P. A. (2014). 
Dopaminergic therapy affects learning and impulsivity in Parkinson's disease. 
Annals of Clinical and Translational Neurology, 1(10), 883-843. 
doi:10.1002/acn3.128 
Hiebert, N. M., Vo, A., Hampshire, A., Owen, A. M., Seergobin, K. N., & MacDonald, P. 
A. (2014). Striatum in stimulus-response learning via feedback and in decision 
making. Neuroimage, 101, 448-457. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.07.013 
Hirschtritt, M. E., Bloch, M. H., & Mathews, C. A. (2017). Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder: Advances in Diagnosis and Treatment. JAMA, 317(13), 1358-1367. 
doi:10.1001/jama.2017.2200 
Ikemoto, S., & Panksepp, J. (1999). The role of nucleus accumbens dopamine in 
motivated behavior: a unifying interpretation with special reference to reward-
seeking. Brain Research Reviews, 31(1), 6-41. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-
0173(99)00023-5 
49 
 
Janssen, R. J., Jylanki, P., Kessels, R. P., & van Gerven, M. A. (2015). Probabilistic 
model-based functional parcellation reveals a robust, fine-grained subdivision of 
the striatum. Neuroimage, 119, 398-405. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.06.084 
Jellinger, K. A. (2012). Neuropathology of sporadic Parkinson's disease: evaluation and 
changes of concepts. Mov Disord, 27(1), 8-30. doi:10.1002/mds.23795 
Jessup, R. K., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2011). Human dorsal striatal activity during choice 
discriminates reinforcement learning behavior from the gambler's fallacy. J 
Neurosci, 31(17), 6296-6304. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6421-10.2011 
Jung, W. H., Jang, J. H., Park, J. W., Kim, E., Goo, E. H., Im, O. S., & Kwon, J. S. 
(2014). Unravelling the intrinsic functional organization of the human striatum: a 
parcellation and connectivity study based on resting-state FMRI. PLoS One, 9(9), 
e106768. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106768 
Jung, W. H., Kang, D. H., Han, J. Y., Jang, J. H., Gu, B. M., Choi, J. S., . . . Kwon, J. S. 
(2011). Aberrant ventral striatal responses during incentive processing in 
unmedicated patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Acta Psychiatr Scand, 
123(5), 376-386. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.2010.01659.x 
Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., Jessell, T. M., Siegelbaum, S. A., & Hudspeth, A. J. 
(2013). Principles of neural science (Fifth ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill 
Medical. 
Kimura, M. (1992). Behavioral modulation of sensory responses of primate putamen 
neurons. Brain Res, 578(1), 204-214. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0006-
8993(92)90249-9 
Kimura, M., Rajkowski, J., & Evarts, E. (1984). Tonically discharging putamen neurons 
exhibit set-dependent responses. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 81(15), 4998-5001.  
Kincaid, A. E., Zheng, T., & Wilson, C. J. (1998). Connectivity and Convergence of 
Single Corticostriatal Axons. The Journal of Neuroscience, 18(12), 4722-4731.  
Kish, S. J., Shannak, K., & Hornykiewicz, O. (1988). Uneven Pattern of Dopamine Loss 
in the Striatum of Patients with Idiopathic Parkinson's Disease. New England 
Journal of Medicine, 318, 876-880.  
Knutson, B., & Cooper, J. C. (2005). Functional magnetic resonance imaging of reward 
prediction. Current Opinion in Neurology, 18, 411-417.  
Knutson, B., Fong, G. W., Adams, C. M., Varner, J. L., & Hommer, D. (2001). 
Dissociation of reward anticipation and outcome with event-related fMRI. Brain 
Imaging, 12(17), 3683-3687.  
Koob, G. F., Balcom, G. J., G.J., B., Meyerhoff, J. L., & Meyerhoff, J. L. (1975). 
Dopamine and norepinephrine levels in the nucleus accumbens, olfactory tubercle 
50 
 
and corpus striatum following lesions in the ventral tegmentalarea. Brain Res, 
94(0006-8993 (Print)).  
Kravitz, A. V., Tye, L. D., & Kreitzer, A. C. (2012). Distinct roles for direct and indirect 
pathway striatal neurons in reinforcement. Nat Neurosci, 15(6), 816-818. 
doi:10.1038/nn.3100 
Künzle, H. (1975). Bilateral projections from precentral motor cortex to the putamen and 
other parts of the basal ganglia. An autoradiographic study inMacaca fascicularis. 
Brain Res, 88(2), 195-209. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/0006-8993(75)90384-4 
Kwak, Y., Müller, M. L. T. M., Bohnen, N. I., Dayalu, P., & Seidler, R. D. (2012). l-
DOPA changes ventral striatum recruitment during motor sequence learning in 
Parkinson's disease. Behav Brain Res, 230(1), 116-124. 
doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2012.02.006 
Larson, M. J., Clayson, P. E., Primosch, M., Leyton, M., & Steffensen, S. C. (2015). The 
Effects of Acute Dopamine Precursor Depletion on the Cognitive Control 
Functions of Performance Monitoring and Conflict Processing: An Event-Related 
Potential (ERP) Study. PLoS One, 10(10), e0140770. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140770 
Lau, B., & Glimcher, P. W. (2007). Action and Outcome Encoding in the Primate 
Caudate Nucleus. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27(52), 14502.  
Lau, B., & Glimcher, P. W. (2008). Value representations in the primate striatum during 
matching behavior. Neuron, 58(3), 451-463. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.02.021 
Le Jeune, F., Verin, M., N'Diaye, K., Drapier, D., Leray, E., Du Montcel, S. T., . . . 
French Stimulation dans le trouble obsessionnel compulsif study, g. (2010). 
Decrease of prefrontal metabolism after subthalamic stimulation in obsessive-
compulsive disorder: a positron emission tomography study. Biol Psychiatry, 
68(11), 1016-1022. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.06.033 
Leh, S. E., Chakravarty, M. M., & Ptito, A. (2008). The connectivity of the human 
pulvinar: a diffusion tensor imaging tractography study. Int J Biomed Imaging, 
2008, 1-5. doi:10.1155/2008/789539 
Liljeholm, M., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2012). Contributions of the striatum to learning, 
motivation, and performance: an associative account. Trends Cogn Sci, 16(9), 
467-475. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.07.007 
MacDonald, A. A., Seergobin, K. N., Tamjeedi, R., Owen, A. M., Provost, J.-S., Monchi, 
O., . . . MacDonald, P. A. (2014). Examining dorsal striatum in cognitive effort 
using Parkinson's disease and fMRI. Annals of Clinical and Translational 
Neurology, 1(6), 390-400. doi:10.1002/acn3.62 
51 
 
MacDonald, P. A., MacDonald, A. A., Seergobin, K. N., Tamjeedi, R., Ganjavi, H., 
Provost, J. S., & Monchi, O. (2011). The effect of dopamine therapy on ventral 
and dorsal striatum-mediated cognition in Parkinson's disease: support from 
functional MRI. Brain, 134(Pt 5), 1447-1463. doi:10.1093/brain/awr075 
MacDonald, P. A., & Monchi, O. (2011). Differential effects of dopaminergic therapies 
on dorsal and ventral striatum in Parkinson's disease: implications for cognitive 
function. Parkinsons Dis, 2011, 1-18. doi:10.4061/2011/572743 
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a Century of Research on the Stroop Effect: An Integrative 
Review. Psychological Bulletin, 109(2), 163-203. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.109.2.163 
MacLeod, C. M., & Dunbar, K. (1988). Training and Stroop-Like Interference: Evidence 
for a Continuum of Automaticity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 14(1), 126-135.  
MacLeod, C. M., & MacDonald, P. A. (2000). Interdimensional interference in the 
Stroop effect: uncovering the cognitive and neural anatomy of attention. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 4(10), 383-391.  
Macpherson, T., Morita, M., & Hikida, T. (2014). Striatal direct and indirect pathways 
control decision-making behavior. Front Psychol, 5, 1301. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01301 
Mataix-Cols, D., Wooderson, S., Lawrence, N., Brammer, M. J., Speckens, A., & 
Phillips, M. L. (2004). DIstinct neural correlates of washing, checking, and 
hoarding symptomdimensions in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 61(6), 564-576. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.61.6.564 
Mattay, V. S., Tessitore, A., Callicott, J. H., Bertolino, A., Goldberg, T. E., Chase, T. N., 
. . . Weinberger, D. R. (2002). Dopaminergic modulation of cortical function in 
patients with Parkinson's disease. Ann Neurol, 51(2), 156-164.  
Monchi, O., Petrides, M., Petre, V., Worsley, K., & Dagher, A. (2001). Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Revisited: Distinct Neural Circuits Participating in Different Stages of the 
Task Identified by Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 21(19), 7733-7741.  
Myers, C. E., Shohamy, D., Gluck, M. A., Grossman, S., Kluger, A., Ferris, S., . . . 
Schwartz, R. (2003). Dissociating Hippocampal versus Basal Ganglia 
Contributions to Learning and Transfer. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
15(2), 185-193. doi:10.1162/089892903321208123 
Nakao, T., Nakagawa, A., Yoshiura, T., Nakatani, E., Nabeyama, M., Yoshizato, C., . . . 
Kawamoto, M. (2005). A functional MRI comparison of patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder and normal controls during a Chinese character Stroop task. 
Psychiatry Res, 139(2), 101-114. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2004.12.004 
52 
 
Newton, R., & Price, D. D. (1975). Modulation of cortical and pyramidal tract induced 
motor responses by electrical stimulation of the basal ganglia. Brain Res, 
85(0006-8993 (Print)). doi:D - NASA: 75091675 EDAT- 1975/03/07 00:00 
MHDA- 1975/03/07 00:01 CRDT- 1975/03/07 00:00 PHST- 1975/03/07 00:00 
[pubmed] PHST- 1975/03/07 00:01 [medline] PHST- 1975/03/07 00:00 [entrez] 
AID - 0006-8993(75)90816-1 [pii] PST - ppublish 
Nielen, M. M., den Boer, J. A., & Smid, H. G. (2009). Patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder are impaired in associative learning based on external 
feedback. Psychol Med, 39(9), 1519-1526. doi:10.1017/S0033291709005297 
O'Doherty, J., Dayan, P., Schultz, J., Deichmann, R., Friston, K., & Dolan, R. J. (2004). 
Dissociable roles of ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental conditioning. 
Science, 304(5669), 452-454. doi:10.1126/science.1094285 
O'Doherty, J. P. (2004). Reward representations and reward-related learning in the human 
brain: insights from neuroimaging. Curr Opin Neurobiol, 14(6), 769-776. 
doi:10.1016/j.conb.2004.10.016 
O'Neill, J., & Feusner, J. D. (2015). Cognitive-behavioral therapy for obsessive-
compulsive disorder: access to treatment, prediction of long-term outcome with 
neuroimaging. Psychol Res Behav Manag, 8, 211-223. 
doi:10.2147/PRBM.S75106 
Ohira, H., Ichikawa, N., Nomura, M., Isowa, T., Kimura, K., Kanayama, N., . . . Yamada, 
J. (2010). Brain and autonomic association accompanying stochastic decision-
making. Neuroimage, 49(1), 1024-1037. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.07.060 
Park, H. R., Kim, I. H., Kang, H., Lee, D. S., Kim, B. N., Kim, D. G., & Paek, S. H. 
(2017). Nucleus accumbens deep brain stimulation for a patient with self-
injurious behavior and autism spectrum disorder: functional and structural 
changes of the brain: report of a case and review of literature. Acta Neurochir 
(Wien), 159(1), 137-143. doi:10.1007/s00701-016-3002-2 
Perani, D., Colombo, C., Bressi, S., Bonfanti, A., Grassi, F., Scarone, S., . . . Fazio, F. 
(1995). [18F]FDG PET study in obsessive-compulsive disorder. A 
clinical/metabolic correlation study after treatment. Br J Psychiatry, 166(2), 244-
250.  
Pereira, J. B., Ibarretxe-Bilbao, N., Marti, M. J., Compta, Y., Junque, C., Bargallo, N., & 
Tolosa, E. (2012). Assessment of cortical degeneration in patients with 
Parkinson's disease by voxel-based morphometry, cortical folding, and cortical 
thickness. Hum Brain Mapp, 33(11), 2521-2534. doi:10.1002/hbm.21378 
Piras, F., Piras, F., Chiapponi, C., Girardi, P., Caltagirone, C., & Spalletta, G. (2015). 
Widespread structural brain changes in OCD: a systematic review of voxel-based 
morphometry studies. Cortex, 62, 89-108. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2013.01.016 
53 
 
Poldrack, R. A., Prabhakaran, V., Seger, C. A., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1999). Striatal 
Activation During Acquisition of a Cognitive Skill. Neuropsychology, 13(4), 564-
574.  
Poldrack, R. A., Sabb, F. W., Foerde, K., Tom, S. M., Asarnow, R. F., Bookheimer, S. 
Y., & Knowlton, B. J. (2005). The neural correlates of motor skill automaticity. J 
Neurosci, 25(22), 5356-5364. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3880-04.2005 
Postuma, R. B., Berg, D., Stern, M., Poewe, W., Olanow, C. W., Oertel, W., . . . Deuschl, 
G. (2015). MDS clinical diagnostic criteria for Parkinson's disease. Mov Disord, 
30(12), 1591-1601. doi:10.1002/mds.26424 
Postuma, R. B., & Dagher, A. (2006). Basal ganglia functional connectivity based on a 
meta-analysis of 126 positron emission tomography and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging publications. Cereb Cortex, 16(10), 1508-1521. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhj088 
Pujol, J., Soriano-Mas, C., Alonso, P., & et al. (2004). Mapping structural brain 
alterations in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
61(7), 720-730. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.61.7.720 
Rangel, A., Camerer, C., & Montague, P. R. (2008). A framework for studying the 
neurobiology of value-based decision making. Nat Rev Neurosci, 9(7), 545-556. 
doi:10.1038/nrn2357 
Rauch, S. L. (1997). Neuroimaging and neuropsychology of the striatum. Bridging basic 
science and clinical practice. The Psychiatric clinics of North America, 20(4), 
741-768.  
Rauch, S. L., Jenike, M. A., Alpert, N. M., & et al. (1994). Regional cerebral blood flow 
measured during symptom provocation in obsessive-compulsive disorder using 
oxygen 15—labeled carbon dioxide and positron emission tomography. Archives 
of General Psychiatry, 51(1), 62-70. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1994.03950010062008 
Ray, N. J., & Strafella, A. P. (2012). The neurobiology and neural circuitry of cognitive 
changes in Parkinson's disease revealed by functional neuroimaging. Mov Disord, 
27(12), 1484-1492. doi:10.1002/mds.25173 
Redgrave, P., & Gurney, K. (2006). The short-latency dopamine signal: a role in 
discovering novel actions? Nature Reviews Neuroscience(1471-003X (Print)).  
Redgrave, P., Rodriguez, M., Smith, Y., Rodriguez-Oroz, M. C., Lehericy, S., Bergman, 
H., . . . Obeso, J. A. (2010). Goal-directed and habitual control in the basal 
ganglia: implications for Parkinson's disease. Nat Rev Neurosci, 11(11), 760-772. 
doi:10.1038/nrn2915 
Remijnse, P. L., Nielen, M. A., van Balkom, A. M., & et al. (2006). REduced 
orbitofrontal-striatal activity on a reversal learning task in obsessive-compulsive 
54 
 
disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63(11), 1225-1236. 
doi:10.1001/archpsyc.63.11.1225 
Riffkin, J., Yucel, M., Maruff, P., Wood, S. J., Soulsby, B., Olver, J., . . . Pantelis, C. 
(2005). A manual and automated MRI study of anterior cingulate and orbito-
frontal cortices, and caudate nucleus in obsessive-compulsive disorder: 
comparison with healthy controls and patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res, 
138(2), 99-113. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2004.11.007 
Robertson, B. D., Hiebert, N. M., Seergobin, K. N., Owen, A. M., & MacDonald, P. A. 
(2015). Dorsal striatum mediates cognitive control, not cognitive effort per se, in 
decision-making: An event-related fMRI study. Neuroimage, 114, 170-184. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.03.082 
Roeper, J. (2013). Dissecting the diversity of midbrain dopamine neurons. Trends 
Neurosci, 36(6), 336-342. doi:10.1016/j.tins.2013.03.003 
Rolls, E. T., Thorpe, S. J., & Maddison, S. P. (1983). Responses of striatal neurons in the 
behaving monkey. 1. Head of the caudate nucleus. Behav Brain Res, 7(2), 179-
210. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-4328(83)90191-2 
Rubin, R. T., Villanueva-Meyer, J., Ananth, J., Trajmar, P. G., & Mena, I. (1992). 
Regional xenon 133 cerebral blood flow and cerebral technetium 99m hmpao 
uptake in unmedicated patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder and matched 
normal control subjects: Determination by high-resolution single-photon emission 
computed tomography. Archives of General Psychiatry, 49(9), 695-702. 
doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1992.01820090023004 
Rutledge, R. B., Dean, M., Caplin, A., & Glimcher, P. W. (2010). Testing the reward 
prediction error hypothesis with an axiomatic model. J Neurosci, 30(40), 13525-
13536. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1747-10.2010 
Ryterska, A., Jahanshahi, M., & Osman, M. (2013). What are people with Parkinson's 
disease really impaired on when it comes to making decisions? A meta-analysis of 
the evidence. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 37(10 Pt 2), 2836-2846. 
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.10.005 
Scatton, B., Javoy-Agid, F., Rouquier, L., Dubois, B., & Agid, Y. (1983). Reduction of 
cortical dopamine, noradrenaline, serotonin and their metabolites in Parkinson's 
disease. Brain Res, 275(0006-8993 (Print)).  
Schrag, A., Jahanshahi, M., & Quinn, N. (2000). What contributes to quality of life in 
patients with Parkinson's disease? Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & 
Psychiatry, 69, 308-312.  
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive Reward Signal of Dopamine Neurons. J Neurophysiol, 
80(1), 1-27. doi:10.1152/jn.1998.80.1.1 
55 
 
Schultz, W., Apicella, P., Scarnati, E., & Ljungberg, T. (1992). Neuronal activity in 
monkey ventral striatum related to the expectation of reward. J Neurosci, 12(12), 
4595-4610.  
Seger, C. A., & Cincotta, C. M. (2005). The roles of the caudate nucleus in human 
classification learning. J Neurosci, 25(11), 2941-2951. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3401-04.2005 
Seibell, P. J., & Hollander, E. (2014). Management of obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
F1000Prime Rep, 6, 68. doi:10.12703/P6-68 
Seo, M., Beigi, M., Jahanshahi, M., & Averbeck, B. B. (2010). Effects of dopamine 
medication on sequence learning with stochastic feedback in Parkinson's disease. 
Front Syst Neurosci, 4, 1-9. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2010.00036 
Shiner, T., Seymour, B., Wunderlich, K., Hill, C., Bhatia, K. P., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. 
(2012). Dopamine and performance in a reinforcement learning task: evidence 
from Parkinson's disease. Brain, 135(Pt 6), 1871-1883. doi:10.1093/brain/aws083 
Shohamy, D., & Wagner, A. D. (2008). Integrating memories in the human brain: 
hippocampal-midbrain encoding of overlapping events. Neuron, 60(2), 378-389. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.09.023 
Smittenaar, P., Chase, H. W., Aarts, E., Nusselein, B., Bloem, B. R., & Cools, R. (2012). 
Decomposing effects of dopaminergic medication in Parkinson's disease on 
probabilistic action selection--learning or performance? Eur J Neurosci, 35(7), 
1144-1151. doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2012.08043.x 
Soto, F. A., Waldschmidt, J. G., Helie, S., & Ashby, F. G. (2013). Brain activity across 
the development of automatic categorization: a comparison of categorization tasks 
using multi-voxel pattern analysis. Neuroimage, 71, 284-297. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.01.008 
Su, C. Y., Chen, H. M., Kwan, A. L., Lin, Y. H., & Guo, N. W. (2007). 
Neuropsychological impairment after hemorrhagic stroke in basal ganglia. Arch 
Clin Neuropsychol, 22(4), 465-474. doi:10.1016/j.acn.2007.01.025 
Sutton, & Barto. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 3(9), 360. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01331-5 
Swainson, R., Rogers, R. D., Sahakian, B. J., Summers, B. A., Polkey, C. E., & Robbins, 
T. W. (2000). Probabilistic learning and reversal deficits in patients with 
Parkinson's disease or frontal or temporal lobe lesions: possible adverse effects of 
dopaminergic medication. Neuropsychologia, 38, 596-612.  
Szabo, J. (1980). Distribution of striatal afferents from the mesencephalon in the cat. 
Brain Res, 188(1), 3-21. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/0006-8993(80)90552-1 
56 
 
Takahashi, Y., Roesch, M. R., Stalnaker, T. A., & Schoenbaum, G. (2007). Cocaine 
exposure shifts the balance of associative encoding from ventral to dorsolateral 
striatum. Front Integr Neurosci, 1(11). doi:10.3389/neuro.07/011.2007 
Tanner, C. M., & Goldman, S. M. (1996). Epidemiology of Parkinson's disease. 
Neurologic clinics, 14(2), 317-335.  
Thompson, R. L. (1959). Effects of lesions in the caudate nuclei and dorsofrontal cortex 
on conditioned avoidance behavior in cats. Journal of comparative & 
physiological psychology, 52, 650-659.  
Thompson RL, M. F. (1963). Permanent learning deficit associated with lesions in the 
caudate nuclei. American journal of mental deficiency, Jan(67), 526-535.  
Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the associative 
processes in animals. New York, NY, US: Columbia University Press. 
Tricomi, E., Balleine, B. W., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2009). A specific role for posterior 
dorsolateral striatum in human habit learning. Eur J Neurosci, 29(11), 2225-2232. 
doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2009.06796.x 
Tziortzi, A. C., Haber, S. N., Searle, G. E., Tsoumpas, C., Long, C. J., Shotbolt, P., . . . 
Gunn, R. N. (2014). Connectivity-based functional analysis of dopamine release 
in the striatum using diffusion-weighted MRI and positron emission tomography. 
Cereb Cortex, 24(5), 1165-1177. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhs397 
Vaillancourt, D. E., Schonfeld, D., Kwak, Y., Bohnen, N. I., & Seidler, R. (2013). 
Dopamine overdose hypothesis: evidence and clinical implications. Mov Disord, 
28(14), 1920-1929. doi:10.1002/mds.25687 
Van Eimeren, T., Ballanger, B., Pellecchia, G., Miyasaki, J. M., Lang, A. E., & Strafella, 
A. P. (2009). Dopamine agonists diminish value sensitivity of the orbitofrontal 
cortex: a trigger for pathological gambling in Parkinson's disease? 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 34(13), 2758-2766. doi:10.1038/sj.npp.npp2009124 
van Velzen, L. S., Vriend, C., de Wit, S. J., & van den Heuvel, O. A. (2014). Response 
inhibition and interference control in obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders. 
Front Hum Neurosci, 8, 419. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00419 
Vo, A., Hiebert, N. M., Seergobin, K. N., Solcz, S., Partridge, A., & MacDonald, P. A. 
(2014). Dopaminergic medication impairs feedback-based stimulus-response 
learning but not response selection in Parkinson’s disease. Front Hum Neurosci, 
8, 784. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00784 
Volkow, N. D., Wise, R. A., & Baler, R. (2017). The dopamine motive system: 
implications for drug and food addiction. Nat Rev Neurosci, 18(12), 741-752. 
doi:10.1038/nrn.2017.130 
57 
 
Voorn, P., Vanderschuren, L. J., Groenewegen, H. J., Robbins, T. W., & Pennartz, C. M. 
(2004). Putting a spin on the dorsal-ventral divide of the striatum. Trends 
Neurosci, 27(8), 468-474. doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.06.006 
Vriend, C., de Wit, S. J., Remijnse, P. L., van Balkom, A. J., Veltman, D. J., & van den 
Heuvel, O. A. (2013). Switch the itch: a naturalistic follow-up study on the neural 
correlates of cognitive flexibility in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry 
Res, 213(1), 31-38. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2012.12.006 
Waldschmidt, J. G., & Ashby, F. G. (2011). Cortical and striatal contributions to 
automaticity in information-integration categorization. Neuroimage, 56(3), 1791-
1802. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.02.011 
Wichmann, T., DeLong, M. R., Guridi, J., & Obeso, J. A. (2011). Milestones in research 
on the pathophysiology of Parkinson's disease. Mov Disord, 26(6), 1032-1041. 
doi:10.1002/mds.23695 
Wickens, J. R., Horvitz, J. C., Costa, R. M., & Killcross, S. (2007). Dopaminergic 
mechanisms in actions and habits. J Neurosci, 27(31), 8181-8183. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1671-07.2007 
Wright, B. C., & Wanley, A. (2003). Adults' versus children's performance in the Stroop 
task: Interference and facilitation. The British Psychological Society, 94, 475-485.  
Wunderlich, K., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2012). Mapping value based planning and 
extensively trained choice in the human brain. Nat Neurosci, 15(5), 786-791. 
doi:10.1038/nn.3068 
Xue, G., Ghahremani, D. G., & Poldrack, R. A. (2008). Neural substrates for reversing 
stimulus-outcome and stimulus-response associations. J Neurosci, 28(44), 11196-
11204. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4001-08.2008 
Yamamoto, S., Kim, H. F., & Hikosaka, O. (2013). Reward value-contingent changes of 
visual responses in the primate caudate tail associated with a visuomotor skill. J 
Neurosci, 33(27), 11227-11238. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0318-13.2013 
Yanike, M., & Ferrera, V. P. (2014). Representation of outcome risk and action in the 
anterior caudate nucleus. J Neurosci, 34(9), 3279-3290. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3818-13.2014 
Yin, H. H., & Knowlton, B. J. (2006). The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation. 
Nat Rev Neurosci, 7(6), 464-476. doi:10.1038/nrn1919 
Yoo, S. Y., Roh, M. S., Choi, J. S., Kang, D. H., Ha, T. H., Lee, J. M., . . . Kwon, J. S. 
(2008). Voxel-based morphometry study of gray matter abnormalities in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. J Korean Med Sci, 23(1), 24-30. 
doi:10.3346/jkms.2008.23.1.24 
58 
 
Zarei, M., Mataix-Cols, D., Heyman, I., Hough, M., Doherty, J., Burge, L., . . . James, A. 
(2011). Changes in gray matter volume and white matter microstructure in 
adolescents with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biol Psychiatry, 70(11), 1083-
1090. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.06.032 
Zhang, T., L;, Z., Liang, Y., Siapas, A., Zhou, F.-M., & Dani, J. (2009). Dopamine 
Signaling Differences in the Nucleus Accumbens and Dorsal Striatum Exploited 
by Nicotine. Journal of Neuroscience, 29(13), 4035-4034-4043.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
60 
 
Chapter 2  
2 Dorsal striatum does not mediate feedback-based, stimulus-
response learning 
Learning associations between stimuli and responses is essential to everyday life.  Dorsal 
striatum (DS) has long been implicated in stimulus-response learning, though recent results 
challenge this contention.  We have proposed that discrepant findings arise because 
stimulus-response learning methodology generally confounds learning and response 
selection processes. In 19 patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) and 18 age-matched 
controls, we found that dopaminergic therapy (DA) decreased the efficiency of stimulus-
response learning, with corresponding attenuation of ventral striatum (VS) activation.  In 
contrast, DA improved response accuracy related to enhanced DS BOLD signal.  Contrasts 
between PD patient and control groups fully support these within-subject patterns.  These 
double dissociations in terms of behaviour and neural activity related to VS and DS in 
response to DA, strongly refute the view that DS mediates stimulus-response learning 
through feedback.  Our findings integrate with a growing literature favouring a role for DS 
in decision making rather than learning, and unite two literatures that have been evolving 
independently. 
 
 
 
 
 
A version of this chapter is under review at NeuroImage: Hiebert, N. M., Owen, A. M., 
Ganjavi, H., Mendonça, D., Jenkins, M.E., Seergobin, K. N., & MacDonald, P. A. (2017) 
Dorsal striatum does not mediate feedback-based, stimulus-response learning. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The view that the dorsal striatum (DS)—consisting of the bulk of the caudate nucleus and 
putamen—is critical for stimulus-response learning, is well-entrenched (Brovelli, 
Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2011; Chiu, Jiang, & Egner, 2017; Thompson RL, 1963; 
Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Despite the prevalence of this view, learning is often preserved 
in patients (Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, Vo, Ganjavi, & 
MacDonald, 2014; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2013; Vo et al., 2014) and animals (Atallah, 
Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007) with DS dysfunction.  
Potentially underlying the discrepancies in the stimulus-response learning literature, 
response selection decisions and learning are often intrinsically confounded (Jessup & 
O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004).  In stimulus-response learning experiments, 
trials generally proceed as follows: a) a stimulus is presented and participants perform a 
response, and b) feedback regarding response accuracy is provided.  Feedback is the means 
through which stimulus-response associations are learned.  Accuracy in selecting a learned 
response provides the learning measure.  Performance depends upon both decision and 
learning processes.  Failing either to acquire stimulus-response relations or to correctly 
select learned responses produces impaired performance.  Further, in fMRI studies, a) 
deciding upon and enacting a response, and b) learning from feedback, are typically treated 
as a single event with all significantly activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning 
per se (Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999).  
Accordingly, some brain regions that might underlie response selection could erroneously 
be assigned a role in learning.  The objective of the current study was to directly test this 
confound in patients with PD, using a stimulus-response learning paradigm previously 
shown to separate decisions and learning, producing differential patterns of activity in DS 
and VS (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).    
Combining fMRI with behavioural manipulations in patients with PD tested both off and 
on dopaminergic therapy, provides a powerful approach for investigating striatum-
mediated cognitive functions.  In PD, the quintessential motor symptoms arise when 
dopamine-producing neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) degenerate to 
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seriously restrict dopamine supply to the DS (Kish, Shannak, & Hornykiewicz, 1988).  In 
contrast, dopamine-producing neurons in the adjacent ventral tegmental area (VTA) are 
relatively spared in PD, especially in the early disease stages, resulting in adequate 
endogenous dopamine to regions such as VS, composed of the nucleus accumbens and 
ventral portions of the caudate and putamen (Kish et al., 1988).  Consequently, in 
unmedicated PD patients, DS functions and neural activity are depressed, whereas VS 
operations and activation levels are spared.    
Dopaminergic therapy remediates DS dopamine depletion and improves function (Cools, 
2006; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011).  Unfortunately, exogenous dopamine distributes non-
selectively, increasing dopamine even to the relatively-replete VS.  As a consequence, 
dopaminergic medications have been shown to attenuate neural activity and worsen 
functions performed by VTA-innervated brain regions, presumably due to dopamine 
overdose (Cools, 2006).  In this way, comparing the OFF and ON states, a double 
dissociation in terms of behaviour and neural activity is observed comparing DS and VS.   
If DS mediates stimulus-response learning, it is predicted that a) DS activity will correlate 
with learning measures and with the moment when stimulus-response association learning 
occurs (i.e., the Feedback Event, when outcome information regarding response accuracy 
is provided) and b) learning efficiency and DS signal will improve with dopaminergic 
therapy in PD.  These outcomes are predicted because the DS is significantly dopamine 
depleted and its functions are impaired at baseline in PD.  DS functions and activity 
improve with dopamine replacement (P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011).   
In contrast, if DS mediates stimulus-response decision performance and VS mediates 
stimulus-response association learning, as we expect, a) DS activity will correlate with 
accuracy of decision performance and with the moment when response selection occurs 
(i.e., the Stimulus-Response Decision Event), and b) accuracy of stimulus-specific 
decisions and DS signal will improve with dopaminergic therapy in PD.  Further, we 
predict that a) VS activity will correlate with learning measures and with the moment of 
learning during the Feedback Event, and b) efficiency of learning and VS signal will 
decrease with dopaminergic therapy in PD.  These predictions are based on the knowledge 
63 
 
that DS functions and activation improve with dopaminergic therapy in PD, whereas 
functions and activation of VTA-innervated brain areas are attenuated by exogenous 
dopamine in PD, which overdoses these relatively dopamine-replete regions.  
2.2 Materials and methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-three participants with PD and 19 age- and education-matched healthy controls participated 
in this experiment.  All participants with PD were previously diagnosed by a licenced neurologist, 
had no co-existing diagnosis of dementia or another neurological or psychiatric disease, and met 
the core assessment for surgical interventional therapy and the UK Brain Bank criteria for the 
diagnosis of idiopathic PD (Hughes, Daniel, Kilford, & Lees, 1992).  All PD and no control 
participants were treated with dopaminergic therapy.  Age- and education-matched controls were 
within five years of age (average difference was 3.6 years) and five years of education (average 
difference was 2.4 years) to the matched PD patient.  Participants with PD were recruited through 
the movement disorders database at the London Health Sciences Centre.  Participants abusing 
alcohol, prescription or illicit drugs, or taking cognitive-enhancing medications including 
donepezil, galantamine, rivastigmine, memantine, or methylphenidate were excluded from 
participating.  Additionally, participants obtaining a Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) score 
of 24 or less were excluded.  
The motor sub-scale of the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) was scored by a 
licenced neurologist with sub-specialty training in movement disorders (P.A.M.) to assess the 
presence and severity of motor symptoms for all patients both off and on dopaminergic medication.  
Control participants were also screened to rule out undiagnosed neurological illness.  Mean group 
demographic, as well as cognitive and affective screening scores for all patients and controls in 
each experimental group were recorded (Table 1).  UPDRS motor subscale scores off and on 
dopaminergic therapy, daily doses of dopamine replacement therapy in terms of ι -dopa equivalents 
(LED), and mean duration of PD was also recorded (Table 1).  Calculation of daily LED for each 
patient was based on the theoretical equivalence to ι-dopa(mg) as follows: ι -dopa dose(mg)  × 1 + 
ι-dopa controlled release(mg) × 0.75 + ι-dopa(mg) × 0.33 if on entacapone(mg) + amantadine(mg) 
× 0.5 + bromocriptine(mg) × 10 + cabergoline(mg) × 50 + pergolide(mg) × 100 + pramipexole(mg) 
× 67 + rasagiline(mg) × 100 + ropinirole(mg) × 16.67 + selegiline(mg) × 10 (Wullner et al., 2010). 
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All participants provided informed written consent to the protocol before beginning the experiment 
according to the Declaration of Helsinki.  This study was approved by the Health Sciences Research 
Ethics Board of the University of Western Ontario. 
2.2.2 Experimental design 
Participants with PD were randomly divided into two groups and all participated in two 
sessions on separate days.  Different stimulus-response pairs were used in Sessions 1 and 
2.  Both Sessions 1 and 2 were separated into two phases.  Phase 1, the learning phase, 
constituted the phase during which stimulus-response associations were learned through 
feedback.  Phase 2, the performance phase, comprised the phase during which stimulus-
specific responses learned in Phase 1 were performed without further feedback.   
Participants with PD randomly assigned to Group 1 (OFF-ON) performed Session 1 off 
dopaminergic therapy and Session 2 on dopaminergic therapy.  In contrast, PD patients 
randomized to Group 2 (ON-OFF) performed Session 1 in the ON dopaminergic therapy 
state and Session 2 in the OFF state.  Although control participants did not take 
dopaminergic therapy in either session, their data were analyzed to correspond to the ON-
OFF order of the PD patient to whom they were matched.  Matching was performed prior 
to data analysis at the time of data collection.  This controlled for possible order, fatigue, 
and practice effects.  Participants with PD took their dopamine medication as prescribed 
by their treating neurologist during ON testing sessions, but abstained from taking all 
dopaminergic medication including dopamine precursors such as Ι-dopa, aromatic-L-
amino-acid decarboxylase inhibitors such as carbidopa, and catechol-O-methyltransferase 
(COMT) inhibitors such as entacapone (Comtan) for a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 
18 hours, and dopamine agonists, such as pramipexole (Mirapex), ropinirole (Requip), or 
pergolide (Permax), as well as amantadine (Symmeterel), rasagiline (Azilect), and 
selegiline (Eldepryl or Deprenyl) for 16 to 20 hours before beginning OFF testing sessions.  
All patients confirmed that they complied with these medication instructions.  Ten PD 
patients and eight controls were in the OFF-ON group, whereas nine PD and ten controls 
were in the ON-OFF group. 
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In Phase 1, the learning phase of each session, participants learned to associate abstract 
images with one of three button-press responses.  Images were computer-generated with 
GroBoto (Braid Art Labs, Colorado Springs, USA).  In each trial, an abstract image 
appeared in the centre of a projection screen until the participant responded with a button-
press.  Feedback (i.e., ‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) was provided after every response and in 
this way, participants learned to associate each of the abstract images with the appropriate 
button-press response through trial and error.  Trials were organized into blocks.  After 
each block, participants were provided with a percentage score, summarizing their learning 
performance.  Participants completed a maximum of 12 blocks.  Once participants scored 
greater than 75% on two successive blocks, Phase 1 ended.  Our aim was to examine early 
learning.  Further, we wanted to avoid accuracy reaching ceiling so that we could also 
investigate, as a separate measure, decision performance.  If after 12 blocks the participant 
was not responding at an accuracy level greater than chance (~33%), his/her data were not 
included in the analysis for either the OFF or ON Sessions.  Before proceeding to Phase 1, 
participants received 20 practice trials with different images from those employed during 
the main experimental sessions to become familiar with the procedure.  In Phase 2, the 
performance phase of each session, stimuli presented in Phase 1 were shown again.  
Participants were asked to provide the stimulus-specific button-press responses that they 
had learned in Phase 1.  No feedback was provided to preclude new feedback-based 
learning during this phase that was aimed to test selection of accurate responses.  Again, 
different sets of images were used in Session 1 and Session 2.     
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Figure 2.1 Abstract images presented in Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
Abstract Image Set A and Set B refer to the images presented in Session 1 and Session 2 respectively.  
Images were associated with a button pressed by the index, middle, or ring finger buttons. 
Both Phases 1 and 2 of Sessions 1 and 2 were performed while fMRI measures were 
simultaneously recorded.  Twelve abstract images were used in the experiment, six during 
each session of testing (Figure 2.1).  There were 24 trials per block in Phase 1 of each 
session, with each abstract image occurring four times in random order per block.  Two 
images were assigned to each the second, third, and fourth button on the button box per 
session and participants pressed these buttons with their index, middle, and ring fingers, 
respectively.  A button-press response was required to advance from the feedback phase to 
the next trial.  In this way, in each trial, motor responses were included in both Stimulus-
Response Decision and Feedback Events (Figure 2.2A). 
Trials in the Learning Phases proceeded as follows: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the 
projection screen for 500 ms; (ii) a blank screen occurred for 500 ms; (iii) an abstract image 
was presented until a button-press response was performed (i.e., the Stimulus-Response 
Decision Event); (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable amount of time sampled from 
an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v) 
feedback (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) appeared for 1000 ms followed by a green circle 
that appeared in the centre of the projection screen signifying to the participant to press the 
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first button with his/her thumb to advance to the next trial (i.e., the Feedback Event); (vi) 
a blank screen appeared for a variable amount of time sampled from an exponential 
distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms). 
A distractor task lasting approximately 15 minutes (data not shown) was employed 
between the Phases 1 and 2 in both Sessions 1 and 2. This was to prevent rehearsal of 
stimulus-response associations as well as to make stimulus-response decisions more 
challenging.  In Phase 2 of each session, participants performed three blocks of 24 trials, 
in which the same six images studied during Phase 1 were presented in random order, four 
times per block.  Participants provided the button-press response that they had learned for 
each image during Phase 1.  No feedback regarding accuracy was provided in Phase 2 of 
each session, precluding further feedback-based learning.  Parameters for each trial in 
Phase 2 were otherwise identical to those in Phase 1 with the exception that the Feedback 
Event was omitted.  Figures 2.2A and B present example trials in Phases 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 2.2 Example of a single trial in Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
A) Participants learned to associate six abstract images with one of three button-press responses in Phase 1.  
The following is an example of a trial: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection screen for 500 ms; 
(ii) a blank screen occurred for 500 ms; (iii) an abstract image was presented in the centre of the projection 
screen until a button-press response; (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time sampled from 
an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v) feedback (i.e., 
‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time 
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sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms).  B) 
Participants recalled the responses to the learned images in the absence of feedback in Phase 2. Trials in 
Phase 2 were identical to the Phase 1 except that feedback was omitted.  * The inter-stimulus and inter-trial 
intervals (ISI and ITI, respectively) were jittered between the response and feedback and between the offset 
of feedback and the beginning of the subsequent trial to create two fMRI events within each trial: a) the 
Stimulus-Response Decision Event and b) the Feedback Event for Phase 1.  In Phase 2, the ITIs were jittered 
between the response and the subsequent trial, as the Feedback Event was omitted. 
2.2.3 Statistical analysis 
2.2.3.1 Behavioural 
Executing stimulus-specific response selections in Phase 2 depended on how well these 
associations were learned during Phase 1 in each session.  We hypothesized that PD and 
medication would affect learning.  We therefore implemented measures to better isolate 
decision performance.  First, we aimed to equate the degree to which stimulus-response 
associations were acquired across participants and sessions by imposing a learning criterion 
in Phase 1.  That is, once participants reached a learning criterion of 75% correct on two 
consecutive blocks or once they completed 12 blocks, Phase 1 ended.  Second, we used an 
Adjusted-Savings Score to evaluate accuracy of stimulus-specific response selections 
during Phase 2.  This score was calculated as follows for each session: % accuracy of Block 
1 of Phase 2 ÷ % accuracy of Last Block of Phase 1.  By weighting response-selection 
performance relative to previous learning performance in Phase 1, we corrected for 
learning differences between participants and across sessions.  This score permitted 
evaluation of stimulus-specific response selection performance independent of medication 
effects on stimulus-response learning.  
Efficiency of encoding stimulus-response associations across the Phase 1 of each session 
was estimated by the rate of change of correct responses across the session.  The slope of 
change was measured by summing the scores obtained at the end of each block over the 
total number of blocks required to reach the pre-set learning criterion (i.e., standard slope 
of the linear regression function, Microsoft Excel, 2011), as follows: 
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where b is the slope, and x and y are the sample means of the number of blocks and block 
scores, respectively.  
For each of our dependent measures, Adjusted-Savings Score and slope, 2 × 2 mixed 
ANOVAs with Group (PD versus control) and Medication (ON versus OFF) as the 
between-subject, and within-subject variables, respectively.  Simple effects will be 
investigated in the case of significant interactions.  Simple effects tests will include: 
• Within-subject 
o PD OFF versus PD ON 
o control OFF versus control ON 
• Between-subject 
o OFF PD versus control 
o ON PD versus control 
2.2.3.2 Imaging acquisition 
During data collection of this experiment, the MRI scanner at Robarts Research Institute 
at the University of Western Ontario was upgraded.  FMRI data were collected either in a 
3 Tesla Siemens Magnetom Trio (before upgrade) or Magnetom Prisma (after upgrade) 
with Total Imaging Matrix.  Nine PD patients and seven control participants were scanned 
on the Magnetom Trio.  The scanning parameters for each scanner before and after the 
upgrade were identical.  We obtained a scout image for positioning the participant and T1 
for anatomical localization.  Number of runs of T2*-weighted functional acquisitions varied 
depending on the participant’s rate of learning but ranged from a minimum of one to a 
maximum of four runs.  Each run was of variable length and therefore consisted of a 
variable number of blocks of 24 trials.  A distractor task lasting approximately 15 minutes 
was administered between Phases 1 and 2 in both sessions.  All participants performed 
b =
(∑ x − x )(y− y )
(x − x )∑
2
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Phase 2 as the final fMRI run.  All runs lasted on average eight minutes with one whole 
brain image consisting of 43, 2.5mm-thick slices taken every 2.5s.  The field of view was 
oriented along the anterior and posterior commissure with a matrix of 88 × 88 pixels, an 
isotropic voxel size of 2.5×2.5×2.5 mm3.  The echo time was 30ms and the flip angle was 
90°. 
2.2.3.3 FMRI data analysis 
Statistical Parametric Mapping Version 8 (SPM8; Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom) was used in conjunction with Matrix Laboratory 
(MATLAB; MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) to complete fMRI 
analysis.  Images were slice-time corrected, reoriented for participant motion, spatially 
normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, smoothed with 
an 8mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel, and high-pass filtered (0.0056Hz). 
Individual participant data were modeled using fixed effects analysis using SPM8.  
Regressors were formed using onsets and durations of psychological events of interest, 
particularly Stimulus-Response Decision, Feedback, and post-feedback Rest Events, with 
the canonical hemodynamic response function.  The inter-stimulus interval between 
Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback Events was not explicitly modelled to 
minimize over fitting the data.  If the randomly generated inter-trial interval (ITI) between 
the Feedback Event and the Stimulus-Response Decision Event for the next trial was 
between 525-2000ms, the final 500ms of this interval was modeled to form the Rest Event.  
If the ITI was between 2000-4000ms, the final 1000ms comprised the Rest Event for that 
trial.  Finally, for ITIs that were greater than 4000ms, the final 2000ms were included as 
the Rest measure.  The aims were to a) separate the Stimulus-Response Decision, 
Feedback, and Rest Events as much as possible, and b) create Rest events with variable 
durations to match the Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback Events.  Stimulus-
Response Decision Events were defined as the time from the onset of the abstract image 
until the participant made a button-press response.  The Feedback Event was defined as the 
time from the onset of feedback (“Correct” or “Incorrect”) until and including the button-
press response that participants made when the green circle appeared on the projection 
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screen, signalling their readiness to proceed to the next trial.  This ended the Feedback 
Event.  In this way, a motor response occurred during the Stimulus-Response Decision and 
Feedback Events.   
A single General Linear Model (GLM) was created for Phase 1 in each session to 
investigate regional BOLD responses for Stimulus-Response Decision, Feedback, and Rest 
Events.  Number of predictor functions corresponded to the number of blocks completed 
by each participant multiplied by the three event types (i.e., Stimulus-Response Decision, 
Feedback, and Rest).  A similar GLM was created to for Phase 2 in each session to 
investigate regional BOLD responses for Stimulus-Response Decision and Rest Events, 
with regressors corresponding to each of the three blocks completed in each of the sessions, 
multiplied by the two event types (i.e., Stimulus-Response and Rest).  Contrasts were made 
at the individual level for each session comparing Stimulus-Response Decision, Feedback, 
and Rest Events for Phase 1, and Stimulus-Response Decision and Rest Events for Phase 
2.  Correct and incorrect trials were examined separately.  At the group level, two GLMs 
were created, one for Phase 1 and the other for Phase 2.  The Phase 1 GLM consisted of 
separate regressors for correct and incorrect Stimulus-Response Decision minus Rest, and 
Feedback minus Rest Events for both PD and control, off and on medication, yielding 16 
regressors.  Age and Order were also added as covariates.  Similarly, the Phase 2 model 
contained 8 regressors, separated into correct and incorrect Stimulus-Response Decision 
minus Rest Events for both PD and control participants, off and on medication. 
First, group-level contrasts examined events collapsed across Group (PD and control) 
and Medication (OFF and ON) to confirm that we replicated the results from Hiebert 
et al., (2014b). The contrasts of interest for Phases 1 and 2 were as follows: (i) Stimulus-
Response Decision Events minus Rest in Phase 1, (ii) Stimulus-Response Decision minus 
Feedback Events in Phase 1, (iii) Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest in Phase 
2, (iv) Feedback Events minus Rest in Phase 1, (v) Feedback Events minus Stimulus-
Response Decision Events in Phase 1, (vi) correct versus incorrect Feedback Events in 
Phase 1.  Peaks in these contrasts are reported at a significance level of q<0.05 corrected 
for multiple comparisons using false discovery rate (FDR) at the voxel level, unless 
otherwise noted. 
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We next conducted Bayesian analysis, because critical conclusions regarding DS’s 
role in stimulus-response learning depend on accepting null effects.  Specifically, 
refuting the entrenched view that DS mediates stimulus-response learning is accomplished 
by showing that a) DS activation does not arise during the Feedback Event when stimulus-
response associations are learned. There is a justified bias against publishing negative 
findings, in that with frequentist approaches, the probabilities of Type II (i.e., falsely failing 
to reject the null hypothesis) and Type I errors (i.e., falsely rejecting the null hypothesis) 
are asymmetric.  Type I errors are set at a clear maximum, usually less than 0.05, whereas 
Type II errors vary across studies in terms of magnitude and determinants (Dienes, 2014) 
not pre-determined by the experimenter.  Bayesian analysis allows directly contrasting the 
probability of the null and the alternative hypotheses in a symmetrical way, putting these 
hypotheses on an equal footing, and directly comparing the relative fit of the two models 
(Dienes, 2014).  Bayesian analyses were therefore performed to investigate the strength of 
null effects that arose.  Additionally, the strength of significant effects was investigated by 
conducting Bayesian analyses on the strength of DS and VS activity during Stimulus-
Response Decision and Feedback events, respectively.  Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests 
were conducted separately for PD patients and control participants, using average beta 
values extracted from left and right anatomical DS and VS ROIs during Stimulus-Response 
Decision and Feedback Events in the following contrasts:  
i. Stimulus-Response Decision Events across Phase 1 collapsed across 
Medication session (OFF and ON) 
ii. Stimulus-Response Decision Events across Phase 2 collapsed across 
Medication session (OFF and ON) 
iii. Correct minus Incorrect Feedback events across Phase 1 collapsed across 
Medication session (OFF and ON)  
ROIs were created using the Automated anatomical labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 
2002), and WFU PickAtlas (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) in conjunction 
with MarsBaR (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002).  The left and right DS ROI 
included left and right dorsal caudate nucleus and left and right dorsal putamen at a level 
of z > 2 mm in MNI space.  The left and right VS ROIs were similarly created and included 
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the left and right ventral caudate nucleus and putamen at a level of z ≤ 2 mm in MNI space, 
as well as the NAcc.   
Using the Bayes’ factor of three as the cut-off, previously indicated to be the Bayesian 
corollary of p < 0.05 in frequentist hypothesis testing (Dienes, 2014), we tested whether 
the extracted beta values were indeed zero.  If the Bayes’ factor of the average beta value 
is less than three, it strongly supports the null hypothesis, that the activation level is not 
greater than zero.  
Next, we investigated brain-behaviour correlations to confirm that behavioural 
performance was related to DS versus VS activity patterns.  We tested whether BOLD 
signal in striatal regions correlated with behavioural indices of response selection decisions 
and learning respectively.  Specifically, we tested whether activity in two DS versus two 
VS ROIs taken from Hiebert et al., (2014b), correlated with the Adjusted-Savings Score 
(i.e., our measure of response-selection decisions), and with Learning Slope (i.e., our 
measure of learning efficiency).  Correlations were performed separately for PD and 
healthy control groups in the event that learning and response selection performance 
differed across groups collapsed across medication session.  The two right and left DS and 
two right and left VS ROIs from Hiebert et al., (2014b) were employed for the correlation 
analysis in the present study using the MarsBar Toolbox in SPM8 (Brett et al., 2002).  DS 
ROIs were centered on the dorsal head of the caudate nucleus (x=±18, y=24, z=6), and 
dorsal putamen (x=±29, y=9, z=6).  For VS, x=±10, y=8, z=−4, and x=±12, y=18, z=−6, 
centering on the nucleus accumbens and ventral caudate nucleus respectively were used.  
Spherical ROIs centred on the aforementioned coordinates were created with a radius of 
6mm.  Beta values in our ROIs were extracted from four contrasts of interest: (i) Stimulus-
Response Decision Events across Phase 2 for patients with PD across Sessions 1 and 2 (i.e., 
off and on dopaminergic medication); (ii) Feedback Events across Phase 1 for patients with 
PD across Sessions 1 and 2 (i.e., off and on medication); (iii) Stimulus-Response Decision 
Events across Phase 2 for healthy controls across Sessions 1 and 2; and (iv) Feedback 
Events across Phase 1 for healthy controls across Sessions 1 and 2.  These average beta 
values for each ROI were correlated with behavioural measures of stimulus-specific 
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response selection (i.e., the adjusted savings scores) and learning (i.e., slope values) for 
each group separately.  
Subsequently, events of interest were examined for PD and Healthy controls 
separately comparing OFF and ON Medication sessions directly.  These within-subject 
contrasts of interest for Phases 1 and 2 were as follows: (i) PD OFF versus ON Stimulus-
Response Decision Events in Phase 1; (ii) PD OFF versus ON Stimulus-Response Decision 
Events in Phase 2, (iii) PD OFF versus ON medication for Feedback Events in Phase 1; 
(iv) PD OFF correct minus incorrect Feedback Events versus ON correct minus incorrect 
Feedback Events; (v) control OFF versus ON Stimulus-Response Decision Events in Phase 
1; (vi) control OFF versus ON Stimulus-Response Decision Events in Phase 2, (vii) control 
OFF versus ON medication for Feedback Events in Phase 1; (viii) and control OFF correct 
minus incorrect Feedback Events versus ON correct minus incorrect Feedback Events.  For 
OFF-ON contrasts in PD patients and controls, peaks within the striatum were considered 
predicted and are reported at a significance level of p≤0.001, uncorrected for multiple 
comparisons. Peaks outside of the striatum are reported at a threshold of q<0.05 FDR 
corrected at the voxel level.  Striatal regions were defined using the Harvard-Oxford 
Subcortical Atlas in the FMRIB Software Library version 5.0 (FSL v5.0; Analysis Group, 
FMRIB, Oxford, United Kingdom).  DS and VS are not distinct anatomical structures, 
which creates difficulty when attempting to separate them in an fMRI context.  In a review, 
Postuma and Dagher (2006) define VS as z≤2, which we employed.  Here, DS refers to 
portions of the caudate nucleus and putamen at a level of z>2mm in MNI space.  VS was 
defined as the nucleus accumbens, caudate, and putamen at a level of z≤2mm in MNI space.  
All cortical regions were defined using the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Atlas in the FMRIB 
Software Library version 5.0 (FSL v5.0; Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, United 
Kingdom).  All x, y, z coordinates are reported in MNI space. 
Next, to clarify our within-subject contrasts that explored the effects of dopaminergic 
therapy on DS and VS function in PD patients, we contrasted Group (PD versus control) 
in each of the Medication states separately.  The contrasts of interest for Phases 1 and 2 
were as follows: (i) Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest in Phase 1, (ii) 
Stimulus-Response Decision minus Feedback Events in Phase 1, (iii) Stimulus-Response 
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Decision Events minus Rest in Phase 2, (iv) Feedback Events minus Rest in Phase 1, (v) 
Feedback Events minus Stimulus-Response Decision Events in Phase 1, (vi) correct versus 
incorrect Feedback Events in Phase 1.  For OFF-ON contrasts in PD patients and controls, 
peaks within the striatum were considered predicted and are reported at a significance level 
of p≤0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons. Peaks outside of the striatum are 
reported at a threshold of q<0.05 FDR corrected at the voxel level. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Behavioural data 
Demographic, affective, and clinical data are presented in Table 2.1 and behavioural data 
for Phases 1 and 2 are presented in Table 2.2. 
2.3.1.1 Demographic, affective, and clinical data 
Three patients with PD were excluded because they obtained a Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(MoCA) score of 24 or less, and a further one PD patient and one control participant failed to show 
any evidence of learning in Phase 1 in either Session 1 or 2 (explained below) and were therefore 
excluded from all analyses.  Nineteen patients with PD and 18 age- and education-matched healthy 
controls were therefore included in the final analyses.  
There were no significant demographic differences between PD and control participants (Table 
2.1).  Participants with PD scored significantly higher on both Beck Depression Inventory II and 
Beck Anxiety Inventory compared to controls regardless of medication status as is expected based 
on previous research.  No differences were found in terms of depressive or anxiety symptoms 
between participants with PD measured off or on their dopaminergic medication.  UPDRS scores 
were significantly higher in participants with PD measured off relative to on dopaminergic 
medication (t >6.00, p<0.0001), signifying greater PD signs when patients were in the unmedicated 
state. 
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Table 2.1 Demographic, clinical, screening cognitive, and affective measures for PD 
patients and healthy controls. 
Group N Age Edu Duration Ɩ-dopa (mg) 
DA 
(n) 
UPDRS 
OFF 
UPDRS 
ON 
PD 19 65.73 (1.80) 15.21 (0.69) 
3.95 
(0.60) 
599.50 
(46.37) 9 
15.26 
(1.48) 
12.16 
(1.32) 
CTRL 18 65.06 (1.70) 15.00 (0.59) ˗ ˗ ˗ ˗ ˗ 
Group ANART MOCA BDI-II OFF 
BDI-II 
ON 
BAI 
OFF 
BAI   
ON 
Apathy 
OFF 
Apathy 
ON 
PD 124.80 (1.63) 
27.05 
(0.52) 
8.31 
(1.21) 
7.94 
(1.23) 
7.57 
(1.42) 
6.47 
(1.30) 
10.05 
(1.06) 
10.68 
(1.13) 
CTRL 124.45 (1.51) 
27.00 
(0.28) 
3.53 
(0.56) 
3.53 
(0.70) 
2.41 
(0.58) 
2.05 
(0.55) 
9.88 
(0.79) 
10.29 
(0.95) 
Values are presented as group means and standard error of the mean (SEM) in braces.  Screening cognitive 
and affective measures were completed on medication unless otherwise stated.  Dopaminergic therapy was 
not administered to control (CTRL) participants at any time during the experiment.  Their data are presented 
here in the ON-OFF order corresponding to their matched PD patient.  Edu – Years of education; Duration – 
Number of years since PD diagnosis; Ι-dopa (mg) - Ι-dopa equivalent dose in mg; DA – number of PD patients 
on dopamine agonists; UPDRS OFF – Unified Parkinson’s disease rating scale motor score off medication; 
UPDRS ON – Unified Parkinson’s disease rating scale motor score on medication; ANART – National Adult 
Reading Test IQ Estimation; MOCA – Montreal Cognitive Assessment total score out of 30; BDI-II OFF – Beck 
Depression Inventory II score measured when patients with PD were off medication and for CTRL participants 
during the off session of their corresponding PD patient; BDI-II ON – Beck Depression Inventory II score 
measured when patients with PD were on medication and for CTRL participants during the ON Session of 
their corresponding PD patient; BAI OFF – Beck Anxiety Inventory score measured when patients with PD 
were off medication and for CTRL participants during the OFF Session of their corresponding PD patient; BAI 
ON – Beck Anxiety Inventory score measured when patients with PD were on medication and for CTRL 
participants during the ON Session of their corresponding PD patient; Apathy OFF – Starkstein Apathy Scale 
score measured when patients with PD were off medication and for CTRL participants during the OFF Session 
of their corresponding PD patient; Apathy ON – Starkstein Apathy Scale score measured when patients with 
PD were on medication and for CTRL participants during the ON Session of their corresponding PD patient. 
2.3.1.2 Response selection decision behavioural measure 
Accuracy of selecting previously-learned stimulus-specific responses was measured using 
an Adjusted-Savings Score.  The score obtained in Block 1 of Phase 2 was weighted 
relative to the final accuracy obtained during the last block of Phase 1 for each session.  A 
2×2 mixed ANOVA of the Adjusted-Savings Scores was conducted with Group (PD versus 
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control) as between-subject factor and Medication Session (OFF versus ON) as the within-
subject variable.  There were no significant main effects of Group (F<1) or Medication 
(F1,32=1.327, MSE=235.00, p=0.258).  The Group×Medication interaction trended toward 
significance, F1,32=4.007, MSE=235.00, p=0.054, and was further investigated using 
pairwise comparisons.  This revealed a significantly improved Adjusted-Savings Score for 
participants with PD tested ON compared to OFF dopaminergic medication (t=2.24, 
p=0.038; Figure 2.3A) as would be predicted if DS mediates decisions or response 
selections.  There were no significant differences between OFF and ON sessions for control 
participants (t=0.70, p=0.494).  Recall that control participants did not actually receive 
dopaminergic therapy but their data were analyzed to correspond to the ON-OFF order of 
the PD patient to whom they were matched.  Additionally, there were no significant 
differences between PD and control groups for either the OFF (t=1.26, p=0.104) or ON 
(t=0.50, p=0.308) contrast.  
Table 2.2 Behavioural measures for participants with PD and control participants. 
Group Adjusted-Savings Score (%)	 Learning Slope 
PD 	  
OFF 94.00 (3.70)	 0.206 (0.023) 
ON 104.75 (3.65)	 0.165 (0.021) 
Control 	  
OFF 102.86 (3.80)	 0.186 (0.025) 
ON 99.33 (3.75)	 0.205 (0.23) 
Values presented are mean (SEM).  To reiterate, Adjusted-Savings Score was measured using the following 
equation: percent accuracy in Block 1 of Phase 2 ÷ percent accuracy in the last block of Phase 1.  Slope was 
calculated using the block accuracy scores over the number of blocks in early and late halves using the slope 
of the linear regression function (Microsoft Excel 2011). All values are presented separately for PD patients in 
the OFF and ON medication sessions, and control participants in the sessions corresponding to the OFF and 
ON sessions for the PD patient to whom they were matched.  Healthy controls did not receive dopaminergic 
therapy at any point in this study.    
2.3.1.3 Stimulus-response association learning measure 
Efficiency of stimulus-response association learning was estimated using the slope of 
accuracy change over the total number of blocks required to reach the learning criterion in 
Phase 1 (i.e., 75% accuracy on two consecutive blocks).  Slope was calculated using the 
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linear regression function in Microsoft Excel (2011).  A 2×2 mixed ANOVA on the slopes 
of learning obtained during Phase 1 was conducted with Group (PD versus control) as the 
between-subject factor and Medication Session (OFF versus ON) as the within-subject 
variable.  There were no main effects of Group (F<1) or Medication (F<1).  However, the 
Group×Medication interaction was significant, F1,35=4.46, MSE=0.004, p=0.042.  
Investigated further using pairwise comparisons, we found significantly slower learning 
ON relative to OFF medication for PD patients (t=2.17, p=0.044; Figure 2.3B) but no 
medication difference for control participants (t=0.92, p=0.368), replicating what we found 
previously in patients with PD (Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, et al., 2014; Vo et al., 2014) 
and supporting the dopamine overdose hypothesis.  Additionally, there were no significant 
slope differences between PD and control groups for either the OFF (t=-0.17, p=0.568) or 
ON (t=0.85, p=0.200) contrast. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Effect of PD and dopaminergic therapy on learning and response selection. 
A) Effect of PD and dopaminergic therapy on Adjusted-Savings Score.  Adjusted-Savings Score served as a 
measurement of stimulus-specific response selection accuracy.  Adjusted-Savings Score was measured using 
the following equation: percent accuracy in Block 1 of Phase 2 ÷ percent accuracy in the last block of the 
Phase 1.  Adjusted-Savings Score was significantly higher in PD patients tested ON compared to OFF 
medication.  B) Effect of PD and dopaminergic therapy on slope of learning stimulus-response associations.  
Slope of learning served as a measurement of learning efficiency.  To reiterate, slope was calculated using 
the block accuracy scores over the number of blocks in Phase 1 using the slope of the linear regression 
function (Microsoft Excel 2011).  Slope of learning was significantly slower in PD patients tested ON compared 
to OFF dopaminergic medication.  All values are presented separately for PD patients tested OFF medication, 
PD patients tested ON medication, and control participants tested in the sessions designated as ON and OFF 
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though control did not actually receive dopaminergic therapy.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
* p<0.05. 
2.3.2 FMRI data 
Significant activations in contrasts of interest are presented in Tables 2.3-7 and Figures 2.4 
and 2.6.  Contrasts collapsing across Group and Medication Session are reported at a 
significance level of q<0.05 FDR corrected at the voxel level.  Contrasts examining patients 
with PD versus healthy controls, as well as exploring each group separately for OFF-ON 
effects are reported at a significance level of p≤0.001 for predicted striatal regions, 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons.      
2.3.2.1 Groups and medication sessions collapsed 
Stimulus-Response Decision Events: Significant activity in the right dorsal caudate 
occurred during the Stimulus-Response Decision relative to Rest in Phase 1 (peak 
coordinates: 12, 5, 5; t=5.76, q<0.001; Figure 2.4A).  Significant right dorsal caudate 
activity also occurred in the Stimulus-Response Decision minus Feedback contrast in Phase 
1 (peak coordinates: 12, 5, 2; t=7.51, q<0.001; Figure 2.4B).  When Stimulus-Response 
Decision Events were compared to Rest in Phase 2, significant activity in the left dorsal 
caudate (peak coordinates: 15, -1, 14; t=4.76, q=0.015; Figure 2.4C) occurred.  DS was 
preferentially recruited during the Stimulus-Response Decision Event, in both Phases 1 
and 2, replicating our previous findings (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014). 
Table 2.3 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest collapsed across Group 
(PD and control) and Medication (OFF and ON) reported in MNI space. 
Contrast Anatomical Area Cluster 
Size 
t q* x, y, z 
Phase 1: SR Events      
SR minus rest  Right dorsal 
caudate 
75 5.76 <0.001  12, 5, 5 
 Right lingual gyrus 6928 12.33 <0.001 6, -85, -7 
 Left paracingulate 
gyrus 
427 6.62 <0.001 -3, 20, 44 
 Right middle frontal 
gyrus 
285 6.55 <0.001 48, 32, 32 
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SR minus FB  Right dorsal 
caudate 
** 7.51 <0.001 12, 5, 2 
 Left occipital 
fusiform gyrus 
3471 13.70 <0.001 -30, -76, -
16 
 Right postcentral 
gyrus 
299 4.89 <0.001 36, -31, 41 
Phase 2: SR Events       
SR minus Rest  Right dorsal 
caudate 
105 4.76 0.015 15, -1, 14 
 Right lateral 
occipital cortex 
3567 9.49 <0.001 42, -73, -
10 
 Right precentral 
gyrus 
1011 5.40 <0.001 54, 11, 35 
 Left precentral gyrus 1713 5.05 <0.001 -48, 5, 29 
Phase 1: FB Events      
FB minus rest Left postcentral 
gyrus 
389 7.55 <0.001 -39, -28, 
47 
 Right postcentral 
gyrus 
299 4.89 <0.001 36, -31, 41 
FB minus SR  No Suprathreshold 
activations 
    
FB Correct minus 
Incorrect 
Right nucleus 
accumbens 
150 4.87 0.007 18, 11, -7 
 Left nucleus 
accumbens 
123 4.49 0.016 -18, 11, -1 
FB Incorrect minus 
Correct 
No suprathreshold 
activations 
    
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  *Significance values are reported at q < 0.05 FDR corrected at the voxel 
level.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each 
contrast.  **Cluster size unobtainable as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster.   N.B. SR – Stimulus-
Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.  
Feedback Learning Events: Correct and incorrect Feedback Events combined relative to 
Rest or relative to Stimulus-Response Decision Events revealed no significant striatal 
activations.  Significant VS but not DS activity occurred in the left (peak coordinates: -18, 
11, -1; t=4.49, q=0.016; Figure 2.4D), and right nucleus accumbens (peak coordinates: 18, 
11, -7; t=4.87, q<0.007; Figure 2.4D), in the correct minus incorrect feedback contrast, 
however.  No significant striatal region was active in the reverse (i.e., incorrect minus 
correct) contrast.  
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Figure 2.4 Significant activations in contrasts collapsing across Group (PD and control) 
and medication status (OFF and ON). 
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Activation maps are presented at a threshold of p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons, as well as 
centred on the striatal activation for visualization purposes.  A) BOLD signal for Stimulus-Response Decision 
Events minus Rest across all blocks in Phase 1.  The cross-hairs are centred on the significant activity that 
arose in the right dorsal caudate (peak coordinates: 12, 5, 5; t = 5.76, q < 0.001).  B) BOLD signal for Stimulus-
Response Decision minus Feedback Events across all blocks in Phase 1.  The cross-hairs are centred on the 
significant cluster that arose in the right dorsal caudate (peak coordinates: 12, 5, 2; t = 7.51, q < 0.001).  C) 
BOLD signal for Stimulus-Response Decision minus Rest Events across all blocks in Phase 2.  The cross-
hairs are centred on the significant activity that arose in the left dorsal caudate (peak coordinates: 15, -1, 14; 
t = 4.76, q = 0.015.  D) BOLD signal for correct minus incorrect Feedback Events across all blocks in the 
Phase 1.  The cross-hairs are centred on the significant activation that arose in the right nucleus accumbens 
(peak coordinates: 18, 11, -7; t = 4.87, q < 0.007).  A significant cluster was also present in the left nucleus 
accumbens (peak coordinates: -18, 11, -1; t = 4.49, q = 0.016).  N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events 
and FB – Feedback Events in the figure. 
2.3.2.2 Bayesian analysis 
Beta values extracted from the two right and left anatomical DS and VS ROIs from key 
contrasts of interest involving Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback Events (Table 
4).  Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests were conducted on beta values for each of the four 
ROIs extracted from each contrast of interest.  In this analysis, a Bayes’ factor of less than 
three is considered to significantly support the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014). 
Phase 1 Stimulus-Response Decision Events: Contrasting Stimulus-Response Decision 
minus Rest events for Phase 1 in PD patients, collapsed across Medication session revealed 
a Bayes’ factor greater than three in the Right DS in both PD patients and control 
participants, separately (Right DS: BF10 = 8.705; Right DS: BF10 = 3.691, respectively).  
Bayes’ factor for Right VS was also greater than three in PD patients only (BF10 = 3.124). 
Phase 2 Stimulus-Response Decision Events: Contrasting Stimulus-Response Decision 
minus Rest events for Phase 2, collapsed across Medication session, revealed Bayes’ 
factors greater than three in Left DS for PD patients (BF10 = 4.911), and Right DS for 
control participants (BF10 = 6.870). 
Phase 1 Correct minus Incorrect Feedback Events: In the correct minus incorrect Feedback 
Events, collapsed across Medication session, PD patient’s Bayes’ factors for DS ROIs were 
far below three, indicating that beta values in these regions were not significantly above 
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zero (Left DS: BF10 = 0.905; Right DS BF10 = 0.963).  In contrast, Bayes’ factors for VS 
ROIs were above three indicating that VS is preferentially activated during these events 
with beta values significantly above zero (Left VS: BF10 = 8.666; Right DS: BF10 = 7.022).  
A similar pattern arose in control participants (Left DS: BF10 = 0.129; Right DS BF10 = 
0.117; Left DS: BF10 = 4.843; Right DS BF10 = 7.042).       
Table 2.4 Bayes’ factors for contrasts of interest in Phases 1 and 2. 
Contrasts  Left DS 
Right 
DS 
Left 
VS 
Right 
VS 
PD patients collapsed across Medication session 
i) Stimulus-Response Decision Events in 
Phase 1 1.768 8.705 0.561 3.124 
ii) Stimulus-Response Decision Events in 
Phase 2 4.911 2.396 1.222 0.363 
iii) Correct minus Incorrect Feedback Events 
minus Rest in Phase 1 0.905 0.963 8.666 7.022 
Control participants collapsed across Medication session 
i) Stimulus-Response Decision Events in 
Phase 1 1.505 3.691 0.827 1.003 
ii) Stimulus-Response Decision Events in 
Phase 2 2.684 6.870 0.625 0.625 
iii) Correct minus Incorrect Feedback 
Events minus Rest in Phase 1 0.129 0.117 4.843 7.042 
Bayes’ factors (BF10) are presented for each of the four anatomical ROIs for contrasts of interest.  Bayes’ 
factors less than three indicate that the results strongly support the null hypothesis, that activation is not 
greater than zero.   
2.3.2.3 Brain-behaviour correlations: PD and controls separately 
Two right and left VS and two right and left DS ROIs were employed in Nole M. Hiebert, 
Vo, et al. (2014)—the study in which the current cognitive paradigm was first explored 
with fMRI in healthy young controls.  BOLD signal in these ROIs was correlated with our 
behavioural measures of stimulus-response decision accuracy and feedback-based learning 
efficiency.  The Adjusted-Savings Score served as our measure of decision accuracy, and 
the slope of change in correctly associating stimuli and responses was used our measure of 
stimulus-response association learning.  
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Striatum and response-selection decisions:  Beta values from each of the ROIs were 
correlated with adjusted-saving scores in OFF and ON sessions for PD patients and healthy 
controls separately.  For PD patients, beta values extracted during Stimulus-Response 
Decision Events in the Phase 2 from the left dorsal caudate ROI positively correlated with 
adjusted savings scores (r=0.35, t=2.19, p=0.035; Figure 2.5A).  For control participants, 
beta values extracted from the right dorsal putamen ROI significantly correlated with 
adjusted savings (r=0.35, t=2.18, p=0.042; Figure 2.5B).  Neither of the VS ROIs correlated 
with Adjusted-Savings Scores in either the PD or the healthy control group. 
Striatum and learning from feedback:  Beta values from each of the VS and DS ROIs were 
correlated with slope of learning in the OFF and ON sessions combined for PD patients 
and healthy controls separately.  A significant positive correlation arose between slope and 
beta value in the right ventral caudate ROI (r=0.34, t=2.17, p=0.037; Figure 2.5C) for PD 
patients only.  No other ROIs correlated significantly with slope.  Of greatest significance 
given our aim of directly testing the notion that DS mediates stimulus-response learning, 
levels of activation in our DS ROIs did not correlate with the slope of stimulus-response 
learning in either the PD or control groups.   
 
Figure 2.5 Brain-behaviour correlations between BOLD signal in ROIs and measures of 
learning and stimulus-specific response selection. 
A) Beta values extracted from the left dorsal caudate ROI in the Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus 
Rest contrast correlated positively and significantly with adjusted-savings in patients with PD on and off 
medication.  B) Beta values extracted from the right dorsal putamen ROI significantly correlated with adjusted 
savings in healthy controls.  C) Beta values extracted from the right anterior VS ROI in the Feedback Events 
minus Rest contrast, correlated positively and significantly with slope of learning in patients with PD on and 
off medication. 
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2.3.2.4 PD patients: OFF versus ON sessions 
Stimulus-Response Decision events OFF minus ON: There was no preferential activity in 
the striatum in this contrast for Phase 1 or 2 data.  
Stimulus-Response Decision events PD ON minus OFF: Significant left (peak coordinates: 
-24, 5, 11; t=3.86, p<0.001) and right dorsal putamen (peak coordinates: 21, 2, 14; t=3.83, 
p<0.001) activity arose in the ON relative to OFF Session for Stimulus-Response Decision 
Events in Phase 1 (Figure 2.6A).  A significant peak of activity in the right nucleus 
accumbens (peak coordinates: 12, 11, -10; t=4.40, p<0.001) also arose.  Significant left 
(peak coordinates: -12, 11, 14; t=3.68, p<0.001) and right dorsal caudate (peak 
coordinates: 6, 2, 20; t=3.45, p<0.001) activity occurred in the ON relative to OFF Session 
for the Stimulus-Response Decision contrast in Phase 2 (Figure 2.6B).  Overall, these 
results reveal a task-specific, dopaminergic therapy-related DS BOLD signal enhancement 
for decision enactment. 
Feedback learning events OFF minus ON: When Feedback Events were investigated in 
the OFF minus ON contrast, significantly greater activity occurred in the left ventral 
putamen (peak coordinates: -21, 5, -1; t=3.41, p<0.001; Figure 2.6C), suggesting that 
medication dampened VS activity.   
Feedback learning events ON minus OFF: No significant activity occurred in this contrast. 
Feedback learning correct minus incorrect events OFF minus ON: Significantly greater 
activity occurred in the right ventral putamen, extending into the nucleus accumbens and 
ventral caudate (peak coordinates: 18, 11, -4; t=3.15, p=0.001) when PD patients were 
tested off relative to on dopaminergic therapy.  Again, this suggests that dopaminergic 
therapy attenuates VS activity, consistent with the dopamine overdose hypothesis. 
Feedback learning correct minus incorrect events ON minus OFF: No significant striatal 
activity occurred in this contrast. 
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Table 2.5 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest for patients with PD 
OFF versus ON dopaminergic medication reported in MNI space. 
Contrast Anatomical Area Cluster 
Size 
t p* x, y, z 
Phase 1:  SR Events      
OFF minus ON SR 
events  
No suprathreshold 
activations 
    
ON minus OFF SR 
events  
Right dorsal 
putamen 
15 3.83 <0.001 21, 2, 14 
 Left dorsal putamen 36 3.86 <0.001 -24, 5, 11 
 Right nucleus 
accumbens 
** 4.40 <0.001 12, 11, -10 
Phase 2: SR Events      
OFF minus ON SR 
events  
No suprathreshold 
activations 
    
ON minus OFF SR 
events  
Left dorsal caudate 43 3.68 <0.001 -12, 11, 14 
 Right dorsal caudate 61 3.45 <0.001 6, 2, 20 
Phase 1: FB Events      
OFF minus ON FB 
events 
Left ventral putamen 14 3.41 <0.001 21, 5, -1 
ON minus OFF FB 
events  
No suprathreshold 
activations 
    
OFF minus ON 
Correct minus 
Incorrect FB events 
Left ventral putamen 178 
 
3.15 0.001 -21, 20, -1 
ON minus OFF 
Correct minus 
Incorrect FB events 
No suprathreshold 
activations 
    
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  p values are reported at a significance level of at p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected at 
the voxel level.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in 
each contrast.  **Cluster size unobtainable as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster.   N.B. SR – 
Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.  
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Figure 2.6 Significant activations in contrasts examining only PD patients ON and OFF 
dopaminergic medication. 
88 
 
Activation maps are presented at a threshold of p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons and centred 
on the striatal activation.  A) BOLD signal for ON minus OFF Stimulus-Response Decision Events across all 
blocks in Phase 1.  The cross-hairs are centred on the significant cluster that arose in the left dorsal putamen 
(peak coordinates: -24, 5, 11; t = 3.86, p < 0.001).  Significant activity also arose in the right dorsal putamen 
(peak coordinates: 21, 2, 14; t = 3.83, p < 0.001) and right nucleus accumbens (peak coordinates: 12, 11, -
10; t = 4.40, p < 0.001).  B) BOLD signal for ON minus OFF Stimulus-Response Decision Events across all 
blocks in Phase 2.  The cross-hairs are centred on the significant activity that arose in the right dorsal caudate 
(peak coordinates: -12, 11, 14; t = 3.68, p < 0.001).  Significant activity also occurred in the left dorsal caudate 
(peak coordinates: 6, 2, 20; t = 3.45, p < 0.001).  C) BOLD signal for OFF minus ON Feedback Events across 
all blocks in the Phase 1.  The cross-hairs are centred on the significant cluster in the left ventral putamen 
(peak coordinates: 21, 5, -1; t = 3.41, p < 0.001).  D)  BOLD signal for OFF minus ON correct minus incorrect 
Feedback Events across all blocks in Phase 1.  The cross-hairs are centred on the cluster of activation in the 
left ventral putamen (peak coordinates: -21, 20, -1; t = 3.15, p = 0.001).  N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response 
Decision Events and FB – Feedback Events in the figure. 
2.3.2.5 Healthy control: ON versus OFF sessions 
There was no preferential activity in the striatum in any contrasts comparing OFF and ON 
sessions in healthy controls.  This is as expected given that healthy control participants did 
not actually receive dopaminergic therapy in any condition and their data were simply 
analyzed to correspond to the OFF-ON state of the PD patient to whom they were matched.    
Table 2.6 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest for healthy controls in 
the OFF versus ON groups 
Contrast Anatomical 
Area 
Cluster 
Size 
t q* x, y, z 
Phase 1: SR Events      
OFF minus ON SR events  No suprathreshold activations  
ON minus OFF SR events  No suprathreshold activations   
Phase 2: SR Events      
OFF minus ON SR events  No suprathreshold activations  
ON minus OFF SR events  No suprathreshold activations   
Phase 1: FB Events      
OFF minus ON FB events  No suprathreshold activations  
ON minus OFF FB events No suprathreshold activations   
OFF minus ON Correct 
minus Incorrect FB events 
No suprathreshold activations  
ON minus OFF Correct 
minus Incorrect FB events 
No suprathreshold activations 
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Cluster size is reported in voxels.  p values are reported at a significance level of p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons.  p values are reported at the voxel level.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  
Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each contrast.  **Cluster size unobtainable as peak 
coordinates are within a larger cluster. N.B.  SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback 
Events.  
2.3.2.6 PD versus controls 
OFF Stimulus-Response Decision Events: Contrasting PD minus control revealed no 
significant striatal activity in Phases 1 or 2.  However, in the control minus PD contrast, 
controls exhibited significantly greater activation in the right dorsal caudate nucleus (peak 
coordinates: 6, 5, 5; t=3.21, p<0.001) than PD patients who were in the OFF state in Phase 
1.  No significant activity arose in Phase 2 comparing control and PD participants.   
ON Stimulus-Response Decision Events: When PD patients were corrected with exogenous 
dopaminergic therapy in the ON Session, no significant striatal activity arose in the PD 
minus control or control minus PD contrasts.  In Phase 2, in fact, significantly greater 
activation arose in the left (peak coordinates: -12, 11, 17; t=3.75, p<0.001) and right dorsal 
caudate nuclei (peak coordinates: 6, 5, 20; t=3.35, p<0.001) for PD patients relative to 
healthy age-matched controls.  Recall that age-matched controls did not actually receive 
dopaminergic therapy and rather their data were simply analyzed to correspond to the 
dopaminergic state of the PD patient to whom they were matched. No significant striatal 
activity occurred in the reverse contrast (i.e., control minus PD). 
OFF Feedback Events: No significant striatal activity arose for OFF sessions in the PD 
minus control contrast.  A significant cluster arose in the left ventral caudate (peak 
coordinates: -18, 23, -1; t=3.66, p<0.001) in the control minus PD contrast. 
ON Feedback Events: Contrasting PD minus control revealed no significant striatal 
activity.  However, in the control minus PD contrast, significant activity arose in the left 
ventral putamen (peak coordinates: -18, 5, -1; t=2.31, p=0.001). 
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Table 2.7 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest for patients with PD 
versus control participants OFF and ON dopaminergic medication reported in MNI 
space. 
Contrast Anatomical 
Area 
Cluster 
Size 
t p* x, y, z 
Phase 1: SR Events      
PD OFF minus control OFF No suprathreshold activations   
control OFF minus PD OFF  Right dorsal 
caudate 
2 3.21 0.001 6, 5, 5 
PD ON minus control ON  No suprathreshold activations   
control ON minus PD ON  No suprathreshold activations   
Phase 2: SR Events      
PD OFF minus control OFF  No suprathreshold activations   
control OFF minus PD OFF  No suprathreshold activations   
PD ON minus control ON  Left dorsal 
caudate 
8 3.75 <0.001 -12, 11, 17 
control ON minus PD ON  No suprathreshold activations   
Phase 1: FB Events      
PD OFF minus control OFF  No suprathreshold activations   
control OFF minus PD OFF  Left ventral 
caudate 
29 3.66 <0.001 -18, 23, -1 
PD ON minus control ON  No suprathreshold activations   
control ON minus PD ON  No suprathreshold activations   
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  p values are reported at a significance level of at p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected at 
the voxel level.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in 
each contrast. N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.  
2.4 Discussion 
In both Phases 1 and 2 across Sessions 1 and 2, we found that DS activity correlated 
preferentially with Stimulus-Response Decision Events and not with Feedback Events.  It 
is notable that feedback-based learning was precluded by the omission of feedback in Phase 
2.  DS activation persisted in Phase 2 nonetheless, further casting doubt on DS’s role in 
feedback-based learning.  We also found that beta values in DS ROIs (i.e., left dorsal 
caudate in the PD group; left dorsal putamen in the healthy controls) in Phase 2 correlated 
with the accuracy of stimulus-specific response selections (i.e., Adjusted Savings Score), 
intended as our behavioural measure of decision making.  Most significant, given our aim 
of critically testing DS’s role in stimulus-response learning, intensity of activation in DS 
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ROIs did not correlate with our behavioural measure of learning efficiency in either the PD 
or control group. These results implicate DS in stimulus-specific response decisions 
entirely replicating our main finding in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), in which we 
used this paradigm in healthy young controls. 
In contrast, in Phase 1 only, VS was preferentially activated during correct relative to 
incorrect Feedback Events.  The Feedback Event in each trial is the moment during which 
learning stimulus-response relations occurs through deterministic outcome information.  
Further, we found that beta values in a VS ROI (i.e., right ventral caudate in the PD group) 
correlated significantly with Learning Slope, our measure of learning efficiency but not 
with Adjusted-Savings Score, our measure of decision accuracy.  These findings support a 
role for VS in stimulus-response association learning also replicating our results with 
healthy young controls in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014).  
In agreement with our frequentist behavioural and fMRI analyses presented above, using 
Bayesian analyses we found that in both PD patients and healthy controls investigated 
separately, activation in DS ROIs correlated significantly with Stimulus-Response 
Decision Events in both Phases 1 and 2 of the experiment.  In contrast and of critical 
importance given the main aim of our study, with Bayesian analysis, we confirmed that 
activation in DS ROIs was not significantly associated with stimulus-response association 
learning during Feedback events (i.e., the null hypothesis was supported).  VS ROI beta 
values were significant during the Feedback event using Bayesian analyses concordant 
with our other investigations in suggesting that the VS mediates stimulus-response 
association learning through feedback.  
Strongly supporting these distinct cognitive roles for DS and VS, PD patients evidenced 
impaired response-selection performance, using the Adjusted-Savings Score, off 
medication, which was normalized by dopaminergic therapy.  Conversely, efficiency of 
learning stimulus-response associations, assessed by our slope of learning measure, was 
equivalent for PD patients and healthy controls, off dopaminergic medication.  However, 
the slope of learning was worsened by dopaminergic medication in our PD group.  Recall 
that in PD, DS is dopamine depleted and its functions are impaired in the OFF state.  DS 
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functions are remediated by dopaminergic therapy.  In contrast, VTA-innervated brain 
areas such as VS are relatively dopamine replete and their functions are normal at baseline.  
Their functions are actually worsened due to dopamine overdose in the ON state (Cools, 
2006).  Entirely confirming our interpretation of the behavioural patterns, DS signal 
associated with the Stimulus-Response Decision Event was enhanced by dopaminergic 
medications in PD patients using within-subject contrasts. In contrast, Feedback Event-
related VS signal was depressed by exogenous dopamine therapy (i.e., dopamine overdose 
effect).  
In contrast to our findings in PD, for healthy controls who did not actually receive 
dopaminergic therapy but whose data were analyzed to correspond to the ON-OFF order 
of the PD patients to whom they were matched, there were no response-selection accuracy 
or learning efficiency differences, or differential patterns of fMRI activity comparing the 
ON versus OFF sessions, as expected.  These findings in controls suggest that differences 
observed for PD patients were not the result of order, practice, or stimulus effects across 
the OFF and ON sessions. 
Bolstering our within-subject patterns in PD, between-group comparisons revealed that DS 
activation in PD patients was reduced relative to DS activation in healthy age-matched 
controls in the OFF state during Stimulus-Response Decision Events.  DS activation 
between PD and healthy controls was equivalent, however, in the ON Sessions, once PD 
patients were medicated with dopaminergic therapy.  Further, VS, but not DS, activation 
was decreased for PD patients relative to healthy controls in the ON Session in the exact 
region (i.e., left ventral putamen) where dopaminergic therapy attenuated VS activation in 
the PD OFF-ON contrast, consistent with the dopamine overdose hypothesis.    
2.4.1 Cognitive functions mediated by striatum 
The striatum mediates cognitive functions (Atallah et al., 2007; Alex A. MacDonald et al., 
2014) in addition to its better-known role in motor control.  We independently assessed 
response-selection decisions and stimulus-response learning, using behavioural measures 
and distinct fMRI events.  We aimed to disentangle neural substrates specifically mediating 
these different cognitive processes.  DS activation correlated with stimulus-response 
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decisions whereas VS signal arose preferentially during delivery of feedback through 
which stimulus-response associations were learned.  This entirely replicates our results in 
healthy, young individuals (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).  Beyond correlational 
evidence, however, in PD patients, we found clear double dissociations in DS- and VS-
mediated behaviour and preferential neural activity contrasting the OFF and ON 
dopaminergic therapy states.  PD patients demonstrated enhanced stimulus-specific 
response-selection accuracy and DS activity during Stimulus-Response Decision Events, 
compared to attenuated stimulus-response association learning and VS activation during 
Feedback Events, on relative to off dopaminergic therapy.  This pattern of results provides 
strong support for the concept that DS mediates response-selection decisions and not 
learning─ the latter being mediated by VS rather.  
Our results are completely at odds with the large literature attributing feedback-based 
learning to DS (Balleine, Liljeholm, & Ostlund, 2009; Hart, Leung, & Balleine, 2013; Yin 
& Knowlton, 2006).  A potential explanation for the long-standing association of DS with 
stimulus-response association learning, despite increasing numbers of contradictory results 
(Atallah et al., 2007; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2008; Ohira et al., 2010; Reiss et al., 
2005), relates to the common confounding of  learning and decision-making processes 
(Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004).  In behavioural studies, learning is 
generally measured by the accuracy of stimulus-specific response selections that are 
provided as evidence that learning has occurred.  Poor performance therefore could be the 
result of failing either to learn stimulus-response associations or to correctly select 
responses based on these learned associations.  In fMRI studies, a) enacting a response 
when presented with a stimulus, and b) learning from feedback, are typically treated as a 
single event with all significantly-activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning per se 
(Dobryakova & Tricomi, 2013; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; Poldrack et al., 1999).  By 
separately assessing response-selection decisions and learning, our approach aimed to 
resolve the discrepancy between studies that involve DS in feedback-based learning 
(Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005; O'Doherty et al., 2004) versus those in PD patients 
(Swainson et al., 2000; Vo et al., 2014), and participants with DS lesions (Ell, Marchant, 
& Ivry, 2006; Exner et al., 2002) that dispute the notion that DS mediates stimulus-response 
learning.   
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Our findings integrate with a growing literature favouring a role for DS in decision making 
rather than learning per se.  In neuroimaging studies, DS activity consistently remains 
significantly increased above baseline after sequences (Reiss et al., 2005), categorization 
rules (Helie, Roeder, & Ashby, 2010; Seger, Peterson, Cincotta, Lopez-Paniagua, & 
Anderson, 2010), stimulus–reward (Daw & Doya, 2006; Seger et al., 2010), and response–
reward associations (Ohira et al., 2010) are well learned.  Additionally, DS frequently 
correlates with response selections, particularly when an element of deliberation is required 
(N. M. Hiebert, Owen, Seergobin, & MacDonald, 2017), even in contexts devoid of new 
learning (Grahn et al., 2008), such as in the Stroop task (Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, & 
Price, 2010), and in making numeric magnitude judgments (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011).  
This activation profile is inconsistent with a brain region mediating learning per se and is 
more in line with one that underlies decisions.   
Our results, in contrast suggest that VS mediates learning stimulus-response associations.  
Replicating our previous findings (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), VS signal occurred 
specifically during the Feedback Event and correlated with efficiency of learning assessed 
with slope measure.  Further, learning efficiency and VS activation were reduced for PD 
patients on relative to off dopaminergic therapy, suggesting that VS, a VTA-innervated 
structure, was overdosed by exogenous dopamine.  This result fits with the larger literature 
implicating VS in forms of implicit learning, such as reward (Camara, Rodriguez-Fornells, 
& Munte, 2010), stimulus-stimulus (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011), sequence (Ghilardi et 
al., 2007), motor sequence (Feigin et al., 2003), and category learning (Shohamy, Myers, 
Geghman, Sage, & Gluck, 2006). 
2.4.2 Effect of dopaminergic therapy on cognition in PD 
The notion that abnormalities in dopamine across different brain regions cause cognitive 
as well as motor symptoms in PD has long been considered (Brown & Marsden, 1984; 
Gotham, Brown, & Marsden, 1988).  Cognitive functions mediated by SNc-innervated 
brain regions such as the DS are expected to be improved by dopaminergic therapy, 
whereas the opposite pattern is expected for VTA-supplied brain regions such as VS in PD.  
This is due to different rates and degrees of degeneration of dopamine-producing neurons 
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in SNc and VTA in PD.  This theoretical framework successfully explains complex 
behavioural patterns in PD (Cools, 2006; Vaillancourt, Schonfeld, Kwak, Bohnen, & 
Seidler, 2013).  This framework is prevalent and effectively accounts for behavioural 
patterns across a large number of PD studies (Cools, 2006; Dirnberger & Jahanshahi, 2013; 
Vaillancourt et al., 2013).  Studies that fully support these concepts in a single experiment 
are lacking, however.  Here, we provide direct support for this framework for 
understanding cognitive patterns in PD.  We show for the first time that dopaminergic 
therapy simultaneously a) improved DS-mediated response selection and boosted DS 
signal and b) impaired VS-mediated stimulus-response learning and attenuated VS activity.  
Though previous investigations provide evidence of improved DS function and increased 
DS activity (Aarts et al., 2014) or impaired functions mediated by VTA-innervation brain 
regions and corresponding reduced signal (Aarts et al., 2014; Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, 
& Robbins, 2007; Kwak, Müller, Bohnen, Dayalu, & Seidler, 2012; Van Eimeren et al., 
2009), none have provided evidence of these simultaneous and opposite effects within the 
same participants, though a number of studies aimed to do so (Aarts et al., 2014; Argyelan 
et al., 2008; Shiner et al., 2012; Van Eimeren et al., 2009).  
2.4.3 Conclusions 
Our findings dispute the prevalent notion that DS mediates stimulus-response learning.  We 
showed that DS mediates response selections whereas VS underlies feedback-based 
learning in PD patients and healthy age-matched controls.  This study provides strong 
support for the view that DS has been erroneously ascribed a role in feedback-based, 
stimulus-response learning due to methodology that confounds learning and response-
selection processes.  Our findings integrate with a growing literature favouring a role for 
DS in decision performance rather than learning per se.      
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Chapter 3  
3 Role of baseline dorsal and ventral striatum activity in 
stimulus-response learning in patients with obsessive 
compulsive disorder 
Dorsal striatum (DS) has long been implicated in stimulus-response learning, though recent 
results challenge this notion.  We have proposed that discrepant findings arise because 
stimulus-response learning methodology generally confounds learning and response 
selection processes.  We implement a design that allows DS and ventral striatum (VS) to 
be assessed within the same experimental paradigm, with these conditions interleaved with 
one another.   Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a prevalent psychiatric disorder 
characterized by obsessions and compulsions.  Studies investigating symptomatology and 
cognitive deficits in OCD frequently implicate the DS and VS.  The main aim of this study 
was to dissociate the roles of DS and VS in decision making and stimulus-response learning 
in patients with OCD to a) better clarify DS and VS function, as well as b) understand how 
DS and VS dysfunction might lead to characteristic symptoms.  We found that patients 
with OCD (n=14) and healthy age-matched controls (n=15) exhibited decision making 
deficits and learned associations slower compared to controls.  Along with these 
behavioural deficits, OCD patients had reduced task-relevant activity in DS and VS, 
compared to controls.  In healthy controls, activity in DS arose during response selection 
and correlated with our measure of decision making and not learning, however.  When rest 
activity was separately investigated, no differences were noted in DS but activity in VS 
was significantly higher in patients with OCD compared to controls.  Additionally, the 
level of activity in VS negatively correlated with the severity of compulsions in patients 
with OCD.  OCD patients with higher baseline VS activity had less severe compulsions, 
potentially because tension-reduction related to compulsion-enactment could not be 
encoded as rewarding when VS was chronically hyperactive.  This study suggests that DS 
does not mediate stimulus-response learning and sheds light on the cognitive deficits and 
symptoms experienced by patients with OCD. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric disorder prevalent in 1.2% of 
American adults and is described by the National Institute of Mental Health as typically 
chronic with a gradual onset (Association, 2013; Sasson et al., 1997).  OCD is characterized 
by two major symptoms: obsessions and compulsions (Association, 2013; Sasson et al., 
1997).  The former is defined as disturbing thoughts, urges, or impulses, and the latter as 
recurring behaviours or mental acts that individuals affected by the disorder feel driven to 
perform (Association, 2013). 
Patients with this disorder exhibit diversity in severity, however, the symptoms tend to 
follow a general order: obsessive thoughts, anxiety, compulsions, and temporary relief with 
reduction in anxiety (Association, 2013; Sasson et al., 1997). For example, with respect to 
sanitization, patients may have an irrational fear of being contaminated by germs, resulting 
in illness or death (Bokor & Anderson, 2014; Mataix-Cols et al., 2004).  Anxiety often 
ensues and patients feel driven to carry out certain tasks to reduce their distress. The 
individual may wash or clean repetitively until a “feeling” of cleanliness is achieved, 
whereas a typical individual may wash until observing that they are clean.  Completion of 
the respective compulsions result in temporary relief and the cycle repeats.  Patients spend 
a substantial amount of time with their obsessions and carrying out compulsions, and this 
can be costly to maintaining jobs and relationships (Torres et al., 2015). 
The basal ganglia, a group of subcortical nuclei, is commonly known to be impaired in 
movement disorders (i.e., Parkinson’s disease).  However, the striatum, the input region of 
the basal ganglia, is increasingly implicated in cognitive functions (Gotham, Brown, & 
Marsden, 1988; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011).  The striatum can be divided 
functionally into two regions, the dorsal and ventral striatum (DS and VS, respectively), 
based on independent dopaminergic and glutamatergic inputs, vascular supplies, and 
functions (Feekes & Cassell, 2006; Kish, Shannak, & Hornykiewicz, 1988; Tziortzi et al., 
2014).  DS encompasses the majority of the caudate nucleus and putamen, and VS is 
comprised of the NAcc and ventral regions of the caudate nucleus and putamen (P. A. 
MacDonald & Monchi, 2011). 
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The view that DS is critical for stimulus-response learning, is well-entrenched (Brovelli, 
Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2011; Chiu, Jiang, & Egner, 2017; Thompson RL, 1963; 
Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Despite the prevalence of this view, learning is often preserved 
in patients (Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, Vo, Ganjavi, & 
MacDonald, 2014; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2013; Vo et al., 2014) and animals (Atallah, 
Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007) with DS dysfunction.  
Potentially underlying the discrepancies in the stimulus-response learning literature, 
response selection decisions and learning are often intrinsically confounded (Jessup & 
O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004).  In stimulus-response learning experiments, 
trials generally proceed as follows: a) a stimulus is presented and participants perform a 
response, and b) feedback regarding response accuracy is provided.  Feedback is the means 
through which stimulus-response associations are learned.  Accuracy in selecting a learned 
response provides the learning measure.  Performance depends upon both decision and 
learning processes.  Failing either to acquire stimulus-response relations or to correctly 
select learned responses produces impaired performance.  Further, in fMRI studies, a) 
deciding upon and enacting a response, and b) learning from feedback, are typically treated 
as a single event with all significantly activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning 
per se (Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999).  
Accordingly, some brain regions that might underlie response selection could erroneously 
be assigned a role in learning.  The objective of the current study was to directly test this 
confound in patients with OCD, using a stimulus-response learning paradigm previously 
shown to separate decisions and learning, producing differential patterns of activity in DS 
and VS (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).    
Notably, a number of studies have observed striatal changes in patients with OCD.  It has 
been found that the VS in patients with OCD has a higher metabolism compared to controls 
at rest (Del Casale et al., 2011; Menzies et al., 2008), as well as in response to symptom-
provoking stimuli using PET (Rauch, Jenike, Alpert, & et al., 1994).  Interestingly, despite 
this baseline increase in activity, during VS-mediated reward-anticipation tasks, Figee et 
al. (2011) reported a decreased change in VS activity in patients with OCD compared to 
controls.     
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In contrast, patients with OCD were found to exhibit decreased DS activity at rest and 
during DS-mediated tasks (Del Casale et al., 2011).  Nakao et al. (2005) conducted a 
colour-word Stroop task, where colour words (i.e., Red, Blue, Green), are presented in font 
colours that are either congruent with the colour word (i.e., Red, Blue, Green), or 
incongruent with the colour word (i.e., Red, Blue, Green).  Patients with OCD and healthy 
controls were instructed to name the colour of the font, rather than read the colour word 
while brain activity was simultaneously recorded using fMRI.  Patients with OCD took 
longer to complete the Stroop task and did not exhibit significant activity in DS, as did the 
healthy controls.  In this task, the role of DS has been shown to mediate inhibiting the 
response that is more salient (colour word) and outputting the visual, font colour 
information (Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, & Price, 2010; Coderre & van Heuven, 2013; 
Djamshidian, O'Sullivan, Lees, & Averbeck, 2011; Fera et al., 2007; Larson, Clayson, 
Primosch, Leyton, & Steffensen, 2015; C. M. MacLeod, 1991; C. M.  MacLeod & 
MacDonald, 2000; Nakao et al., 2005; Wright & Wanley, 2003).  DS deficits in patients 
with OCD result in poor cognitive flexibility and response inhibition that may lead to 
compulsive actions. 
If DS mediates stimulus-response learning, it is predicted that a) DS activity will correlate 
with learning measures and with the moment when stimulus-response association learning 
occurs (i.e., the Feedback Event, when outcome information regarding response accuracy 
is provided), and b) learning will be diminished in patients with OCD and related to reduced 
DS activity compared to controls.  
In contrast, if DS mediates stimulus-response decision performance and VS mediates 
stimulus-response association learning, as we expect, a) DS activity will correlate with 
accuracy of decision performance and with the moment when response selection occurs 
(i.e., the Stimulus-Response Decision Event), and b) accuracy of stimulus-specific 
decisions and DS signal will be poorer in patients with OCD compared to controls.  Further, 
we predict that a) VS activity will correlate with learning measures and with the moment 
of learning during the Feedback Event, and b) efficiency of learning and VS task-related 
signal (i.e., processing of feedback through which stimulus-response associations are 
learned) will be deminished in patients with OCD compared to controls.  
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In turn, this task further allowed us to explore cognitive deficits in patients with OCD, 
relating them to the DS and VS in particular, as well as other brain regions that might 
cooperate with these striatal regions.  Further, we planned to explore how striatal signals 
related to symptoms of OCD. 
3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Fourteen patients with OCD and 15 control participants completed the experiment.  All 
patients with OCD were previously diagnosed by a licenced psychiatrist.  All participants 
had no confounding neurological or psychiatric disorders.  Patients abusing alcohol, 
prescription or street drugs, or taking cognitive-enhancing medications like donepezil, 
galantamine, rivastigmine, memantine, or methylphenidate were excluded from 
participating.  
Mean group demographic, as well as cognitive and affective screen scores for all patients 
and controls were recorded (Table 3.1).  The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale 
(YBOCS) was administered to patients with OCD to quantify the presence and severity of 
obsessive and compulsive symptoms.  The YBOCS is scored yielding a total OCD severity 
score, an obsession sub-score and a compulsive sub-score. 
3.2.2 Experimental Design 
Each participant completed a stimulus-response task in which they learned to associate 
twelve abstract images with one of three button-press responses.  These images, shown in 
Figure 3.1, were computer-generated with GroBoto (Braid Art Labs, Colorado Springs, 
USA).  The task was administered within a 3 Tesla fMRI scanner to observe concurrent 
regional activity within the striatum.  
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Figure 3.1 Abstract images presented in the experiment.   
Images were associated with a button pressed by the index, middle, or ring finger buttons. 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates an example of an experimental trial. Each trial consisted of an 
abstract image being presented in the centre of a projection screen until a response was 
selected.  The participant chose one of the three button-press options.  Feedback regarding 
accuracy of the response (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) was provided.  This provided the 
basis for learning the stimulus-response associations between each abstract image and the 
corresponding button-press response. 
108 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Example of a single trial in the experiment.   
Participants learned to associate six abstract images with one of three button-press responses in Phase 1.  
The following is an example of a trial: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection screen for 500 ms; 
(ii) a blank screen occurred for 500 ms; (iii) an abstract image was presented in the centre of the projection 
screen until a button-press response; (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time sampled from 
an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v) feedback (i.e., 
‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time 
sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms).   
Trials were organized into five blocks.  Each block was comprised of 24 trials–with each 
abstract image randomly appearing twice within each block.  After each block, a percentage 
score was displayed–indicative of their performance. 
There were four buttons on the button box.  Each of the second, third, and fourth buttons 
corresponded to four abstract images.  Participants pressed these three buttons with their 
index, middle, and ring fingers, respectively.  The first button, pressed by the thumb, served 
to advance from the feedback phase to the next trial.  Therefore, motor responses were 
included in both decision-making and feedback phases. 
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Trials proceeded as follows: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection screen for 
700 ms; (ii) a blank screen occurred for 300 ms; (iii) an abstract image was presented until 
a button-press response was made; (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of 
time ; (v) feedback (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen 
appeared until the participant pressed the first button with his/her thumb to proceed to the 
next trial; (vii) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time.  
The inter-stimulus interval (ISI), the period between the response selection and feedback, 
and the inter-trial interval (ITI), the duration between the offset of feedback and the onset 
of the following trial, were jittered. These intervals varied in duration and the length of 
time was sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; 
maximum: 7000 ms). 
These variable intervals served to distinguish two independent events within each trial: the 
Stimulus-Response Decision event and the Feedback event (Figure 3.2).  As previously 
discussed, the Stimulus-Response Decision event consisted of exposure to the abstract 
image until a button-press response was selected.  The Feedback or learning event 
consisted of the duration in which feedback was provided.  In addition to distinguishing 
between Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback events, Rest events will serve as 
establishing baseline activity.  
3.2.3 Behavioural Data Analysis 
In each block, each stimulus was presented twice.  Comparing response times (RT) for 
accurately-performed first presentation of stimuli in the final block of the session (i.e., 
Block 5), with RT for accurately-performed second presentations of stimuli in the second 
to last block of the session (i.e., Block 4), provided our measure of stimulus-response 
decision performance that was free from new feedback-based learning.  Independent t-tests 
were conducted on Final Block RT Change Scores between OCD patients and Controls.   
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Response accuracy (%) was recorded for each block and the slope was calculated across 
all five blocks to operationalize the rate at which participants learned the stimulus-response 
associations across all five blocks.  Block 0 was included in the calculation with a value of 
zero, as participants are assumed to have no prior learned association between the abstract 
images and the correct button-press responses.  The equation used to calculate slope was 
the standard slope of the linear regression function (Microsoft Excel, 2017):  
 
where b is the slope, and x and y are the sample means of the number of blocks and block 
scores, respectively. Statistical analysis involving an independent unpaired Student’s t-Test 
for slope of learning scores between OCD patients and healthy controls. 
3.2.4 Imaging Acquisition 
FMRI data were collected in a 3T Siemens Magnetom Prisma with Total Imaging Matrix 
MRI at Robarts Research Institute at the University of Western Ontario.  A scout image 
was taken to properly orient the participant and T1 for anatomical localization.  Five runs 
of T2*-weighted functional acquisitions were completed, each consisting of one block with 
24 trials.  Each run lasted approximately 5 minutes.  A whole brain image was taken every 
2.5 s, each consisting of 43, 2.5 mm-thick slices.  The field of view was oriented along the 
anterior and posterior commissure of the brain with a matrix of 88 x 88 pixels.  Each 
isotropic voxel size was 2.5×2.5×2.5 mm3.  The echo time was 30 ms and the flip angle 
was 90˚.  
3.2.5 FMRI Data Analysis 
Statistical Parametric Mapping version 12 (SPM12; Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom) was used in conjunction with Matrix Laboratory 
(MATLAB, Mathworks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) to complete fMRI 
analysis.  The scans were slice-time corrected, reoriented for participant motion, spatially 
b =
(∑ x − x )(y− y )
(x − x )∑
2
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normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, smoothed with 
an 8 mm full-width, half maximum Gaussian kernel, and high-pass filtered (0.0056 Hz). 
Fixed-effect analyses were input into SPM12 to model each participant’s data.  Regressors 
were generated by convolving onsets and durations of Stimulus-Response Decision, 
Feedback, and Rest (i.e., ITI) events with the canonical hemodynamic response function. 
The Stimulus-Response Decision event was demarcated as the time between onset of 
abstract image presentation and button-press response, the Feedback event as the time 
between onset of feedback, lasting 1000 ms, including until the participant pressed the first 
button to proceed to the next trial.  As a result, participant motor response occurred in both 
Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback events.  A general linear model, or GLM, was 
created and included the regressors for the Stimulus-Response Decision, Feedback, and 
Rest events.  The GLM examined regional blood-oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD) 
activity associated with these events.  A second GLM was created modelling only Rest 
events, both ISI and ITI events to investigate baseline activity.  Several studies 
investigating baseline activity in patients with OCD have found hypoactive DS and 
hyperactive VS compared to controls.  The Rest events here were modelled to investigate 
this further and determine if baseline activity correlated with behavioural or clinical 
measures, including YBOCS. 
The Harvard-Oxford Subcortical Atlas in the FMRIB Software Library version 5.0 (FSL 
v5.0; Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, United Kingdom) was used to define striatal 
regions. MNI space was used as an x, y, and z coordinate system to delineate each region. 
The VS was defined as z < 2 in MNI space, including the nucleus accumbens and the 
ventral portion of the caudate nucleus and putamen (Postuma & Dagher, 2006).  The DS 
was defined as z ≥ 2 in MNI space, consisting of the bulk of the caudate nucleus and 
putamen (Postuma & Dagher, 2006). 
Contrast models were created to examine differences in VS and DS activity, as well as in 
other brain regions, between the OCD and control groups during different events in the 
stimulus-response task. The following contrasts of interest were analyzed: (i) Stimulus-
Response Decision events minus Rest (i.e., ITI interval) collapsed across Group (OCD and 
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control); (ii) Feedback events minus Rest collapsed across Group (OCD and control); (iii) 
Stimulus-Response Decision events for the OCD group minus for the control group; (iv) 
Feedback events for the OCD group minus for the control group; (v) Rest events for OCD 
minus for control; and (vi) Rest events for control minus for OCD Rest events.  Contrast 
images were examined at the group level in SPM12 for Stimulus-Response Decision, 
Feedback, and Rest events in a separate model. A secondary analysis was performed 
correlating behavioural and clinical data analysis with BOLD analysis during Stimulus-
Response Decision, and Feedback events for the OCD and control groups. 
3.2.6 Correlation Analysis 
Next, we investigated brain-behaviour correlations to confirm that behavioural 
performance was related to DS versus VS activity patterns.  We tested whether BOLD 
signal in striatal regions correlated with behavioural indices of response selection decisions 
and learning respectively.  Specifically, we tested whether activity in two anatomical DS 
ROIs consisting of regions of the caudate nucleus and putamen above z=2, and two VS 
ROIs, consisting of the NAcc and regions of the caudate nucleus and putamen ventral to 
z=2 were correlated with Final Block RT Change (i.e., our measure of response-selection 
decisions), and with Learning Slope (i.e., our measure of learning efficiency).  Correlations 
were performed separately for OCD and healthy control groups in the event that learning 
and response selection performance differed across groups.  The two DS and VS ROIs 
were employed for the correlation analysis in the present study using the MarsBar Toolbox 
in SPM12 (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002).  Beta values in our ROIs were 
extracted from four contrasts of interest: (i) Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus 
Rest for patients with OCD; (ii) Feedback Events minus Rest for patients with OCD; (iii) 
Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest for healthy controls; and (iv) Feedback 
Events minus Rest for healthy controls.  These average beta values for each ROI were 
correlated with behavioural measures of stimulus-specific response selection (i.e., the Final 
Block RT Change) and learning (i.e., Learning Slope) for each group separately.  
Additionally, beta values were extracted for OCD patients from the rest model and the 
experimental model described above to investigate whether baseline activity levels 
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correlated with OCD symptoms.  Specifically, the two DS and VS ROIs were correlated 
with YBOCS-total, YBOCS-obsession, and YBOCS-compulsion scores, independently.  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Behavioural data 
Demographic, affective, cognitive, and clinical data are presented in Table 3.1 and 
behavioural data are presented in Table 3.2. 
3.3.1.1 Demographic, affective, cognitive, and clinical data 
The mean (SEM) ages of the patient and control groups were 26.07 (1.65) and 24.50 (0.68), 
respectively.  The mean (SEM) education levels of the patient and control groups were 
16.93 (0.66) and 17.55 (0.45), respectively.  There were no significant demographic 
differences between OCD and control participants (Table 3.1) in demographic or cognitive 
data.  Participants with OCD scored significantly higher on Beck Depression Inventory II, 
Beck Anxiety Inventory, and Oxford Happiness Questionnaire compared to controls, as 
would be expected given the nature of OCD.  YBOCS was administered to OCD patients 
only.  Again the YBOCS measures the presence and severity of obsessive compulsive 
symptoms.  The scale yields a total score as well as a sub-score for obsessions and 
compulsions, although only the total score is interpreted clinically.  The current OCD 
cohort had a mean total score of 18 which suggests moderately severe OCD (Goodman, 
Price, & Rasmussen, 1989).  YBOCS total scores ranged from 8 (mild OCD) to 26 (severe 
OCD), suggesting a wide range OCD severity (Goodman et al., 1989).  
Table 3.1 Health and demographic information for participants in the OCD and 
control groups. 
 OCD  Control  p value 
Number of participants 14 16 – 
Age  26.07 (1.65) 24.50 (0.68) 0.39 
Education level  16.92 (0.65) 17.54 (0.45) 0.48 
YBOCS – Total Score 18.00 (1.59) – – 
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YBOCS–Obsession sub-score 9.71 (0.85) – – 
YBOCS–Compulsion sub-score 8.29 (1.08) – – 
BDI-II 11.64 (2.54) 4.00 (0.95) 0.01* 
BAI 9.14 (1.44) 3.00 (0.89) 0.002* 
SAS 9.86 (1.25) 8.91 (0.96) 0.58 
ANART 121.67 (1.85) 120.88 (1.45) 0.76 
Epworth Sleepiness Scale 8.21 (1.30) 5.54 (0.67) 0.10 
Oxford Happiness score  3.79 (0.17) 5.08 (0.14) 0.00002* 
BIS-11 58.36 (2.64) 56.54 (3.75) 0.73 
MoCA 27.86 (0.49) 28.82 (0.40) 0.17 
Values are presented as group means and standard error of the mean (SEM) in braces. ANART – National 
Adult Reading Test IQ Estimation; MOCA – Montreal Cognitive Assessment total score out of 30; BDI-II– Beck 
Depression Inventory II; BAI – Beck Anxiety Inventory; BIS-11 – Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; SAS – Starkstein 
Apathy Scale; YBOCS – Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale. *indicates statistical significance (p<0.05). 
3.3.1.2 Measure of Decision making efficiency 
Stimulus-response decision making was assessed using a difference score between the 
mean RT of the first presentation of each of the stimuli that were associated with correct 
responses of Block 5 and the mean RT of the second presentation of each of the stimuli 
that were associated with correct responses of Block 4.  As the participant progresses 
through the blocks, associations become better learned and decision making requires less 
and less deliberation, measured by progressively shorter RTs across blocks.  Consequently, 
intact decision making should result in a negative Final Block RT Change Score because 
the mean RT in the first presentation of Block 5 should be faster than the mean RT in the 
second presentation of Block 4.  We found significantly less improvement in Block 5 RT 
relative to Block 4 RT for OCD patients compared to controls (t=1.90, p=0.033; Figure 
3.3A).  In fact, the score was positive for OCD patients, meaning that they slowed down in 
Block 5 relative to Block 4, whereas controls had the expected speeding up of RT, 
characteristic of a decision that required lesser deliberation. 
It is important to note that mean RT and accuracy in the final block did not differ 
significantly between OCD patients and controls (Final Block Mean RT: t=0.53, p=0.701; 
Final Block Mean Accuracy: t=0.76, p=0.226). 
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Table 3.2 Behavioural measures for patients with OCD and control participants. 
 Final Block 
Accuracy (%) 
Final Block 
Mean RT (ms) 
Final Block RT 
Change (ms) 
Slope of 
Learning 
OCD  76.20  
(5.74) 
1316.72 
(138.10) 
153.74  
(91.87) 
0.085  
(0.015) 
Control 84.72  
(3.72) 
1251.05 
(97.84) 
-190.06  
(123.16) 
0.132  
(0.016) 
Values are presented as group means and SEM in braces. Final Block RT Change is a difference score 
between the mean RT of the first presentation of each of the stimuli that were associated with correct 
responses of Block 5 and the mean RT of the second presentation of each of the stimuli that were 
associated with correct responses of Block 4.  Slope of Learning was calculated using the linear regression 
function in Microsoft Excel (2011).   
3.3.1.3 Measure of stimulus-response association learning 
Efficiency of stimulus-response association learning was estimated using the slope of 
accuracy change over five blocks of stimulus-response trials.  Slope was calculated using 
the linear regression function in Microsoft Excel (2011).  An independent sample t-test on 
slopes of learning was conducted between OCD and control participants.  We found 
significantly slower learning in patients with OCD compared to control participants 
(t=2.53, p=0.008; Figure 3.3B). 
 
Figure 3.3 Behavioural Data in Patients with OCD and Healthy Controls. 
A) Final Block RT Change was our measure of decision making efficiency.  It was calculated by subtracting 
the mean RT for correct events of the first presentation of the stimuli in Block 5 from the mean RT for correct 
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evens of the second presentation of the stimuli in Block 4.  We found significantly less improvement in Block 
5 RT relative to Block 4 RT for OCD patients compared to controls (t=1.90, p=0.033; Figure 3.3A).   B) Slope 
of learning served as a measurement of learning efficiency.  To reiterate, slope was calculated using the block 
accuracy scores over five blocks using the slope of the linear regression function (Microsoft Excel 2011).  
Slope of learning was significantly slower in OCD patients compared to healthy controls.  Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean.  * p<0.05.    
3.3.2 FMRI data 
Significant activations in contrasts of interest are presented in Tables 3.3-5 and Figures 
3.4-6.  Contrasts are reported at a significance level of p<0.05 FWE, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
3.3.2.1 Groups collapsed 
Stimulus-Response Decision events: Significant activity arose in the right dorsal caudate in 
the Stimulus-Response Decision relative to Rest contrast (peak coordinates: 12, 5, 2; 
t=4.55, p=0.030 FWE).   
Feedback learning events: Significant activity in the VS arose in the left ventral putamen 
in the Feedback Events minus Rest contrast (peak coordinates: -30, -7, -1; t=4.42, p=0.048 
FWE).   
Table 3.3 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest collapsed across Group 
(OCD and control) reported in MNI space. 
Contrast Anatomical Area Cluster 
Size 
t pFWE  x, y, z 
SR minus Rest Right Dorsal Caudate 2 4.55 0.030 12, 5, 2 
  Left Inferior Temporal Gyrus 1 5.13 0.003 -48, -55, -13 
 Left Insula 2 5.11 0.003 -30, 20, -4 
 Right Insula 2 5.05 0.004 30, 23, -1 
 Right Primary Visual Cortex 2 4.89 0.007 6, -82, -4 
 Right Lateral Occipital 
Complex 1 4.63 0.021 51, -49, -13 
 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 1 4.53 0.032 -33, 53, -1 
 Left Postcentral Gyrus 1 4.52 0.033 -45, -28, 38 
      
FB minus Rest Left Ventral Putamen 1 4.42 0.048 -30, -7, -1 
 Right Cerebellum 31 5.52 <0.001 12, -49, -16 
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 Left Thalamus 1 4.72 0.015 -15, -7, 8 
 Left Temporal Occipital 
Fusiform Cortex 1 4.68 0.018 -39, -58, -10 
 Right Pons 1 4.56 0.028 9, -31, -22 
 Right Midbrain 1 4.56 0.028 6, -28, -19 
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  Striatal regions are presented first 
and highlighted in each contrast.  N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.  
3.3.2.2 OCD versus healthy controls 
Stimulus-Response Decision events: Control minus OCD.  Significant activity occurred in 
the bilateral dorsal caudate nuclei (peak coordinates: 15, 2, 14; t=5.32, p=0.001 FWE, and 
peak coordinates: -12, -1, 8; t=4.64, p=0.019 FWE; Figure 3.5A) in the control minus OCD 
Stimulus-Response Decision events. 
 
Figure 3.4 Significant activations in contrasts of interest comparing healthy controls and 
patients with OCD. 
Activation maps are presented at a threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons to allow for 
visualization of activation in all contrasts.  A) BOLD signal for healthy control minus OCD patients for Stimulus-
Response Decision Events minus Rest.  Significant activity occurred in the bilateral dorsal caudate nuclei 
(peak coordinates: 15, 2, 14; t=5.32, p=0.001 FWE, and peak coordinates: -12, -1, 8; t=4.64, p=0.019 FWE).  
B) BOLD signal for OCD patients minus healthy controls for Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest.  
No significant activity arose in the striatum.  C)  BOLD signal for healthy controls minus OCD patients for 
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Feedback Events minus Rest.  Significant activity arose in bilateral ventral putamina (peak coordinates: 30, 5, 
-1; t=5.61, p<0.001 FWE, and peak coordinates: -27, 2, -1; t=5.05, p=0.004 FWE), as well as left dorsal 
putamen (peak coordinates: -27, -1, 11; t=5.67, p<0.001 FWE).  D) BOLD signal for OCD patients minus 
healthy controls for Feedback Events minus Rest.  No significant activity arose in the striatum.  N.B. SR – 
Stimulus-Response Decision Events and FB – Feedback Events in the figure.    
Stimulus-Response Decision events: OCD minus control. No activity occurred in the 
striatum at p<0.05 FWE, or even at the liberal threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected when OCD 
Stimulus-Response Decision events were contrasted with control events (Figure 3.5B). 
Feedback events: control minus OCD.  Significant activity arose in bilateral ventral 
putamina (peak coordinates: 30, 5, -1; t=5.61, p<0.001 FWE, and peak coordinates: -27, 
2, -1; t=5.05, p=0.004 FWE), as well as left dorsal putamen (peak coordinates: -27, -1, 11; 
t=5.67, p<0.001 FWE) in the control minus OCD Feedback events contrast (Figure 3.5C). 
Feedback events: OCD minus control.  No activity occurred in the striatum at p<0.05 FWE, 
or even at the liberal threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected in the OCD minus control Feedback 
events contrast (Figure 3.5D). 
Table 3.4 Significant brain activations in patients with OCD versus healthy controls 
in contrasts of interest reported in MNI space. 
Contrast Anatomical Area Cluster 
Size 
t pFWE x, y, z 
SR Events      
OCD minus 
control 
Left Lateral Occipital 
Cortex 5 3.98 <0.001* -36, -82, 8 
 Right Cerebellum 16 3.97 <0.001* 3, -70, -10 
 Left Cerebellum 11 3.62 <0.001* -18, -52, -16 
      
Control minus 
OCD Right Dorsal Caudate 21 5.32 0.001 15, 2, 14 
 Left Dorsal Caudate 8 4.64 0.019 -12, -1, 8 
 Left Insular Cortex 48 6.33 <0.001 -30, 26, 5 
 Right Insular Cortex 19 5.26 0.001 33, 26, 2 
 Right Frontal Orbital Cortex 9 4.97 0.005 42, 20, -7 
 Left Precentral Gyrus 9 4.93 0.006 -54, 5, 22 
 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 1 4.57 0.025 51, 23, 29 
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FB Events      
OCD minus 
control Right Cerebellum 52 4.56 <0.001* 12, -46, -19 
 Right Angular gyrus 49 4.18 <0.001* 48, -46, 26 
 Right Hippocampus 22 4.17 <0.001* 33, -25, -10 
 Right Middle Temporal gyrus 35 4.04 <0.001* 63, -43, 2 
 Left Lateral Occipital Cortex 35 3.69 <0.001* -48, -67, 8 
 Right Occipital Fusiform gyrus 6 3.67 <0.001* 39, -58, -7 
 Left Cerebellum 7 3.55 <0.001* -15, -55, -16 
 Left Inferior Temporal gyrus 7 3.40 <0.001* -39, -58, -1 
 Right Supramarginal gyrus 1 3.18 0.001* 51, -22, 32 
 Right Amygdala 1 3.16 0.001* 27, -10, -13 
 Right Inferior Temporal gyrus 1 3.15 0.001* 51, -19, -22 
 Left Superior Temporal gyrus 1 3.13 0.001* -60, -22, -4 
      
Control minus 
OCD Right Ventral Putamen 28 5.61 <0.001 30, 5, -1 
 Left Ventral Putamen ** 5.05 0.004 -27, 2, -1 
 Left Dorsal Putamen 113 5.67 <0.001 -27, -1, 11 
 Left Lateral Occipital Cortex 56 5.81 <0.001 -42, -70, -4 
 Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 5 5.17 0.002 -27, 5, 29 
 Right Occipital Pole 5 5.13 0.002 27, -91, -1 
 Left Postcentral gyrus 7 4.79 0.011 -57, -19, 26 
 Left Supramarginal gyrus 8 4.77 0.012 -51, -31, 47 
 Left Inferior Frontal gyrus 2 4.73 0.014 -54, 11, 5 
 Left Inferior Temporal gyrus 2 4.67 0.018 -45, -49, -16 
 Left Supplementary Motor Cortex 7 4.66 0.018 -3, 2, 56 
 Right Inferior Temporal gyrus 2 4.50 0.034 45, -49, -13 
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  Striatal regions are presented first 
and highlighted in each contrast.  *Indicates a threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected.    **Cluster size unobtainable 
as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster.    N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – 
Feedback Events.  
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3.3.2.3 Rest-Only Model 
Rest events control minus OCD: No activity in the striatum arose for the control minus 
OCD Rest events contrast. 
 
Figure 3.4 Significant activations in contrasts of interest involving Rest Events. 
Activation maps are presented at a threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons to allow for 
visualization of activation in all contrasts.  A) BOLD signal for healthy control minus OCD patients for Rest 
Events.  No activity arose in the striatum.  B) BOLD signal for OCD patients minus healthy controls for Rest 
Events. Significant activity arose in the right ventral putamen (peak coordinates: 21, 8, -7; t=3.62, p=0.001).  
Rest events OCD minus control: No activity occurred at a threshold of p<0.05 FWE, but at 
the more liberal threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected, activity arose in the right ventral 
putamen (peak coordinates: 21, 8, -7; t=3.62, p=0.001). 
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Table 3.5 Significant brain activations during Rest events in patients with OCD 
versus healthy controls in contrasts of interest reported in MNI space. 
Contrast Anatomical Area Cluster 
Size 
t pFWE x, y, z 
Rest events      
OCD minus 
control Right Ventral Putamen 47 3.62 0.001* 21, 8, -7 
 Left Central Operculum Cortex 54 4.85 <0.001* -57, -4, 11 
 Superior Frontal Gyrus 119 3.60 0.001* 0, 11, 62 
 Right Central Operculum Cortex 46 3.38 0.001* 48, -10, 14 
      
Control minus 
OCD 
No suprathreshold 
activations     
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  Striatal regions are presented first 
and highlighted in each contrast.  *Indicates a threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected.  N.B. SR – Stimulus-
Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.  
3.3.2.4 Brain-behaviour Correlations: OCD and controls separately 
One right and left ROI encompassing the entirety of the VS and one right and left DS ROI 
encompassing the entirety of the DS were employed.  Beta values for the four ROIs were 
extracted separately from Stimulus-Response Decision events, Feedback events, and Rest 
events.  BOLD signal in these ROIs was correlated with behavioural measures for OCD 
patients and controls separately.  We expected that baseline DS and VS neural activity 
might correlate with disease severity given previous findings of DS hypoactivity an VS 
hyperactivity in OCD.  Therefore, we correlated measures of disease severity with beta 
values extracted from DS and VS ROIs.  Specifically, YBOCS total score and YBOCS 
sub-scores of OCD patients were correlated with BOLD signal in these ROIs with beta 
values extracted from the Rest-only model.  
3.3.2.4.1 Striatum and decision making efficiency 
Final Block RT Change scores were correlated with beta values from each of the two DS 
and VS ROIs, separately for OCD patients and healthy controls.  For control participants a 
significantly negative correlation occurred between Final Block RT Change and beta 
122 
 
values in the left DS ROI during Stimulus-response Decision Events minus Rest (r=-0.552, 
t=1.99, p=0.033; Figure 3.7A), suggesting that those participants with greater activity in 
the left DS had quicker RTs in the first stimulus presentation in Block 5 compared to the 
second stimulus presentation in Block 4.  No significant correlation arose in control 
participants for our decision-making efficiency score and BOLD signal during Feedback 
Events minus Rest.  For OCD patients our decision-making efficiency score did not 
correlate with neural activity during Stimulus-Response Decision or Feedback Events 
minus Rest. 
3.3.2.4.2 Striatum and learning from feedback 
Learning slope was correlated with beta values from each of the VS and DS ROIs, 
separately for OCD patients and controls.  Looking at the control data, a significant, 
positive correlation occurred between slope of learning and Feedback Event minus Rest 
beta values extracted from the left VS ROI (r=0.542, t=1.93, p=0.037; Figure 3.7B).  No 
significant or trending correlations were present in the control participants` data relating 
slope and BOLD signal during Stimulus-response Decision Events.  For OCD patients, 
learning slope, our measure of learning efficiency, did not correlate with neural activity 
during either Feedback or Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest.  
 
Figure 3.5 Correlation between behavioural indices of decision making and learning 
for control participants and beta values in striatal ROIs.   
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A) Correlation between Final Block RT Change and beta values in left DS ROI in healthy controls 
(r=-0.552, t=1.99, p=0.033).  B) Correlation between Learning Slope and beta values of left VS ROI 
in healthy controls.  Beta values were significantly, positively correlated with slope of learning 
(r=0.542, t=1.93, p=0.037). 
3.3.2.4.3 Striatum and severity of OCD 
Compulsion sub-score of the YBOCS significantly, negatively correlated with beta values 
in both the left and right VS ROIs (Left VS ROI: r=-0.565, t=2.47, p=0.035, Figure 3.8A; 
Right VS ROI: r=-0.604, t=2.73, p=0.022, Figure 3.8B). YBOCS total score trended 
towards being negatively correlated with Left VS (r=-0.470, t=1.42, p=0.090) and Right 
VS ROIs (r=-0.493, t=1.55, p=0.073).  Obsession sub-scores did not correlate with beta 
values in either Left VS (r=-0.160, t=0.22, p=0.584) and Right VS ROIs (r=-0.152, t=0.27, 
p=0.604).  OCD disease severity did not significantly correlate with either Left or Right 
DS ROIs (Left DS ROI: Total YBOCS r=-0.046, t=0.16, p=0.876, Obsession sub-score 
r=0.085, t=0.30, p=0.773, Compulsion sub-score r=-0.134, t=0.47, p=0.647; Right DS 
ROI: Total YBOCS r=-0.164, t=0.58, p=0.575, Obsession sub-score r=-0.011, t=0.04, 
p=0.971, Compulsion sub-score r=-0.233, t=0.83, p=0.424). 
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Figure 3.6 Correlation between DS and VS ROIs and YBOCS-compulsion sub-scores 
in patients with OCD.   
A) Correlation between YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score and beta values of left VS ROI in patients with OCD.  
Beta values significantly, negatively correlated with YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score (r=-0.565, p=0.035).  B) 
Correlation between YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score and beta values of right VS ROI in patients with OCD.  
Similarly, beta values significantly, negatively correlated with YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score (r=-0.604, 
p=0.022). C) Correlation between YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score and beta values of left DS ROI in patients 
with OCD (r=-0.143, p=0.647).  D) Correlation between YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score and beta values of 
right DS ROI in patients with OCD (r=-0.233, p=0.424).  No significant correlations arose comparing YBOCS-
Compulsion sub-score and DS ROIs in patients with OCD. 
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3.4 Discussion 
In the current investigation, OCD patients responded slower on the first presentation of 
stimuli in the final block compared to the second stimuli presentation in the previous block, 
compared to healthy controls who responded faster.  This is evidence for poorer decision 
making in OCD patients compared to controls.  Additionally, we found that patients with 
OCD learned the stimulus-response associations significantly slower compared to healthy 
controls based on slope of learning.  
Activity in DS correlated with Stimulus-Response Decision Events and not with Feedback 
events, when stimulus-response associations are actually learned, in OCD patients and 
controls participants combined.  We also found that Final Block RT Change score (i.e. our 
measure of decision making efficiency) negatively correlated with beta values in the left 
DS ROI in healthy controls.  Learning Slope (i.e. our measure of learning) did not correlate 
with beta values in DS in controls or in patients with OCD.  These results support a role 
for DS in decision making and not learning, confirming our results in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, 
et al. (2014) and in Chapter 2. 
In contrast, VS was recruited during Feedback Events for OCD patients and controls 
combined.  To reiterate, the Feedback event is when deterministic feedback is received and 
learning takes place.  Further, Learning Slope correlated significantly with beta values in 
the left VS of healthy controls.  These findings support the notion that VS mediates 
stimulus-response learning. 
These distinct cognitive roles for DS and VS were investigated in OCD patients relative to 
healthy controls.  Patients with OCD evidenced less efficient decision-making, with greater 
deliberation and no speeding up of response selection decisions from Block 4 to the final 
block of the experiment, relative to controls who showed significant reductions in RTs.  
This was despite equal accuracy between controls and patients with OCD.  Consistent with 
these behavioural findings, DS was more strongly recruited during Stimulus-Response 
Decision Events for controls compared to patients with OCD.  Patients with OCD also 
showed diminished learning, with a lower slope of stimulus-response association learning 
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across blocks, compared to healthy controls.  In keeping with this, VS activity was greater 
during Feedback Events in healthy controls compared to OCD patients.  OCD patients did 
not evidence any significant correlations between our measures of decision-making versus 
learning efficiency and DS or VS BOLD signal. These results strongly suggest diminished 
decision making and learning in patients with OCD, related to deficits in task-relevant DS 
and VS activation.   
We investigated VS and DS signal in Rest Events in OCD patients and controls.  Compared 
to healthy controls, OCD patients evidenced significantly increased VS activity during Rest 
Events (i.e., not related to a specific task).  Baseline DS activity did not differ between 
healthy controls and OCD patients.  Further, we found that the compulsion sub-score of 
the YBOCS negatively correlated with VS beta values extracted from Rest, suggesting that 
this enhanced baseline VS activity was related to disease severity.  Total YBOCS and 
obsession and compulsion sub-score measures did not correlate with DS activity in patients 
with OCD. 
3.4.1 Cognitive functions mediated by the striatum 
We independently assessed decision making and stimulus-response learning, using 
behavioural measures and distinct fMRI events.  We aimed to disentangle neural substrates 
specifically mediating these different cognitive processes.  
Our results are contrary to the large literature attributing feedback-based learning to DS 
(Balleine, Liljeholm, & Ostlund, 2009; Hart, Leung, & Balleine, 2013; Yin & Knowlton, 
2006).  A potential explanation for the long-standing association of DS with stimulus-
response association learning, despite increasing numbers of contradictory results (Atallah 
et al., 2007; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2008; Ohira et al., 2010; Reiss et al., 2005), relates 
to the common confounding of  learning and decision-making processes (Jessup & 
O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004).  In behavioural studies, learning is generally 
measured by the accuracy of stimulus-specific response selections that are provided as 
evidence that learning has occurred.  Poor performance therefore could be the result of 
failing either to learn stimulus-response associations or to correctly select responses based 
on these learned associations.  In fMRI studies, a) enacting a response when presented with 
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a stimulus, and b) learning from feedback, are typically treated as a single event with all 
significantly-activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning per se (Dobryakova & 
Tricomi, 2013; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; Poldrack et al., 1999).  By separately assessing 
response-selection decisions and learning, our approach aimed to resolve the discrepancy 
between studies that involve DS in feedback-based learning (Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005; 
O'Doherty et al., 2004) versus those in PD patients (Swainson et al., 2000; Vo et al., 2014), 
and participants with DS lesions (Ell, Marchant, & Ivry, 2006; Exner et al., 2002) that 
dispute the notion that DS mediates stimulus-response learning.   
Our findings integrate with a growing literature favouring a role for DS in decision making 
rather than learning per se.  In neuroimaging studies, DS activity consistently remains 
significantly increased above baseline after sequences (Reiss et al., 2005), categorization 
rules (Helie, Roeder, & Ashby, 2010; Seger, Peterson, Cincotta, Lopez-Paniagua, & 
Anderson, 2010), stimulus–reward (Daw & Doya, 2006; Seger et al., 2010), and response–
reward associations (Ohira et al., 2010) are well-learned.  Additionally, DS frequently 
correlates with response selections, particularly when an element of deliberation is required 
(N. M. Hiebert, Owen, Seergobin, & MacDonald, 2017), even in contexts devoid of new 
learning (Grahn et al., 2008), such as in the Stroop task (Ali et al., 2010), and in making 
numeric magnitude judgments (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011).  This activation profile is 
inconsistent with a brain region mediating learning per se and is more in line with one that 
underlies decisions.   
Our results, in contrast suggest that VS mediates learning stimulus-response associations.  
Replicating our previous findings (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), VS signal occurred 
specifically during the Feedback Event and correlated with efficiency of learning assessed 
with slope measure in healthy controls.  This result fits with the larger literature implicating 
VS in forms of implicit learning, such as reward (Camara, Rodriguez-Fornells, & Munte, 
2010), stimulus-stimulus (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011), sequence (Ghilardi et al., 2007), 
motor sequence (Feigin et al., 2003), and category learning (Shohamy, Myers, Geghman, 
Sage, & Gluck, 2006). 
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3.4.2 OCD and the striatum 
Structural and functional changes within the striatum in patients with OCD could be linked 
to cognitive dysfunction as well as OCD symptomatology.  Deficits in DS and VS could 
lead to dysfunction in decision making, cognitive flexibility, and reward processing and 
learning respectively. 
Here, OCD patients evidenced poorer decision making coupled with decreased DS activity 
compared to controls during decision events assessed with fMRI.  These results align with 
the larger literature showing that patients with OCD have diminished DS function in tasks 
examining cognitive flexibility (Del Casale et al., 2011; Vriend et al., 2013), and response 
inhibition (Del Casale et al., 2011; van Velzen, Vriend, de Wit, & van den Heuvel, 2014).  
As cognitive flexibility and response inhibition appear to be reduced in OCD patients, this 
may be linked to the inability to choose naturally rewarding behaviours over compulsive 
actions (Vriend et al., 2013).  DS deficits in patients with OCD could underlie the poorer 
cognitive flexibility and deficient response inhibition that lead to compulsive actions. 
In the current study, learning was also poorer in patients with OCD related to decreased 
VS activity during learning events assessed with fMRI.  Other studies have shown 
diminished reversal learning (Remijnse, Nielen, van Balkom, & et al., 2006) and reward 
learning (Nielen, den Boer, & Smid, 2009) in OCD patients compared to healthy controls.  
Remijnse et al. (2006), ascribe impairments in task-switching and learning to striatal 
deficiencies, which they purport as significant contributors to the neurological foundations 
of ineffective behavioural adaptation to changing stimuli and cognitive inflexibility in 
OCD patients.  Compulsive behaviours are the manifestations of such neural impairments.  
Obsessive-compulsive behaviours have been linked to hyperactivity in the VS at baseline 
(Baxter et al., 1987; de Vries et al., 2017; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Gursel, 
Avram, Sorg, Brandl, & Koch, 2018; Le Jeune et al., 2010; Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 
1997). Augmented baseline VS activity in patients with OCD impairs performance on VS-
mediated tasks and may play an integral role in OCD symptomatology. 
A present model of OCD based on data discussed above suggests that obsessions and 
compulsive behaviours might be linked to a disproportion between hyperactivity in the VS 
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and hypoactivity in the DS while processing incoming information.  Dysfunctional reward 
circuitry centred in the VS results in an inability to respond to natural rewards and instead 
VS activation is modulated by stressful, obsession-related stimuli (Baxter et al., 1987; de 
Vries et al., 2017; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Gursel et al., 2018; Le Jeune 
et al., 2010; Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 1997).  Concurrent, hypoactivity in DS results in 
deficits in cognitive flexibility and response inhibition.  These impairments are related to 
difficulty switching away from thinking of obsessions, and toward performing adaptive 
actions over maladaptive compulsions (Del Casale et al., 2011; van Velzen et al., 2014; 
Vriend et al., 2013).  Our results are entirely supportive of these models.  Further, we found 
a strong negative association between between compulsion sub-score on the YBOCS and 
bilateral beta values in VS ROIs at baseline.  This suggests that patients with high baseline 
VS activity, relative to other OCD patients, do not rate compulsive behaviours highly in 
their OCD phenotype.  There is evidence to suggest the reward system in OCD patients is 
hijacked to regard OCD behaviours as rewarding, rather than natural rewards (i.e. food, 
sex; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Remijnse et al., 2006).  This could be 
explained by reports of hyperactive VS (i.e. integral structure in the reward system) at rest 
(de Vries et al., 2017) and in response to symptom-provoking stimuli (Rauch et al., 1994), 
compared to natural rewards, relative to controls (Remijnse et al., 2006).  Patients with 
exceptionally hyperactive VS at rest, compared to other patients with OCD, may not even 
respond to OCD-related compulsive behaviours as rewarding and therefore these patients 
may not perform them, or do not feel they are significant burdens in their OCD, as our data 
suggests.    
3.4.3 Conclusions 
 Our findings dispute the prevalent notion that DS mediates stimulus-response learning.  
We showed that DS mediates response selections whereas VS underlies feedback-based 
learning in PD patients and healthy age-matched controls.  This study provides strong 
support for the cognitive deficits that arise in OCD that might sustain compulsive behaviour 
and obsessive thinking.  Further, these cognitive deficits seem to implicate DS and VS 
respectively. Finally, baseline VS hyperactivity relates to lower compulsions.  We ascribe 
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this to a decreased ability of VS to signal rewards due to its persistent elevated state, even 
those rewards that arise due to performance of compulsions and temporary relief of anxiety.    
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Chapter 4  
4 Dorsal striatum mediates deliberate decision making, not 
late-stage, stimulus-response learning 
 
We investigated a controversy regarding the role of the dorsal striatum (DS) in deliberate 
decision-making versus late-stage, stimulus–response learning to the point of 
automatization. Participants learned to associate abstract images with right or left button 
presses explicitly before strengthening these associations through stimulus–response trials 
with (i.e., Session 1) and without (i.e., Session 2) feedback. In Session 1, trials were divided 
into response-selection and feedback events to separately assess decision versus learning 
processes. Session 3 evaluated stimulus–response automaticity using a location Stroop 
task. DS activity correlated with response-selection and not feedback events in Phase 1 
(i.e., Blocks 1–3), Session 1. Longer response times (RTs), lower accuracy, and greater 
inter-trial variability characterized Phase 1, suggesting deliberation. DS activity 
extinguished in Phase 2 (i.e., Blocks 4–12), Session 1, once RTs, response variability, and 
accuracy stabilized, though stimulus–response automatization continued. This was 
signaled by persisting improvements in RT and accuracy into Session 2. Distraction 
between Sessions 1 and 2 briefly reintroduced response uncertainty, and correspondingly, 
significant DS activity reappeared in Block 1 of Session 2 only. Once stimulus–response 
associations were again re-familiarized and deliberation unnecessary, DS activation 
disappeared for Blocks 2–8, Session 2. Interference from previously learned right or left 
button responses with incongruent location judgments in a location Stroop task provided 
evidence that automaticity of stimulus–specific button-press responses had developed by 
the end of Session 2. These results suggest that DS mediates decision making and not late-
stage learning, reconciling two, independently evolving and well-supported literatures that 
implicate DS in different cognitive functions. 
 
A version of this chapter has been published in Human Brain Mapping: Hiebert, N. M., 
Owen, A. M., Seergobin, K. N., & MacDonald, P. A. (2017) Dorsal striatum mediates 
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deliberate decision making, not late-stage, stimulus-response learning. Hum Brain Mapp. 
38(12):6133-6156. Doi: 10.1002/hbm.23817. 
4.1 Introduction 
The dorsal striatum (DS)—the bulk of the caudate nucleus and putamen—has long been 
implicated in stimulus-response learning (Ashby, Ennis, & Spiering, 2007; Yin & 
Knowlton, 2006).  The DS is ascribed a role in both early, goal-directed learning (Brovelli, 
Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2004) as well as late-stage 
learning of stimulus-response associations to the point of automaticity (Ashby, Turner, & 
Horvitz, 2010; Balleine, Liljeholm, & Ostlund, 2009).  Challenging this notion, however, 
learning is often preserved in patients (Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Nole M. Hiebert, 
Seergobin, Vo, Ganjavi, & MacDonald, 2014; A. A. MacDonald, Seergobin, et al., 2013; 
Vo et al., 2014) and in animals (Atallah, Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007) with 
DS dysfunction.  Features of standard stimulus-response learning methodology potentially 
shed light on this controversy as detailed in the paragraphs below.  
4.1.1 Disentangling Learning and Decisions Guided by Learning 
Decision-making and learning processes are confounded in standard stimulus-response 
learning methodologies (Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004).  Trials 
typically proceed as follows: a) a stimulus is presented and participants decide among a set 
of responses, and b) feedback regarding accuracy is provided, shaping stimulus-response 
associations.  Learning is generally measured by the accuracy in selecting responses.  
Consequently, failing either to acquire stimulus-response associations or to select accurate 
responses based on these learned associations could lead to impaired performance in these 
paradigms.  In this way, in standard paradigms, evaluation of learning and decision making 
is ambiguous.  Further, in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, a) 
selecting a response and enacting it, and b) learning from feedback regarding the 
appropriateness of the response are typically treated as a single event with all significantly 
activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning per se (Dobryakova & Tricomi, 2013; 
Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; R. A.  Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999).  
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Accordingly, some brain regions that might underlie decision processes guided by learned 
associations could erroneously be assigned a role in learning.  Given that these processes 
are temporally intertwined and functionally interdependent, distinguishing them is very 
challenging, requiring novel experimental designs, and nuanced interpretations.  Learning 
and decision selection are entirely distinct processes phenomenologically, however.  
Distinguishing neural substrates of these different operations is important, with 
implications for understanding cognition in health and disease.    
Recently, we investigated this issue in early, goal-directed learning using fMRI (Nole M. 
Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).  Participants learned to associate abstract images with button 
presses through deterministic feedback.  We modeled a) the phase during which 
participants decided amongst options and selected responses separately from b) the stage 
when participants learned about associations through feedback regarding the accuracy of 
their choices.  We found activation of DS—specifically the head of the caudate nucleus—
only during the decision enactment phase, not during the feedback phase when participants 
learned the associations based on outcome information.  Furthermore, DS activation during 
the decision stage of our trials only occurred for trials arising later in the learning session, 
when the slope of learning was shallower but when participants were beginning to have a 
basis on which to make response selections, guided by associations that they had acquired 
in the earliest trials.  In contrast, activity in the ventral striatum (VS)—consisting of the 
nucleus accumbens and most ventral parts of the caudate nucleus and putamen—correlated 
with the feedback phase of our stimulus-response learning trials as has been shown by 
others (R. Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, & Robbins, 2007; Schultz, Apicella, Scarnati, & 
Ljungberg, 1992).  Feedback-related VS activation was greatest in the earliest phase of 
learning when the slope of behavioural change, indicative of stimulus-response association 
learning, was steepest.   
4.1.2 DS mediates Late-Stage Learning and Automaticity? 
The findings of Hiebert et al., (2014b) were a) consistent with the view that DS mediates 
decisions regarding response selection, and b) inconsistent with the contention that DS 
mediates early, feedback-based learning, as has previously been prevalently claimed 
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(Balleine et al., 2009; Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005; Brovelli et al., 2011; Brown & Stern, 
2013; Foerde, Race, Verfaellie, & Shohamy, 2013; Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 2013; Hart, 
Leung, & Balleine, 2013; O'Doherty et al., 2004).  However, a role for DS in other forms 
of learning that do not depend upon feedback or that occur during later stages of stimulus-
response association formation could not be ruled out.  Indeed, in addition to claims that 
the DS mediates early learning, the DS, particularly the body and tail of the caudate 
nucleus, has also been implicated in later stages of learning, when stimulus-response 
associations are strengthened through repeated experience to the point that they become 
automatic (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie, Roeder, & Ashby, 2010).   
A prominent theory of automaticity suggests that the role of the DS—specifically the body 
and tail of the caudate nucleus—is to acquire associations and train cortical-cortical 
connections between higher-order sensory and pre-motor areas (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie 
et al., 2010).  This model of automaticity is referred to as Subcortical Pathways Enable 
Expertise Development (i.e., SPEED; Ashby et al., 2007).  SPEED predicts that subcortical 
regions mediate learning.  The theory maintains that the head of the caudate nucleus 
mediates early learning, and as the associations become more practiced, progressing toward 
automaticity, more posterior regions of the striatum, namely the body and tail of the 
caudate nucleus, underlie late-stage learning.  Once automaticity has been achieved, 
involvement of DS ceases, and stimulus-specific, automatic behaviours become mediated 
by cortical regions (i.e., pre-motor, motor, and visual cortices; Ashby et al., 2007).   
Balleine and O'Doherty (2010), however, go further contending that in addition to being 
implicated in training stimulus-response habits, DS mediates and sustains habitual or 
automatic responding even once these associations are well-entrenched (Balleine & 
O'Doherty, 2010; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Tricomi, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2009).  
Though several human studies of habit learning ascribe habit formation to DS (i.e., dorsal 
putamen), closer examination reveals that the ventral, posterior putamen (e.g., peak 
coordinates z = 0) is often the region preferentially activated during these pivotal learning 
studies (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Tricomi et al., 2009;  but see Wunderlich, Dayan, & 
Dolan, 2012, implicating dorsal putamen).  It is widely accepted that VS and DS are 
functionally distinct (Atallah et al., 2007; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; van der Meer 
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& Redish, 2011).  Indeed, others explicitly claim that posterior ventral putamen (i.e., VS) 
mediates overlearning of motor responses (Jueptner, Frith, Brooks, Frackowiak, & 
Passingham, 1997; Lehericy et al., 2005).  
In a study implicating DS in the development of automatic behaviours, Helie et al. (2010) 
investigated automatization of responses in a category learning paradigm that included over 
10,000 trials, across 20 separate learning sessions, with fMRI data obtained in Sessions 1, 
4, 10, and 20.  They found that activity in DS was increased throughout Session 1, at the 
end of which high levels of response accuracy were ultimately achieved (i.e., 89.6%).  In 
subsequent sessions, DS activity was significantly attenuated (i.e., after Session 1) whereas 
cortical activation continued to correlate with accurate categorization even after extensive 
training.  Only neural activity correlating with stimulus-response events (i.e., the time 
period from the onset of the stimulus to the button-press response) were examined.  Given 
the confounding of decision and learning processes in these methodologies and consistent 
with our claim in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), DS activation at the time of response 
selection and enactment could have arisen due to its involvement in decision-making 
processes and not with association learning per se.  Several other studies cited as support 
for the SPEED model can be re-interpreted similarly to the findings of Helie et al. (2010), 
concluding that DS activation arises not due to its role in learning but rather due to its role 
in decision-making processes (R. A. Poldrack et al., 2005; Wu, Kansaku, & Hallett, 2004).  
As with studies of early stimulus-response learning, most experiments investigating DS’s 
role in late-stage learning combine and confound learning processes and stimulus-specific 
response-selection processes (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2009).  
4.1.3 DS mediates Decision Making? 
Indeed, a re-interpretation of these early- and late-learning experiments, considering the 
facts that decision making and stimulus-response association learning a) depend upon one 
another to produce accurate performance, and b) are often merged in fMRI studies, could 
integrate two divergent and extensive literatures regarding DS’s role in cognition.  
Increasingly, DS is linked to response selection and decision making (Atallah et al., 2007; 
Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2009; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; A. A. MacDonald et al., 
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2014).  Decision making is defined as the process of representing and assigning values to 
different response possibilities, then selecting and executing the most appropriate action 
(Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008).  DS has particularly been ascribed a role in decision 
making when decisions require a degree of reflection, when there is some ambiguity, and 
when cognitive control or flexibility are required.  This process is referred to as 
deliberation (Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, & Price, 2010; R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; 
Daniel et al., 2010; DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Ohira et 
al., 2010; Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Owen, & MacDonald, 2015).   In this way, DS is 
implicated prominently in this literature in resisting habitual responding or attending to 
more salient stimuli (Balleine et al., 2009; Benke, Delazer, Bartha, & Auer, 2003; 
Cameron, Watanabe, Pari, & Munoz, 2010; R. Cools, 2006; Roshan Cools, Rogers, Barker, 
& Robbins, 2010; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Rieger, 
Gauggel, & Burmeister, 2003; Robertson et al., 2015), completely at odds with the 
independently-evolving literature linking DS with stimulus-response learning and 
automatization.       
In categorization tasks, DS activity, assessed with neuroimaging, correlates with decision 
accuracy when options need to be weighed but not once responses become so well-
practiced that reflection is unnecessary (Helie et al., 2010; Soto, Waldschmidt, Helie, & 
Ashby, 2013).  Preferential DS activation is observed for ambiguous relative to 
unambiguous decisions (DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; 
Schouppe, Demanet, Boehler, Ridderinkhof, & Notebaert, 2014), supporting a role for DS 
in the process of deliberation.  Further, patients with DS dysfunction are less impaired than 
healthy control participants at attending to more salient stimuli among distractors and 
choosing more practiced responses among competing alternatives (Cameron et al., 2010; 
R. Cools, Rogers, Barker, & Robbons, 2009; Hood et al., 2007), but they are more impaired 
when they are required to select less salient stimuli or perform less automatic responses 
relative to alternatives (Benke et al., 2003; Cameron et al., 2010; R. Cools, Altamirano, & 
D'Esposito, 2006; R. Cools et al., 2009; Hood et al., 2007; Rieger et al., 2003; Thoma, 
Koch, Heyder, Schwarz, & Daum, 2008), suggesting that DS’s role in decision making is 
to promote deliberation and prevent poorly considered or impulsive choices.  These claims 
are at odds with prevalent theories ascribing a role for DS in automatization of responses 
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and selection of habitual actions (Everitt & Robbins, 2005) and therefore requires direct 
investigation to reconcile these contradictory contentions regarding DS’s role in cognition. 
4.1.4 Current Study 
Here, we critically tested the claim that DS mediates automatization of stimulus-specific 
responses versus the notion that it underlies deliberation during action selection.  We 
investigated later-stage, stimulus-response learning, once performance accuracy was 
greater than 90%.  We estimated striatal brain activity using fMRI along with behaviour 
during later-stage, stimulus-response learning.  We further included an explicit measure of 
whether stimulus-response associations achieved automaticity.  We closely paralleled Nole 
M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), but used fewer stimuli and only two responses, right or left 
button presses.  Further, we began with an explicit learning phase—a shortcut to late-stage 
learning—during which all stimuli in the experiment were presented and assigned to either 
the right or left button press.  Subsequently, as in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), 
stimulus-response learning took place in an implicit, feedback-based manner (Session 1), 
followed by further implicit strengthening of these associations through repeated stimulus-
response trials with feedback removed (Session 2).  We investigated neural activity for 
decision-making and feedback events separately in Session 1 and for decision-making 
events only in Session 2.  Between Sessions 1 and 2, we implemented a 20-minute 
distractor task with the aim of 1) testing whether stimulus-response automaticity was 
achieved by the end of Session 1, and 2) re-introducing an element of uncertainty and 
deliberation for decisions in Block 1 of Session 2.  The appearance of preferential blood-
oxygenation-dependent (BOLD) signal in DS immediately following distraction therefore 
could critically distinguish between notions that DS mediates the development of stimulus-
response association automaticity versus decisions requiring reflection.  Finally, Session 3 
consisted of a location Stroop task as a second, objective test of whether stimulus-specific 
responses were automatized following Sessions 1 and 2.  In this final session, participants 
indicated the location, with right or left button presses, of stimuli that had previously been 
paired with right or left button-press responses during learning Sessions 1 and 2 versus 
novel stimuli.  
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We also performed a second, supplemental experiment using a similar protocol to the one 
summarized in the preceding paragraph, to further clarify our findings (See 2.6).  
Experiment 2 differed from the Main Experiment in the following ways: 1) neural activity 
was not estimated with fMRI, 2) an additional session of the modified location Stroop task 
was also included immediately after Block 3 (i.e., Phase 1, explained below) in Session 1.    
4.1.5 Predictions 
If DS underlies the development of automaticity as suggested by SPEED, BOLD signal in 
DS should persist for stimulus-specific responses until associations achieve automatic 
status (i.e., throughout Session 1, and possibly in Session 2 depending on explicit measures 
of automaticity).  We included two measures of stimulus-response automaticity.  At the 
end of Session 1, we examined the effect of an intervening task on stimulus-response 
performance and BOLD signal.  If automaticity had developed prior to the end of Session 
1, response time (RT), accuracy, and BOLD signal should be unchanged from Phase 2, 
Session 1 and Session 2 despite an intervening distraction (See Ashby et al., 2010, for a 
review).  At the end of Session 2, we investigated facilitation and interference in a location 
Stroop task, related to automaticity of previously-learned, stimulus-specific right and left 
button presses.  If automaticity had developed by the conclusion of Sessions 1 and/or 2, a) 
faster RTs and/or reduced errors should occur when location button presses matched the 
button press that had previously been associated with the stimulus in Sessions 1 and 2, 
and/or b) slower RTs and/or increased errors should occur when location button presses 
mismatched the button press that had previously been associated with the stimulus in 
Sessions 1 and 2.  
In contrast, if DS mediates deliberation in response selection, DS activity should be 
maximal in very early phases of the Main Experiment when decision making requires 
greater consideration, indexed by longer RTs, lower accuracy, and greater response 
variability (Phase 1, Session 1).  Response variability was measured by changes in standard 
deviation of RTs (SD).  Activity in DS should attenuate and disappear, even prior to 
achievement of automatic responding, once responses become sufficiently well-learned 
that deliberation is unnecessary (Phase 2, and Session 2), signaled by reduced RT, 
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accuracy, and/or response variability.  To further distinguish these views, following an 
unrelated, intervening task, DS BOLD signal is expected to a) re-appear in the first block 
when response deliberation would again be required (i.e., Block 1, Session 2) but b) quickly 
attenuate due to savings when responses again became well-practiced (Blocks 2-8, Session 
2).  
Disputing the claim that DS underlies late-stage learning to the point of stimulus-response 
automaticity using fMRI can only be accomplished by showing that DS BOLD signal is 
dissociated from this process, attenuating before automaticity of stimulus-response 
associations is actually achieved.  In this way, this well-entrenched view about DS’s role 
in behaviour can only be contested by accepting a null result.  There is a, perhaps, justified 
bias against publishing negative findings, in that with frequentist approaches, the 
probabilities of Type II (i.e., falsely failing to reject the null hypothesis) and Type I errors 
(i.e., falsely rejecting the null hypothesis) are asymmetric.  Type I errors are set a clear 
maximum, usually less than 0.05, whereas the former varies across studies in terms of its 
magnitude and determinants (Dienes, 2014) not pre-determined by the experimenter.  
However, this systematic publication bias contributes to extremely slow changes to the 
status quo with the effect that once a claim is disseminated and relatively accepted, it 
becomes nearly irrefutable, a process referred to as canonization (Nissen, Magidson, Gross, 
& Bergstrom, 2016).  Findings at odds with prevailing views are considered less 
publication-worthy and held to a far higher standard (Nissen et al., 2016).  Computational 
models, however, reveal that selective publication and omission of negative results does 
not improve efficiency or accuracy of scientific inquiry, but does increase false 
canonization (Nissen et al., 2016; van Assen, van Aert, Nuijten, & Wicherts, 2014).  These 
concerns notwithstanding, to critically test the contention that DS underlies late learning 
versus deliberation in action selection and to increase confidence in our results, we have 
introduced a number of manipulations (e.g., distraction separating Sessions 1 and 2) that 
should predictably alter behaviour and DS BOLD signal in distinct ways to dissociate the 
differing accounts of DS’s role in cognition.  Further, in addition to frequentist statistical 
approaches, we planned to investigate our effects using a Bayesian analysis that allows 
directly contrasting the probability of the null and the alternative hypotheses in a 
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symmetrical way, putting these hypotheses on an equal footing, and directly comparing the 
relative fit of the two models (Dienes, 2014).  This approach would allow us greater 
confidence in our interpretation of null results if they arose, as we predicted.  
4.2 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Nineteen healthy, young, right-handed adults participated in this experiment (10 males, 9 
females).  Participants abusing prescription or illicit drugs, alcohol, or taking cognitive-
enhancing medications including methylphenidate were excluded from participating in the 
experiment.  The Health Sciences Research Ethics Board of the University of Western 
Ontario approved this study.  All participants provided informed, written consent to the 
approved protocol before beginning the experiment, according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki (2013). 
4.2.2 Procedures 
At the outset, all participants explicitly learned to associate six abstract images with one of 
two button-press responses prior to fMRI Sessions 1, 2, and 3.  Images consisted of 
characters taken from the invented Klingon alphabet (Figure 4.1).  The six abstract images 
appeared on the screen.  Three were labelled “left button press” and the other three were 
labelled “right button press”.  Participants were given three minutes to memorize the label 
given to the images as best they could.   
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Figure 4.1 Abstract images presented in the experiment. 
Learned images refer to the images that were studied and associated with a specific ‘right’ or ‘left’ button-
press response at baseline, via deterministic feedback in Session 1, and in Session 2.  In Session 3 (3A and 
B in Experiment 2), these learned images created the conditions for the congruent and incongruent conditions 
depending on their location of presentation.  New images refer to the images presented only in Session 3 (i.e., 
3A in the Main Experiment and 3A and 3B in Experiment 2) that constituted the control condition. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the experimental protocol of the Main Experiment.  In Session 1, on 
every trial, one of the six stimuli presented in the baseline learning session appeared in the 
centre of the projection screen.  Participants were asked to perform the button-press 
response that had been assigned to the stimulus.  For stimuli assigned to a left button press, 
participants were instructed to press the left button on the button box with their index 
finger.  For stimuli assigned to the right button press, participants were asked to press the 
right button on the button box with their middle finger.  All responses were performed with 
the right hand.  Deterministic feedback regarding the accuracy of the response was then 
provided (i.e., ‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) during a feedback event.  Trials were organized into 
four scanning runs, with each run consisting of three blocks of 18 trials, for a total of twelve 
blocks and 216 trials.  Each abstract image occurring three times in random order per block.  
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At the end of the twelfth block, participants were given a score summarizing their overall 
performance.   
 
Figure 4.2 Experimental protocol. 
A) In the Main Experiment, participants learned to associate six abstract images with either a ‘left’ or ‘right’ 
button press response explicitly in the block named Explicit.  In Session 1, participants saw each image and 
performed the learned response individually in the presence of feedback.  Due to longer RTs, lower accuracy, 
and increased response variability, the first three blocks (referred to as Phase 1) where analyzed separately 
from Blocks 4-12 (i.e., Phase 2).  After completing a distractor task for 20 minutes, participants performed 
Session 2 where they practiced the learned responses to the images in the absence of feedback.  We 
expected response uncertainty to reappear in Block 1, Session 2 and we therefore analyzed it separately from 
Blocks 2-8, Session 2.  Session 3 served as an objective measure of automaticity and was performed after 
Session 2 concluded.  B) Experiment 2 followed the same protocol as the Main Experiment except that the 
presence of automaticity was measured both after Phase 1, Session 1 and after Session 2 (Session 3A and 
3B respectively).  Areas in grey represent periods where response deliberation is expected and areas in black 
denote the modified Stroop task (i.e., objective measure of automaticity). 
Trials in Session 1 proceeded as follows: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection 
screen for 700 ms; (ii) a blank screen occurred for 300 ms; (iii) an abstract image was 
presented in the centre of the projection screen until a button-press response; (iv) a blank 
screen appeared for a variable period of time sampled from an exponential distribution 
(mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v) feedback (i.e., ‘Correct’ or 
‘Incorrect’) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of 
time sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; 
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maximum: 7000 ms).  The inter-stimulus interval (ISI) and inter-trial interval (ITI) were 
jittered between the response and feedback, and between the offset of feedback and the 
beginning of the subsequent trial, respectively, to create two fMRI events within each trial: 
a) the stimulus-response event and b) the feedback event.  The stimulus-response or 
decision-making event included the presentation of the abstract image until the participant 
made a button-press response.  The feedback, or learning event included the presentation 
of feedback.  Rest events were also created and modelled as regressors and consisted of 
ITIs only (Figure 4.3A). 
Between Sessions 1 and 2, participants performed a 20-minute visual-spatial working 
memory task as a distraction from the main task.  The task consisted of prime and probe 
pairs in which participants indicated, with a button press, whether an array of dots inside a 
grid pattern was the same or different across the prime and probe trials. The distractor task 
was included to re-introduce an element of uncertainty and deliberation in selecting 
responses in the first block of Session 2.  
In Session 2, on every trial, participants performed a right or left button press in response 
to the image that appeared in the center of the screen.  The images were the same six 
Klingon characters presented at the start of the experiment and in Session 1.  Participants 
were asked to make the button-press responses that they had learned explicitly at the outset 
of the experiment and through Session 1 in Session 2.  No feedback was provided, to 
preclude further feedback-based learning during Session 2.  Participants performed eight 
blocks of 18 trials each, spaced across two scanning runs, four blocks per run.  In total, 
Session 2 consisted of 144 trials.  Trial parameters for Session 2 were otherwise identical 
to those in Session 1 (Figure 4.3B). 
In Session 3, the six images associated with left or right button-press responses explicitly 
at the outset of the experiment and throughout Sessions 1 and 2 were presented along with 
six new Klingon characters.  Images were presented one at a time, in random order.  These 
images were presented either to the left or the right of centre, with a distance away from 
centre equal to the width of the image.  Participants responded to the location of the 
stimulus with the left (i.e., index finger) or right (i.e., middle finger) button-press response.  
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No feedback was provided in this session. Participants performed 4 blocks of 36 trials each, 
spaced across two scanning runs, two blocks per run.  In total, Session 3 consisted of 144 
trials and no feedback was provided.  Trial parameters were similar to Sessions 1 and 2 
(Figure 4.3C).       
 
Figure 4.3 Example of a single trial in Sessions 1, 2, and 3 in the experiment. 
A) Participants learned to associate six abstract images with either a ‘left’ or ‘right’ button-press response in 
Session 1.  The following is an example of a trial: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection screen 
for 700 ms; (ii) a blank screen occurred for 300 ms; (iii) an abstract image was presented in the centre of the 
projection screen until a button-press response; (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time 
sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v) 
feedback (i.e., ‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen appeared for a variable period 
of time sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms).  
B) Participants recalled the responses to the learned images in the absence of feedback in Session 2.  C) 
Images appeared left or right of centre, at a distance equal to the width of the image away from centre, and 
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participants indicated the location of the images with a left or right button-press response.  Stimuli included 
the six learned images presented at baseline and in Sessions 1 and 2 as well as six new images.  Trials in 
Sessions 2 and 3 were identical to Session 1 except that feedback was omitted in both and the images 
appeared off centre in Session 3.  * The inter-stimulus and inter-trial intervals (ISI and ITI, respectively) were 
jittered between the response and feedback and between the offset of feedback and the beginning of the 
subsequent trial to create two fMRI events within each trial: a) the stimulus-response event and b) the 
feedback event for Session 1.  In Sessions 2 and 3, the ITIs were jittered between the response and the 
subsequent trial. 
4.2.3 Behavioural Data Analysis 
To examine changes in RT, SD of RTs across blocks, and accuracy across Sessions 1 and 
2, single-factor repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were run with block 
(Session 1: 12 blocks; Session 2: 8 blocks) as the within-subject variable.  RT was the time 
between the onset of the abstract image and the button press by the participant measured 
in milliseconds (ms).  The number of correct “right” and “left” button-press responses 
recorded after each block was our estimate of accuracy.   
Three conditions―congruent, incongruent, and control―were created in Session 3.  In the 
congruent condition, an image appeared in a location that was consistent with the left or 
right button-press response learned for that image at baseline and in Session 1, and 
practiced in Session 2.  In the incongruent condition, a stimulus appeared in a location that 
was inconsistent with the left or right button-press response learned at baseline and in 
Session 1, as well as practiced in Session 2.  In the control condition, six new images that 
were not previously presented in the experiment appeared to the left or right of centre.  
Session 3 consisted of 48 congruent, 48 incongruent, and 48 control trials that occurred in 
random order.  All old and new stimuli appeared left and right of centre equally often.  RTs 
were measured from the onset of the image until the button-press response in ms.  The 
control condition provided a baseline measure of accuracy and latency for providing a 
location response.  Facilitation was calculated as mean RTs or error rates in the congruent 
condition minus those in the control condition and interference was calculated as mean 
RTs or error rates in the incongruent condition minus those in the control condition.  Lastly, 
congruent and incongruent trials together were contrasted with control trials to assess trials 
that involved previously-learned stimuli that could distract from choosing location 
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responses versus the condition in which there were no previously-learned stimulus-identity 
responses to distract from location responses. 
One sample t-tests were run on the facilitation and interference scores to assess if they were 
significantly different from zero.  These analyses provided an objective test of whether the 
stimulus-response associations had been learned to the point that the responses were 
automatic.  
4.2.4 Imaging Acquisition 
FMRI data were collected on a 3 Tesla Siemens Magnetom Prisma with Total Imaging 
Matrix MRI at Robarts Research Institute at the University of Western Ontario.  A scout 
image for positioning the participant and a T1 for anatomical localization were first 
obtained.  Session 1 consisted of four runs of T2*-weighted functional acquisitions.  Each 
run consisted of three blocks of 18 trials.  A distractor task (20 minutes) was administered 
after Session 1.  Session 2 consisted of two experimental runs.  Each run comprised four 
blocks of 18 trials.  Session 3 was completed as the final session and consisted of two 
experimental runs, with each run containing 2 blocks of 36 trials.  In each of the 
experimental sessions, the repetition time was 2.5 s with one whole brain image consisting 
of 43, 2.5 mm-thick slices.  The field of view was oriented along the anterior and posterior 
commissure with a matrix of 88 × 88 pixels, with an isotropic voxel size of 2.5 × 2.5 × 2.5 
mm3.  The echo time was 30 ms and the flip angle was 90°. 
4.2.5 FMRI Data Analysis 
Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB, MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) 
was used in conjunction with Statistical Parametric Mapping version 8 (SPM8; Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom) to complete fMRI 
analysis.  Images were slice-time corrected, reoriented for participant motion, spatially 
normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, smoothed with 
an 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel, and high-pass filtered (0.0078 Hz). 
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Fixed effects analyses were used to model individual participant’s data in SPM8.  
Regressors were created by convolving onsets and durations of stimulus-response, 
feedback, and rest (i.e., the ITI) events with the canonical hemodynamic response function.  
The stimulus-response event was defined as the time from onset of the Klingon character 
until the participant made a button-press response.  The feedback event was defined as the 
duration of feedback (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) presentation (i.e., 1000 ms from onset 
to offset).  The rest period modelled was the time between the offset of the feedback until 
the fixation point of the subsequent trial (i.e., the ITI).  A general linear model (GLM) was 
created for Session 1 events and included regressors for stimulus-response, feedback, and 
rest events for Session 1 and investigated regional BOLD activity associated with these 
events.  There were twelve regressors for each of the three events, corresponding to each 
of the twelve blocks in Session 1.  Six rigid-body realignment parameters were entered as 
nuisance regressors to minimize the effect of head motion.  A similar model was created 
for stimulus-response and rest events for Session 2.  There were a total of 16 regressors, 
two per block, eight of which corresponded to stimulus-response events and the other eight 
for rest events.  Motion regressors were also included in the Session 2 GLM. 
To investigate learning versus deliberation-related brain activity, contrasts at the group 
level were created, examining activity early and late in Session 1 for both stimulus-
response and feedback events.  Given the significant decreases in RT, SD of RTs, and 
significant increases in accuracy in Session 1 across the first three blocks, that subsequently 
levelled off (See Figure 4.4A), Blocks 1-3 were assigned early status, referred to as Phase 
1, and Blocks 4-12 were considered late, referred to as Phase 2.  Similarly, for Session 2, 
we investigated Block 1 and Blocks 2-8 separately, with the expectation that a 20-minute 
distractor task might re-introduce an element of consideration in stimulus-response 
selection but only for the earliest block due to savings and substantial previous experience 
with the stimulus-response pairs.    
For Session 3, regressors were created convolving onsets and durations of congruent, 
incongruent, and control trials.  At the group level, activation correlating with facilitation 
and interference was investigated by contrasting activation of congruent with control trials 
for facilitation and incongruent with control trials for interference.   
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Peaks within the striatum were reported at a significance level of q < 0.05 cluster-corrected 
using false discovery rate (FDR) correction unless otherwise indicated.  Striatal regions 
were defined using the Harvard-Oxford Subcortical Atlas in the FMRIB Software Library 
version 5.0 (FSL v5.0; Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, United Kingdom).  VS and DS 
are not distinct anatomical structures, which creates difficulty when attempting to separate 
them in an fMRI context.  In a review, Postuma and Dagher (2006) define VS as z ≤ 2, 
which we employed.  Here, DS refers to portions of the caudate nucleus and putamen at a 
level of z > 2 in MNI space.  VS was defined as the nucleus accumbens, and the caudate 
nucleus and putamen at a level of z ≤ 2 in MNI space.  All cortical regions were defined 
using the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Atlas in the FMRIB Software Library version 5.0 (FSL 
v5.0; Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, United Kingdom).  All x, y, z coordinates are 
reported in MNI space. 
The contrasts of interest for Sessions 1, 2, and 3 were as follows: (i) stimulus-response 
events versus rest in Phase 1 of Session 1; (ii) feedback events versus rest in Phase 1 of 
Session 1; (iii) stimulus-response versus feedback events in Phase 1 of Session 1; (iv) 
stimulus-response events versus rest in Phase 2 of Session 1; (v) feedback events versus 
rest in Phase 2 of Session 1; (vi) stimulus response versus feedback events in Phase 2 of 
Session 1; (vii) stimulus-response events of Phase 1 versus stimulus-response events of 
Blocks 4, 5, and 6, Blocks 7, 8, and 9, and Blocks 10, 11, and 12 of Session 1;  (viii) 
stimulus-response events in Block 1 of Session 2 versus rest; (x) stimulus-response events 
for Blocks 2-8 versus rest; (xi) stimulus-response events for Block 1 versus Block 8 of 
Session 2; (xii) facilitation in Session 3; (xiii) interference in Session 3; and (xiv) congruent 
and incongruent versus control trials in Session 3.  Phase 1 refers to Blocks 1-3 in Session 
1 and Phase 2 refers to Blocks 4-12 in Session 1, based on behavioural data patterns 
presented below. 
4.2.6 Bayesian Analysis 
Bayesian analyses were performed.  Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests were conducted using 
the average beta values extracted in each block of Sessions 1 and 2, and for all contrasts of 
conditions (i.e., congruent, incongruent and control) in Session 3, using a bilateral dorsal 
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caudate nucleus ROI.  The dorsal caudate nucleus anatomical ROI was created using the 
Automated anatomical labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), and WFU PickAtlas 
(Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) in conjunction with MarsBaR (Brett, Anton, 
Valabregue, & Poline, 2002).  The ROI included left and right dorsal caudate nucleus at a 
level of z > 2 mm in MNI space.  With a test value of zero, the Bayesian analysis examined 
whether the extracted beta values were significantly greater than zero using the Bayes’ 
factor of three, previously indicated to be the Bayesian corollary of p < 0.05 in frequentist 
hypothesis testing (Dienes, 2014).  If the Bayes’ factor of the average beta values is less 
than three, it strongly supports the null hypothesis, that the activation level is not greater 
than zero.     
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Demographic Data 
Participants had a mean (standard error measure; SEM) age and duration of education of 
23.56 (0.83) and 16.63 (0.46) years, respectively.  One participant was excluded from 
analysis due to excessive head motion while in the scanner, whereas another was 
excluded for falling asleep in the scanner.  Two participants were subsequently excluded 
from Session 3 only, due to a misinterpretation of the task instructions.  18 participants 
were included in the analysis of Session 1 and 2, and 16 participants were included in the 
Session 3 analysis.   
4.3.2 Behavioural Data 
RT was measured as the time between the onset of the abstract image and a button-press 
response by the participant in ms.  The number of correct “left” and “right” button-press 
responses recorded after each block provided our measure of accuracy.  Behavioural results 
are presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, and Tables 4.1 and 4.2.   
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4.3.2.1 Session 1 
The mean block RT, SD of RTs across blocks, and accuracy across Session 1 are shown in 
Figure 4.4A-C respectively.  Mauchly’s test was significant, indicating the assumption of 
sphericity was violated (p < 0.001).  Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon for the RT, SD of RTs across blocks, and accuracy single-
factor repeated measures ANOVAs.   
Table 4.1 Significant pairwise comparisons for RT, SD, and accuracy differences by 
block in Session 1. 
Block A Block B RT SD Accuracy t stat p value t stat p value t stat p value 
1 3 3.73 0.002 3.43 0.005 3.06 0.008 
 4 4.07 <0.001 4.32 0.001 - - 
 5 4.07 <0.001 4.09 0.002 3.39 0.004 
 6 4.07 <0.001 4.39 0.001 3.39 0.004 
 7 4.07 <0.001 3.45 0.005 3.39 0.004 
 8 4.07 0.001 3.90 0.002 3.39 0.004 
 9 4.07 <0.001 4.26 0.001 2.75 0.015 
 10 4.07 <0.001 5.28 <0.001 3.20 0.006 
 11 3.39 0.004 4.76 <0.001 >4.07 <0.001 
 12 - - 4.35 0.001 2.95 0.010 
2 3 2.75 0.015 2.70 0.020 - - 
 4 3.54 0.003 3.59 0.004 - - 
 5 >4.07 <0.001 3.36 0.006 - - 
 6 4.07 0.001 3.67 0.003 - - 
 7 4.07 0.001 2.73 0.020 - - 
 8 3.12 0.007 3.17 0.009 - - 
 9 >4.07 <0.001 3.53 0.004 - - 
 10 4.07 0.001 4.56 <0.001 - - 
 11 2.71 0.016 4.03 0.002 - - 
 12 4.07 0.001 3.62 0.004 - - 
3 5 2.82 0.013 - - - - 
 7 >4.07 <0.001 - - - - 
 9 3.06 0.008 - - - - 
 10 3.06 0.008 - - - - 
4 5 >4.07 <0.001 - - - - 
 9 2.28 0.038 - - - - 
5 6 2.75 0.015 - - - - 
 12 3.54 0.003 - - - - 
6 9 3.54 0.003 - - - - 
7 9 2.25 0.040 - - - - 
8 9 3.73 0.002 - - - - 
9 10 2.66 0.018 - - - - 
 12 3.73 0.002 - - - - 
10 12 3.54 0.003 - - - - 
11 12 3.00 0.009 - - - - 
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Only significant (p < 0.05) comparisons are reported.  The left column labelled Block A lists the blocks that 
differed significantly from blocks listed in column Block B.  RT – response time, SD – standard deviation. 
RTs were examined and revealed a main effect of block, F(3, 95) = 9.34, MSE = 63567.54, 
p < 0.001.  Deconstructing this effect using pairwise comparisons revealed significant RT 
differences between Blocks 1 – 11 versus other subsequent blocks (see Table 4.1 and 
Figure 4.4A for specific significant comparisons).  No differences arose between Block 12 
and other blocks.  Mean RTs decreased from 867 ms in Block 1 to 749 ms in Block 12. 
SD of RTs across blocks, within patients, were investigated, and revealed a main effect of 
block F(3, 62) = 5.07, MSE = 11919, p < 0.001.  Significant SD differences between blocks 
were examined using pairwise comparisons and revealed significant differences between 
Blocks 1 – 3 versus other subsequent blocks (See Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4B for specific 
significant comparisons).  No significant differences arose between Blocks 4-12 and other 
subsequent blocks.  Mean SD decreased from 298 ms in Block 1 to 143 ms in Block 12. 
The single factor repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy revealed a significant main 
effect of Block, F(4, 68) = 3.03, MSE = 33.07, p = 0.025.  This was explored further using 
pairwise comparisons (results presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4C).  Significant 
differences existed between Blocks 1 and 2 versus other subsequent blocks in Session 1.  
No significant differences arose between blocks later than 2 with one another.  The average 
Block 1 score was 95.01%, which increased to 98.54% in Block 12. 
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Figure 4.4 Mean response times, standard deviations, and accuracy across Sessions 1 and 
2. 
A) Mean response times (ms) in each block in Session 1.  B) Mean standard deviations (ms) calculated using 
response times in each block in Session 1. C) Mean response accuracy (%) in each block in Session 1.  D) 
Mean response time (ms) in each block in Session 2.  E) Mean standard deviations (ms) calculated using 
response times in each block in Session 2. F) Mean response accuracy (%) in each block in Session 2.  Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean.  Response time was measured from the onset of the abstract 
image to the button-press response made by the participant.  Response accuracy is a percentage measure 
of the number of correct button-press responses in a block relative to total number of trials in the block.  
Significant differences (p < 0.05) are indicated with an asterisk (*) and numbers listed next to the asterisk 
indicate the blocks from which each block differs significantly. 
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4.3.2.2 Session 2 
Mean RT in Block 1, Session 2 was significantly faster than the last block of Session 1 (t 
= 1.86, p = 0.044).  Accuracy in Block 1, Session 2 was not significantly different from 
accuracy in the last block of Session 1 (t = 0.18, p = 0.429). Mean block RT, SD of RTs 
across blocks, and accuracy across Session 2 are presented in Figures 4.4D– F, 
respectively.  As in Session 1, single factor repeated measures ANOVAs were run to 
investigate differences across Session 2.  There were no significant differences across 
blocks for RT (F < 1), SD (F < 1), or response accuracy (F < 1) across Session 2.  
4.3.2.3 Session 3 
Data from two participants were excluded from analysis in Session 3 due to reported 
misinterpretation of the instructions of the task.  The error rate in the remaining 17 
participants was low (average incorrect responses: 0.74%).  Table 4.2 presents the mean 
RTs and error rates in each of the congruent, incongruent, and control conditions.   
Table 4.2 Mean response times and error rates for the congruent, incongruent, and 
control conditions in Session 3. 
Condition Response Time (ms) Error Rate (%) 
Congruent  378.66 (17.44) 0.73 (0.17) 
Incongruent 387.45 (20.66) 1.34 (0.39) 
Control  377.84 (18.17) 0.98 (0.50) 
Mean (SEM) response times (ms) and error rates (%) are presented.  In the congruent condition, an image 
appeared in a location that was consistent with the left or right button-press response learned at baseline, in 
Session 1, and practiced in Session 2.  In the incongruent condition, a stimulus appeared in a location that 
was inconsistent with the left or right button-press response learned at baseline, in Session 1, and practiced 
in Session 2.  In the control condition, six new images that were not previously presented in the experiment 
appeared to the left or right of centre. 
Paired t-tests were performed on error rates between congruent and control, and 
incongruent and control.  One sample t-tests were performed on average RT facilitation 
(i.e., congruent – control), and interference (i.e., incongruent – control; Figure 4.6).  There 
were significantly more errors in incongruent compared to control (t = 2.06, p = 0.029) 
conditions.  In addition, RT interference compared to zero trended towards significance (t 
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= 1.37, p = 0.095).  However, facilitation (t = -1.23, p = 0.881) scores did not differ 
significantly from zero (Figure 4.5).   
 
Figure 4.5 Mean facilitation and interference scores in Session 3. 
Mean (SEM) facilitation, interference, and incongruent minus congruent difference scores are presented.  
Facilitation was calculated as mean RTs in the congruent minus control condition and interference was 
calculated as mean RTs in the incongruent minus control condition.  The incongruent minus congruent contrast 
was also completed.  Again, in the congruent condition stimuli were presented in the location that was 
consistent with the learned left or right button-press responses in earlier sessions.  On incongruent trials, 
stimuli were presented in the location that was inconsistent with the learned left or right button-press responses 
in earlier sessions.  The control condition consisted of new images that the participant had not previously 
associated with a right or left button-press response.  *p<0.05, wp<0.1 
4.3.3 FMRI Data 
Significant activations are reported at a significance level of q < 0.05 FDR corrected unless 
otherwise stated using SPM5 (Table 4.3-5).  In all sessions, error rates were low and 
therefore only correct responses were examined at the group level.  Session 1 contrasts are 
reported in Table 4.3, Session 2 contrasts are stated in Table 4.4, and Session 3 contrasts 
appear in Table 2.5.  All coordinates (x, y, z) are reported in MNI space.  Only significant 
striatal activations are reported in the text below.  Regions of significant activation outside 
of the striatum are presented in Tables 4.3-5.  FMRI contrasts of interest are displayed in 
Figures 4.6 and 4.7.  
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4.3.3.1 Session 1 
Session 1 was divided into two phases of learning based on behavioural performance.  
Phase 1 included Blocks 1-3, whereas Phase 2 was comprised of Blocks 4-12.  During 
Phase 1, RTs were longer and accuracy was slightly lower, with greater across-trial 
variability in these measures than in Phase 2, reflecting response deliberation.  During 
Phase 2, RTs and accuracy had stabilized, indicating that the stimulus-response 
associations were well-learned and required less consideration at this stage.  Session 1 
contrasts of interest are reported in Table 4.3.   
Table 4.3 Significant brain activations in Session 1 contrasts of interest reported in 
MNI space. 
Contrast Anatomical Area Cluster 
Size 
t q x, y, z 
Session 1: Phase 1      
SR minus rest Left dorsal caudate nucleus 1108 6.37 <0.001 -18, -1, 25 
 Right dorsal caudate nucleus * 5.54 <0.001 21, -4, 25 
 Right occipital fusiform gyrus 5836 7.67 <0.001 48, -64, -20 
 Left occipital pole 239 5.76 0.006 0, -97, 16 
 Left postcentral gyrus 139 3.93 0.028 -45, -37, 61 
FB minus rest No suprathreshold activations     
SR minus FB Left dorsal caudate nucleus 152 5.29 0.003 -15, 11, 25 
 Right dorsal caudate nucleus * 3.59 0.028 18, -19, 25 
 Right occipital pole 207 6.34 0.001 3, -91, 22 
 Right inferior frontal gyrus 72 4.35 0.026 54, 17, -2 
FB minus SR Left juxtapositional lobule 
cortex 
23 5.33 0.020 -6, -1, 58 
 Left middle frontal gyrus 23 5.29 0.020 -30, -4, 52 
      
Session 1: Phase 2      
SR minus rest Left ventral putamen 67 3.58 <0.001 -24, 2, -10 
 Right lateral occipital complex 79 4.59 0.022 51, -64, -14 
 Right cerebellum 208 4.37 0.001 33, -52, -29 
 Left cerebellum 214 4.26 0.001 -39, -61, -23 
FB minus rest No suprathreshold activations     
SR minus FB Right ventral putamen * 4.54 0.017 24, 8, -11 
 Left supramarginal gyrus 1388 5.28 <0.001 -60, -31, 46 
 Left lateral occipital cortex 346 5.10 <0.001 -48, -70, -14 
 Right insular cortex 560 4.96 <0.001 39, -1, -2 
 Right cuneal cortex 732 4.68 <0.001 0, -79, 25 
 Right supramarginal gyrus 251 4.56 <0.001 60, -31, 40 
 Right middle frontal gyrus 137 4.55 0.004 36, 35, 43 
 Left frontal pole 115 4.48 0.007 -42, 44, 28 
 Right middle temporal gyrus 332 4.27 <0.001 51, -52, -2 
FB minus SR No suprathreshold activations     
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Session 1: Phase 1 versus Phase 2 for SR events     
Phase 1 minus Blocks 4-6 No suprathreshold activations     
Blocks 4-6 minus Phase 1 Left cingulate gyrus 165 5.08 0.013 -15, -28, 40 
 Right parietal operculum 
cortex 
1519 4.43 <0.001 57, -31, 31 
 Left insular cortex 855 4.40 <0.001 -30, 29, 7 
 Left parietal operculum cortex 355 4.25 0.001 -51, -40, 22 
 Right cingulate gyrus 502 4.24 <0.001 9, 14, 34 
 Right precuneous cortex 191 4.10 0.008 9, -43, 49 
 Left intracalcarine cortex 890 4.01 <0.001 -9, -64, 13 
 Right middle frontal gyrus 113 3.88 0.035 27, 35, 28 
Phase 1 minus Blocks 7-9 Right dorsal caudate nucleus 267 3.69 <0.001 21, 19, 26 
 Left dorsal caudate nucleus * 3.65 <0.001 -18, 2, 26 
 Left precuneous cortex 7451 5.10 <0.001 -9, -64, 16 
 Right frontal medial cortex 196 4.57 0.016 6, 35, -14 
Blocks 7-9 minus Phase 1 No suprathreshold activations     
Phase 1 minus Blocks 10-
12 
Right dorsal caudate nucleus 113 4.25 0.013 18, 26, 13 
 Left dorsal caudate nucleus * 4.18 0.004 -12, -1, 25 
 Right lateral occipital cortex 969 5.58 <0.001 45, -70, -20 
Blocks 10-12 minus Phase 
1 
Left precentral gyrus 2454 5.99 <0.001 -30, -7, 52 
 Left lateral occipital cortex 1539 4.72 <0.001 -51, -73, 19 
 Left thalamus 218 4.62 0.005 -3, -19, 1 
 Right frontal medial cortex 151 4.21 0.016 3, 38, -14 
 Left planum temporale 142 3.86 0.019 -33, -31, 16 
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  Q values are reported at a significance level of q < 0.05 corrected for false 
discovery rate (FDR) at the cluster-level.  T values are reported at the voxel level.  Coordinates are reported 
in MNI space.  Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each contrast.  SR – stimulus-response 
events; FB – feedback events.  *Cluster size unobtainable as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster, q 
value reported is FDR corrected at the voxel level.  
Stimulus-response decisions: Phase 1, Session 1.  In Phase 1, significant activation 
occurred in the left (peak coordinates: -18, -1, 25; t = 6.37; q < 0.001), and right (peak 
coordinates: 21, -4, 25; t = 5.54; q < 0.001) dorsal caudate nucleus contrasting stimulus-
response events with rest periods (Figure 4.6A).  Significant activation also occurred in the 
left (peak coordinates: -15, -1, 25; t = 5.29; q = 0.003) and right (peak coordinates: 18, -
19, 25; t = 3.59; q = 0.028) dorsal caudate nucleus contrasting stimulus-response minus 
feedback events.   
Receiving feedback: Phase 1, Session 1.  No significant striatal activations arose for 
feedback events minus rest or stimulus-response events. 
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Stimulus-response decisions: Phase 2, Session 1.  Significant activation occurred in the left 
ventral putamen (peak coordinates: -24, 2, -10; t = 3.58; q < 0.001) for Phase 2 stimulus-
response events minus rest (Figure 4.6B).  In addition, significant activation occurred in 
the right ventral putamen for stimulus-response events minus feedback events (peak 
coordinates: 24, 8, -11; t = 4.54; q = 0.017).  To further explore Phase 2, stimulus-response 
events were compared to rest at a more liberal criterion of p < 0.005 uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons with a cluster threshold of 10 contiguous voxels.  Even using this 
liberal criterion, no peaks in the DS were revealed.  Some activation related to the peak in 
the left ventral putamen extended dorsally into DS but only at this lessened criterion (peak 
coordinates: -27, 5, -7; t = 3.70; p < 0.001). 
Receiving feedback: Phase 2, Session 1.  No significant activation occurred during Phase 
2 for feedback events minus rest, or feedback minus stimulus-response events. 
Stimulus-response decisions: Phase 1 versus Phase 2.  Given that Phase 1 consisted of the 
first three blocks and Phase 2 was composed of the last nine blocks (Block 4-12), contrasts 
were made between Phase 1 and Phase 2, grouped into three consecutive blocks, to create 
balanced contrasts.  No significant striatal activations occurred in the Phase 1 minus Blocks 
4, 5, and 6 contrast, or the reverse contrast.  Significant activation arose in the left and right 
dorsal caudate nucleus (peak coordinates: -18, 2, 26; t = 3.65; q < 0.001, and peak 
coordinates: 21, -19, 26; t = 3.69; q < 0.001, respectively), for Phase 1 minus Blocks 7, 8, 
9, and for Phase 1 minus Blocks 10, 11, and 12 (peak coordinates: -12, -1, 25; t = 4.18; q 
= 0.004, and peak coordinates: 18, 26, 13; t = 4.25; q = 0.013, respectively; Figure 4.6C) 
contrasts.  No significant striatal activation occurred during the reverse contrasts (Figure 
4.6D).   
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Figure 4.6 Significant activations in contrasts of interest in Session 1 Phases 1 (i.e., Blocks 
1-3) and 2 (i.e., Blocks 4-12): SR events. 
The figure shows significant activation at a threshold of q < 0.05 corrected for false discovery rate (FDR).  In 
each contrast of interest, horizontal slices are presented ranging from z= -5 to z = 25, every 5 mm. A) BOLD 
signal for stimulus-response minus rest events in Phase 1 of Session 1. B) BOLD signal for stimulus-response 
minus rest events in Phase 2 of Session 1. C) BOLD signal for Phase 1 minus Blocks 10, 11, and 12 of Session 
1 stimulus-response events.  D) BOLD signal for Blocks 10, 11, and 12 of Session 1 minus Phase 1 stimulus-
response events.  SR – stimulus-response events. 
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4.3.3.2 Session 2 
Session 2 contrasts of interest are reported in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Significant brain activations in Session 2 contrasts of interest reported in 
MNI space. 
Contrast Anatomical Area Cluster 
Size 
t q x, y, z 
Block 1 minus rest Right dorsal caudate nucleus 42 3.98 <0.001 15, 1, 26 
 Left dorsal caudate nucleus 85 4.08 <0.001 -18, -4, 23 
 Right ventral putamen 151 4.36 <0.001 24, 14, 2 
 Left ventral putamen * 4.32 <0.001 -27, 8, -1 
Block 2-8 minus rest Right cerebellum 54 5.31 0.013 -45, -52, -32 
Block 1 minus Block 8 Right dorsal caudate nucleus * 3.98 <0.001 18, -4, 23 
 Left dorsal caudate nucleus 23 4.26 <0.001 -18, -4, 23 
 Right cerebellum 293 5.17 <0.001 27, -40, -32 
 Left thalamus 160 4.65 <0.001 -6, -1, 1 
 Left temporal occipital fusiform 
cortex 
173 4.62 <0.001 -39, -58, -23 
 Right superior temporal gyrus 67 4.28 0.009 42, -34, 4 
 Right occipital pole 57 4.21 0.014 15, -100, 10 
 Left postcentral gyrus 35 4.01 0.047 -30, -19, 37 
Block 8 minus Block 1 No suprathreshold activations     
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  Q values are reported at a significance level of q < 0.05 corrected for false 
discovery rate (FDR) at the cluster-level.  T values are reported at the voxel level.  Coordinates are reported 
in MNI space.  Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each contrast.  SR – stimulus-response 
events; FB – feedback events. *Cluster size unobtainable as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster, q 
value reported is FDR corrected at the voxel level.  
Stimulus-response decisions:  Block 1, Session 2.  Significant activation arose in the left 
(peak coordinates: -18, -4, 23; t = 4.08; q < 0.001), and right (peak coordinates: 15, 1, 26; 
t = 3.98; q < 0.001) dorsal caudate nucleus, as well as left (peak coordinates: -27, 8, -1; t 
= 4.32; q < 0.001) and right (peak coordinates: 24, 14, 2; t = 4.36; q < 0.001) ventral 
putamen, when Block 1 decision events were contrasted with rest periods (Figure 4.7A).  
No significant striatal activation arose for each of Blocks 2-8 when compared with rest 
events at q < 0.05 FDR or even using a more liberal criterion of p < 0.005 uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons.  Significant activation in left and right dorsal caudate nucleus arose 
when stimulus response events in Block 1 were contrasted with those in Block 8 of Session 
2 (peak coordinates: -18, -4, 23; t = 4.26; q < 0.001 and peak coordinates: 18, -4, 23; t = 
3.98; q < 0.001, respectively; Figure 4.7B and C). 
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Figure 4.7 Significant activations in contrasts of interest in Session 2. 
The figure shows significant activation at a threshold of q < 0.05 corrected for false discovery rate (FDR).  In 
each contrast of interest, horizontal slices are presented ranging from z= -5 to z = 25, every 5 mm.  A) BOLD 
signal for stimulus-response events of Block 1 of Session 2 minus rest.  B) BOLD signal for stimulus-response 
events of Block 1 minus Block 8 of Session 2.  C) BOLD signal of stimulus-response events of Blocks 8 minus 
Blocks 1 of Session 2.  SR – stimulus-response events. 
4.3.3.3 Session 3 
Session 3 contrasts of interest are reported in Table 4.5. 
Localization responses: There were no significant activations in any striatal regions for 
contrasts of facilitation (i.e., congruent minus control trials), interference (i.e., incongruent 
minus control trials), or incongruent and congruent vs. control trials at an FDR corrected 
threshold of q < 0.05.  At a less stringent threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected, however, 
contrasting incongruent and congruent trials (i.e., conditions in which suppression of 
previously-learned stimulus-identity responses were required  in favour of the less-
practiced location responses) with control trials (i.e., condition in which there were no 
previously-learned stimulus-identity responses to distract from location responses), a 271 
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voxel cluster in left dorsal putamen extending into dorsal caudate nucleus appeared (peak 
coordinates: -18, -13, 14; t = 2.86; p < 0.003).  
Table 4.5 Significant brain activations in Session 3 contrasts of interest reported in 
MNI space. 
Contrast Anatomical 
Area 
Cluster 
Size 
t p x, y, z 
Facilitation (Congruent minus Control)  No suprathreshold activations   
Control minus Congruent  No suprathreshold activations    
Interference (Incongruent minus Control)  No suprathreshold activations    
Control minus Incongruent No suprathreshold activations    
Incongruent minus Congruent No suprathreshold activations    
Congruent minus Incongruent No suprathreshold activations    
Congruent and Incongruent minus Control Left dorsal 
putamen 
271 2.86 0.003 -18, -13, 14 
Control minus Congruent and Incongruent No suprathreshold activations    
Cluster size is reported in voxels.  P values are reported at a significance level of p < 0.005 uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons.  T values are reported at the voxel level.  Coordinates are reported in MNI space.  
Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each contrast.  Facilitation was calculated as mean RTs 
in the congruent minus control condition and interference was calculated as mean RTs in the incongruent 
minus control condition.  
4.3.3.4 Bayesian Analysis 
Beta values in the bilateral dorsal caudate nucleus ROI were extracted for stimulus-
response events separately for Sessions 1, 2, and 3.  These values were used in the Bayesian 
analysis.  To rule out a role for DS in late stimulus-response learning, DS BOLD signal 
was predicted to attenuate, despite behavioural signs of ongoing late-stage learning, during 
Phase 2, Session 1, and Blocks 2-8, Session 2.  Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests were 
conducted on the beta values extracted from the dorsal caudate nucleus ROIs in these 
sessions.  In this Bayesian analysis, a Bayes’ factor of less than 3 is considered to 
significantly support the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014) that DS activation was not 
correlated with stimulus-response events. 
Session 1 Bayes’ factors: Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests were conducted separately on 
the average beta values for each block in Session 1.  As supported in the whole brain 
analysis, Bayes’ factors in Blocks 1-4 significantly supported the alternative hypothesis 
that activation in DS in these blocks is significantly greater than zero.  Blocks 5-12, 
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however, all had a Bayes’ factor of less than 3, indicating that the beta values in DS are not 
greater than zero, strongly supporting the null hypothesis.  That is, in Session 1, DS appears 
to mediate response-selection responses in Phase 1 (i.e., Blocks 1-3), with values ranging 
from 7.2-15.4, as well as in Block 4, with a Bayes’ factor of 8.5.  These results strongly 
support the alternative hypothesis.  For all subsequent blocks in Session 1, Bayes’ factors 
were well below the cut-off of 3, with a mean Bayes’ factor of 1.12 (0.09) in all blocks but 
one.  In Block 10 only, an isolated finding, the DS Bayes’ factor trended toward being 
greater than zero (BF10 = 2.78).  Entirely, consistent with the frequency-based statistical 
analyses, our Bayesian analysis of these data strongly support the view that DS BOLD 
signal preferentially arises during blocks when response deliberation is expected based on 
serial order positions, and confirmed by RT, accuracy, and the variability of behaviour 
across trials.  
Session 2 Bayes’ factors: A similar Bayesian analysis was conducted on each of the eight 
average block beta values extracted from the DS ROI.  Supporting the Session 2, whole 
brain analysis, only the first block was trending towards being significantly greater than 
zero (BF10 = 2.61).  Blocks 2-8 had Bayes’ factors of less than 1, with a mean Bayes’ factor 
of 0.20 (0.01), strongly supporting the null hypothesis, that the average DS beta values are 
not significantly greater than zero.  That is, DS is neither mediating learning or responding 
in these later sessions when responses were relatively effortless and therefore required less 
reflection.       
Session 3 Bayes’ factors: Similarly to the above Bayesian analyses for Sessions 1 and 2, 
beta values were extracted from the bilateral DS ROIs for each of the congruent, 
incongruent, and control regressors.  Bayes’ factor, one-sample t-tests were conducted on 
facilitation (i.e., congruent minus control trials) and interference (i.e., incongruent minus 
control trials) scores.  All scores had a Bayes’ factor of less than 1.5 indicating that for 
facilitation (BF10 = 1.30), interference (BF10 = 0.46), as well as for the sum of congruent 
and incongruent minus control (BF10 = 0.62), DS activity beta values are not significantly 
greater than zero using this analysis.   
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4.4 Discussion 
Examining late-stage stimulus-response learning, we found that DS activity—specifically 
the body of dorsal caudate nucleus—correlated with deliberate decision-making rather than 
feedback events, replicating our main finding in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014).  We 
divided Session 1 into Phases 1 and 2, guided by the serial order of blocks and based on 
behavioural data.  We examined Phases 1 versus 2 of Session 1, and Block 1 versus 2-8 of 
Session 2 separately because the concepts that DS mediates a) learning stimulus-response 
associations to the point of automaticity versus b) deliberate response selections, predict 
different patterns of DS engagement during earlier versus later trials of Session 1 and in 
the initial block of Session 2 compared to later blocks.   
Significant DS activity occurred during stimulus-response events in Phase 1, Session 1, but 
not Phase 2, Session 1.  These findings held whether stimulus-response events in Phase 1 
and 2 were contrasted with rest periods, with feedback periods, or with one another.  This 
is important because stimulus-response automaticity had not been achieved at the end of 
Session 1, attested to by improved RT and differences in BOLD signal across Phase 2, 
Session 1 to Session 2.  Further, pairwise comparisons across blocks in Session 1, 
continued to reveal small but significant differences in RT throughout, though SD and 
accuracy had plateaued.  Evidence that stimulus-response automaticity was achieved only 
occurred by the end of Session 2, given a) increased errors in the incongruent relative to 
the control conditions, b) a trend toward significant interference (i.e., incongruent minus 
control) in terms of RT data, and c) significant DS activation (i.e., dorsal putamen 
extending into dorsal caudate nucleus), in a location-based Stroop task in Session 3.   If DS 
mediates learning to the point of automaticity, DS activation should persist until this 
process is complete.  DS BOLD signal dropped out well before this point, demonstrating 
dissociation between DS BOLD signal and the progression of stimulus-response 
association automatization.  DS activation was significantly greater for stimulus-response 
events in Phase 1, Session 1, relative to Phase 2, Session 1 (i.e., Blocks 7-9; 10-12).  The 
correspondence of DS activity with stimulus-response decisions in Phase 1, when longer 
RTs, lower accuracy, and greater trial-by-trial variability (i.e., SD) occurred, relative to 
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when more stable responding occurred in Phase 2, was entirely in keeping with its proposed 
role in deliberate decision making.   
A main aim of Session 2, and the 20-minute distractor task that occurred prior to it, was to 
create situations in which predictions regarding DS activation levels would differ for the 
competing accounts of DS’s role in cognitive function.  Further, Session 2 was designed to 
evaluate whether automaticity had been achieved by the end of Session 1.  This would be 
suggested by an absence of change in a) behaviour (i.e., RT, SD, or accuracy) and b) BOLD 
signal from Phase 2, Session 1 to Session 2, despite an intervening period of distraction.  
As detailed above, this was not the case.  Further, the distractor period was intended to re-
introduce some uncertainty and hence deliberation in response-selection decisions.  If DS 
mediates deliberate response selections, generating uncertainty was expected to cause an 
increase or re-engagement of DS activity initially in Session 2 (i.e., in Block 1), until 
participants re-familiarized themselves once more with stimulus-specific responses.  
Supporting the view that DS mediates deliberate, response decisions, DS BOLD signal re-
emerged and correlated with stimulus-response events in Block 1 of Session 2 only.  This 
block occurred immediately following a 20-minute, unrelated distractor task.  DS BOLD 
signal did not correlate preferentially with stimulus-response decisions in Blocks 2-8 of 
Session 2 compared to rest. Further, significantly greater DS BOLD signal resulted 
comparing Block 1, immediately following distraction, to Block 8, at the end of Session 2.   
Using fMRI in healthy controls, we can only contradict the entrenched view that DS 
mediates development of stimulus-response automaticity by demonstrating absence of DS 
BOLD signal despite behavioural evidence that stimulus-response automatization 
remained in progress (i.e., a null result).  That is, this claim would be challenged by 
dissociating neural signal in DS and behavioural signs of learning.  There is a, perhaps, 
justified bias against publishing null effects.  Null effects can have multiple interpretations 
including the possibility that a true difference was not detected due to insensitivity of 
measures or related to lack of statistical power (i.e., Type II error).  Further with frequentist 
approaches, the null and the alternative hypotheses are set up to be asymmetric with 
investigator control of the maximum error allowable for supporting the alternative 
hypothesis whereas the error associated Type II errors varies in each study based on 
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experimental features and power (Dienes, 2014).  The application of Bayesian analysis can 
reduce pitfalls in dealing with negative results and interpreting null effects.  Bayesian 
analysis treats null and alternative hypotheses symmetrically, using the data themselves to 
determine the relative fit to the respective models.  In this way, the statistical obstacles and 
validity of accepting versus rejecting the null hypotheses are equated with Bayesian 
analysis (Dienes, 2014).   
We performed Bayesian analysis on average block beta values extracted from bilateral DS, 
specifically the dorsal caudate nucleus ROIs.  These ROIs were defined using the 
anatomical boundaries of the caudate nucleus above z = 2 mm.  There was significant 
support for dorsal caudate nucleus BOLD greater than zero in Phase 1, Session 1, as well 
as in in Block 4 (i.e., the first block of Phase 2), Session 1.  Bayesian analysis significantly 
supported accepting the null hypothesis that activation of DS activation was not greater 
than zero in all blocks save Block 4 of Phase 2, Session 1.  Frequency-based analyses 
revealed significant re-emergence of dorsal caudate nucleus activation in Block 1, Session 
2.  The Bayes’ Factor only trended toward significance for Block 1, Session 2 (i.e., 2.61 
with significance threshold set at 3), not fully supporting the alternative hypothesis.  It is 
notable, however, that the mean Bayes’ factors for all other blocks in Session 2 (i.e., Blocks 
2-8) was 0.20.  This pattern of results is entirely incompatible with the view that DS 
mediates late-learning to the point of automaticity and wholly supports the notion that DS 
underlies decisions that still require reflection 
4.4.1 Supplemental Experiment 2   
Based on improved RT and differences in BOLD signal from Phase 2, Session 1 to Session 
2, automaticity was not achieved at the end of Session 1 let alone at the end of Phase 1, 
Session 1.  Nonetheless, DS signal had dropped out by Phase 2 (i.e., across Blocks 5-12), 
Session 1.  Significant DS BOLD signal was noted only in Phase 1 (i.e., Blocks 1-3, and 
Block 4, the latter was only revealed using Bayesian analyses), Session 1 when RT, error 
rates, and mean block SDs were high, suggesting deliberation.  Preferential DS BOLD 
signal also occurred in Block 1, Session 2, following a 20-minute distractor task aimed at 
re-introducing uncertainty and some consideration of response selection decisions.  Phase 
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1, Session 1 constituted only 9 presentations of each stimulus, which referring to the larger 
literature would be insufficient to support the development of automatic stimulus-specific 
responding (Foerde, Knowlton, & Poldrack, 2006; Helie et al., 2010; C. M. MacLeod & 
Dunbar, 1988; Myers et al., 2003; R. A. Poldrack et al., 2005; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; 
Shohamy & Wagner, 2008; Wachter, Lungu, Liu, Willingham, & Ashe, 2009).  
Nonetheless, to be entirely certain of our interpretations of the Main Experiment, we 
conducted Experiment 2 (Methods and Results presented in (2.6.1).  In this behavioural 
experiment, we included a location Stroop task immediately after Phase 1, Session 1 (i.e., 
Session 3A) as well as at the end of Session 2 (i.e., Session 3B), to directly rule out the 
possibility that stimulus-response automaticity had been achieved after Phase 1.    
Performance in Sessions 1 and 2 of Experiment 2 entirely replicated behavioural findings 
in our Main Experiment (i.e., compare Figures 2.5 and Figure 2.9).  Significant interference 
in location responses using RT or accuracy did not occur in the incongruent relative to the 
control condition in Session 3A.  Similarly, there was not significant RT or accuracy 
facilitation in the congruent relative to the control condition in Session 3A.  Consequently, 
there was no evidence that stimulus-specific responses had achieved automatic status at the 
conclusion of Phase 1, Session 1, based on performance of a modified location Stroop task 
in Session 3A.  There was a trend toward slower RTs in Block 1, Session 2, relative to 
Block 12, Session 1, replicating the finding in our Main Experiment that stimulus-response 
automaticity was not achieved by the end of Session 1.   
In contrast, significant interference in terms of RT occurred during Session 3B, after 
stimulus-response associations had been trained in Session 1 (i.e., twelve blocks), and 
Session 2 (i.e., eight blocks), for incongruent relative to control trials.  This suggests that 
stimulus-response automaticity was achieved by the end of Session 2, entirely consistent 
with our findings in the Main Experiment.   
The results in Experiment 2, inform our interpretation of the fMRI findings in the Main 
Experiment.  Taken together, the results favour the view that DS activation correlated with 
stimulus-response events in Phase 1, Session 1, when an element of deliberation remained, 
because this region has a role in decision making, as has been suggested by others as well 
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(Ali et al., 2010; R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Daniel et al., 2010; P. A. MacDonald et al., 
2011; Ohira et al., 2010)  
4.4.2 Summary 
Automaticity is variously defined as reflecting stimulus-specific responses that a) persist 
even when feedback is omitted or is reversed, generalizing across situations (Myers et al., 
2003; Shohamy & Wagner, 2008), b) are unaffected by distracting information or tasks 
(Foerde et al., 2006), and c) interfere with enacting new incongruent responses (C. M. 
MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988).  DS has been implicated in the development of automatic 
stimulus-specific responses (Ashby et al., 2010; Tricomi et al., 2009; Yin & Knowlton, 
2006).  DS has also been ascribed a role in decision making when deliberation is required 
(Ali et al., 2010; R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Daniel et al., 2010; DeGutis & D’Esposito, 
2007; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Ohira et al., 2010; Robertson et al., 2015).  Our results 
refute a role for DS in late-stage, stimulus-response learning and automatization, and rather 
are entirely consistent with the view that DS mediates deliberate decision making.  
In this experiment, significant DS activity— particularly the body region of the dorsal 
caudate nucleus— occurred only during stimulus-response, and not feedback events, 
replicating our main finding in Hiebert et al., (2014b) suggesting that DS mediates response 
decisions and not learning from feedback.  Further supporting a role for DS in mediating 
decisions, DS was significant in Phase 1, Session 1, when longer RTs, lower accuracy, and 
greater trial-by-trial variability suggested a degree of indecision and hence deliberation was 
required.  Session 2 was performed following a 20-minute distractor task that aimed to re-
introduce some uncertainty in response-selection decisions.  This provided a further test of 
the hypothesis that DS mediates decision making when choosing among response 
alternatives demands some contemplation of options.  As we had predicted, we observed a 
transient re-emergence of DS activation, correlating with the decision-making events in 
Block 1, Session 2, immediately following distraction.  In contrast, during Phase 2, Session 
1, and Blocks 2-8 of Session 2, stimulus-response decisions did not correlate significantly 
with DS BOLD signal.  Further, Bayesian analysis supported these null results in all but 
Block 4 (i.e., the first block) of Phase 2, Session 1.  In our Main Experiment, stimulus-
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response automaticity had not been achieved at the conclusion of Session 1 based on the 
evidence that RTs and BOLD signal differed from Block 12, Session 1 and Block 1, 
Session 2 and the additional finding that pairwise t-tests of RT for individual blocks across 
Session 1 continued to shorten slightly across blocks.  Stimulus-response associations were 
over-learned to the point of automaticity at the conclusion of Session 2, supported by the 
finding that stimulus-response associations learned in Session 1 and reinforced in Session 
2 facilitated congruent and interfered with incongruent location responses in a modified 
location Stroop task.  In Experiment 2, we sought direct evidence that Phase 1, Session 1 
was not sufficient to promote development of stimulus-response automaticity, using our 
location Stroop task (See 2.6).  Experiment 2 revealed that stimulus-response automaticity 
was not achieved following Blocks 1-3, Session 1 (i.e., Phase 1) after only 9 presentations 
of each stimulus.  The fact that DS activation attenuated after Phase 1, Session 1, before 
automaticity was achieved, in the Main Experiment is therefore wholly inconsistent with 
the contention that DS mediates late-stage, stimulus-response learning to the point of 
automaticity (Ashby et al., 2007; Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  
There was a clear dissociation between DS BOLD signal and behavioural evidence of late-
stage, stimulus-response association automatization.    
In contrasts where DS activation emerged significantly, cortical regions previously 
implicated in decision making and categorization judgments were also revealed.  These 
included occipital regions of the fusiform gyrus that have been implicated in decision 
making, specifically in motor planning and execution (Tosoni, Guidotti, Del Gratta, 
Committeri, & Sestieri, 2016), as well as the occipital pole and lateral occipital cortex that 
are both implicated in object recognition (Vernon, Gouws, Lawrence, Wade, & Morland, 
2016).  Object recognition is a required step toward enacting stimulus-specific response 
selections.  The right inferior frontal gyrus has been shown to implement and reprogramme 
action plans (Stock, Steenbergen, Colzato, & Beste, 2016).  Many of the brain regions that 
were significantly activated along with DS during response-selection events are 
reciprocally connected with the dorsal caudate nucleus, the body specifically, such as the 
precentral, postcentral, inferior, and fusiform gyri (Robinson et al., 2012; Tziortzi et al., 
2014).  These results highlight the fact that, whereas the DS does not function in isolation, 
it plays a key, central role in performing response-related decisions.  
177 
 
4.4.3 DS in Stimulus-Response Learning versus Decision Making 
The claim that DS mediates learning is well-entrenched (Ashby et al., 2007; Ashby et al., 
2010; Balleine et al., 2009; Brovelli et al., 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2004; Yin & Knowlton, 
2006).  Challenges to this notion are accruing, however (Atallah et al., 2007; Exner et al., 
2002; A. A. MacDonald, Monchi, et al., 2013; Vo et al., 2014).  In a previous experiment, 
we investigated DS’s role in early stimulus-response learning.  We found that DS activity, 
particularly the head of dorsal caudate nucleus, correlated with stimulus-response decisions 
and enactment, not with feedback processing, the point at which early, stimulus-response 
associations are learned (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).  In that experiment, DS activity 
did not correlate with response decisions in the first half of our session, before response 
tendencies had developed.  DS activity emerged and correlated significantly with stimulus-
response decisions in later stages of stimulus-response learning.  At these later stages when 
DS activity correlated with stimulus-response events, the learning curve was shallower and 
therefore DS did not seem to be tracking learning behaviour per se.  Further, and quite 
convincing that DS does not mediate early, stimulus-response learning via feedback, DS 
preferentially correlated with stimulus-response decision events in Session 2, when 
feedback was omitted and hence further feedback-based learning was precluded.  In 
Session 2, however, decision accuracy remained imperfect (i.e., mean 92%), and RTs (i.e., 
mean 696 ms) suggested some deliberation was required.  That is, DS activity arose when 
stimulus-specific responses were not overlearned and still required a degree of deliberation 
in this session of our previous experiment.  We argued that DS is erroneously implicated 
in stimulus-response learning because it mediates aspects of decision making, and most 
stimulus-response learning studies combine decision and learning processes.  This 
confound exists at the behavioural level in that expression of learning typically depends 
upon intact decision-making abilities.  In neuroimaging studies, neural activation 
associated with learning and decision processes are frequently merged into a single 
learning event.  Though our previous finding seriously challenged the premise that DS 
mediates early stimulus-response learning, we could not comment on the DS’s role in late-
stage learning, particularly in stimulus-response automaticity that occurs through repeated 
experience of stimulus-response associations and does not necessarily depend upon 
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feedback.  The view that DS mediates late learning is also prevalent (Ashby et al., 2010; 
Balleine et al., 2009; Ruge & Wolfensteller, 2013; Tricomi et al., 2009) and this served as 
the impetus for the Main Experiment. 
Extending our previous investigation (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), here we examined 
DS’s role in late-stage learning versus decision making.  Our results were entirely 
consistent with the view that DS mediates decisions when a degree of deliberation is 
required (Session 1, Phase 1; Session 2, Block 1), consistent with our previous conclusions 
regarding DS’s role in an early-learning experiment (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).  
That DS activity attenuated before automaticity had been achieved is inconsistent with the 
view that it mediates late-stage stimulus-response learning (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; 
Helie et al., 2010; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012; Macpherson, Morita, & Hikida, 2014; 
Soto et al., 2013; Voorn, Vanderschuren, Groenewegen, Robbins, & Pennartz, 2004; Yin 
& Knowlton, 2006).  If the role of DS is to learn stimulus-response associations and to train 
cortical-cortical connections to the point of automaticity, DS activity should have persisted 
into Session 2, given that this learning process had not reached completion based on 
differences in RT and BOLD signal from Session 1 to Session 2 (Ashby, et al., 2007).  The 
current results are therefore at odds with the SPEED model ascribing DS a role in mediating 
automaticity (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie et al., 2010) as well as with the theory that DS not 
only mediates stimulus-response habit learning but also underlies responding that is 
habitual (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Everitt & Robbins, 2005).   
The finding that DS activity for stimulus-response events attenuates prior to the 
development of automatic responding has been shown convincingly by others as well (Wu, 
et al., 2004; Waldschmidt and Ashby, 2011; Soto et al., 2013).  de Wit, Barker, Dickinson, 
and Cools (2011) used an instrumental conflict task, where participants first learned simple 
biconditional associations in a goal-directed or habit fashion, and later performed decisions 
where select outcomes were devalued.  Patients with PD, tested in the OFF or ON 
dopaminergic medication states, scored similarly to controls in the outcome-devalued stage 
of the experiment with respect to both the goal-directed and habit learned associations.  In 
PD, DS is significantly dopamine depleted and hence DS functions a significantly impaired 
in the off state and are improved by dopaminergic therapy.  These findings, therefore 
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suggest that DS does not mediate the development of automaticity, or interestingly even 
goal-directed learning in this task (de Wit et al., 2011).    
More consistent with our current results, as well as with our previous findings (Nole M. 
Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), DS seems to be implicated in decision making only once 
stimulus-response tendencies begin to develop, when a degree of deliberation remains, but 
before responses are enacted with little reflection or automatically (Figure 2.7).  These 
results integrate with a growing literature linking DS to decision making (Atallah et al., 
2007; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2008), particularly the body of the caudate nucleus. as 
we have shown here, (Cincotta & Seger, 2007; Little, Shin, Sisco, & Thulborn, 2006; 
Seger, Peterson, Cincotta, Lopez-Paniagua, & Anderson, 2010), and especially when 
deliberation, as well as cognitive control or flexibility processes are required (R. Cools & 
D'Esposito, 2011; Robertson et al., 2015).  In neuroimaging studies, DS activity correlates 
with degree of category (Daniel et al., 2010), response-reward (Ohira et al., 2010), and 
stimulus-response (Ali et al., 2010; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011) uncertainty.  Further, 
investigations in patients with DS lesions and in PD patients reveal more significant 
impairments for decisions requiring greater deliberation and in some cases superior 
performance relative to healthy controls for choosing more automatic responses (Benke et 
al., 2003; Cameron et al., 2010; R. Cools et al., 2006; Roshan Cools et al., 2010; Hood et 
al., 2007; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Thoma et al., 2008).  Finally, in neuroimaging 
studies that utilize the Stroop task, a robust paradigm that examines cognitive control (C. 
M.  MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000) resolving response conflict and inhibiting pre-potent 
responses in the incongruent condition frequently implicate DS (Ali et al., 2010; Coderre 
& van Heuven, 2013; Robertson et al., 2015).   These findings are at odds with any theory 
that ascribes a role to DS in habit learning or habitual responding. 
4.4.4 Role of the Striatum in Stimulus-Response Learning and Decision 
Making 
Figure 4.8 presents our theorized patterns of DS and VS engagement for stimulus-response 
versus feedback events separately, following the course from early- to late-stage learning 
and decision making, based on our previous (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014) and current 
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results.  In Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), stimulus-response learning in Session 1 was 
divided in half.  The first half revealed a much steeper slope of stimulus-response learning 
via feedback than the second.  The average percent accuracy achieved after the first half of 
Session 1 in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014) was 57%.  The average percent accuracy at 
the end of the second half of Session 1 (i.e., final learning score) was 93%.  In the Main 
Experiment, after a period of explicit study of stimulus-response associations, the percent 
accuracy of the first block of trials in Session 1 was 94%.  Session 1 of the current study 
was divided into Phases 1 (Blocks 1-3) and 2 (Blocks 4-12) based on behavioural patterns 
of accuracy, RT, and inter-trial variability.  The average percent accuracy and RT achieved 
at the end of Phase 1 were 97% and 746 ms and at the end of Phase 2 were 98% and 694 
ms, respectively.  
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Figure 4.8 Roles of Ds and VS in early and late stimulus-response learning as supported 
by our findings in N. M. Hiebert et al. (2014) and the Main Experiment of the current study. 
Graphs presented above illustrate preferential patterns of DS and VS activation for stimulus-response events 
versus feedback separately, following the course of learning from early to late stage.  This is not actual data 
and the amplitude and shape of curves reflect our theoretical interpretations of our results.  We present 
Session 1, of Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), divided in half.  Average percent accuracy achieved after the 
first half of Session 1 was 57%.  The average percent accuracy for Session 1 final learning, was 93%.  For 
the current study, percent accuracy for Block 1, Session 1 was 94%.  Session 1 was divided into Phase 1 
(Blocks 1-3) and 2 (Blocks 4-12).  The average percent accuracy achieved at the end of Phase 1 was 97% 
and at the end of Phase 2 was 98%.  A) Activation patterns during feedback events.  VS activity was noted 
significantly only in the first half of Session 1 (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014) VS was not significantly 
engaged during the feedback events in the Main Experiment. B) Activation patterns during stimulus-
response events.  DS activity was noted significantly only during the second half of Session 1 and Session 
2 (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014) when stimulus-response associations were learned but still required 
deliberation.  In the Main Experiment, DS was only significant in Phase 1, Session 1 when response selections 
were learned but still required deliberation based on accuracy and RT.  Preferential DS activity was not noted 
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relative to rest, feedback, or Phase 1 stimulus-response events, for stimulus-response events during Phase 2 
of Session 1 and for the bulk of Session 2. 
DS was preferentially engaged during stimulus-response events in both experiments 
(Figure 4.8B).  DS activity peaked towards the end of the learning phase in Nole M. 
Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014) when stimulus-response associations were beginning to form but 
when response selections were still somewhat uncertain (i.e., > 57% accuracy).  In the 
current study, DS activity occurred early once response selections were learned but still 
required deliberation based on accuracy and RT (i.e., < 97% accuracy).  DS activity did 
not correlate preferentially with stimulus-response events during Phase 2 of Session 1 of 
the Main Experiment in which accuracy was above 97% and RTs were quite short.  We 
conceptualize that responses during Phase 2 of Session 1 required much less consideration 
though they had not yet achieved automaticity based on our objective measures.  These 
results together suggest that DS neither mediates early, feedback-based learning, nor late-
stage stimulus-response automaticity.  Instead, these results integrate with a growing 
literature implicating DS in decision making (Atallah et al., 2007; Grahn et al., 2008), 
particularly when deliberation is required (R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011). 
In contrast, VS was preferentially engaged during feedback events (Figure 4.8A) in Nole 
M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), peaking in the first half of Session 1, when the slope of 
learning was steepest.  VS BOLD signal for feedback events was not significantly different 
relative to rest or stimulus-response events in the second half of Session 1 in Nole M. 
Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), when slope of behavioural change indicated that learning had 
decreased.  Consistent with this pattern, VS was not significantly engaged during the 
feedback events in Session 1 of the current study, which focused on late learning.  Early 
stimulus-response association learning had already occurred prior even to Block 1, Session 
1 in the Main Experiment, due to an explicit learning session that preceded the fMRI 
portion of this study, intended as a short-cut to later learning, making feedback much less 
informative.  Our results integrate with an emerging literature suggesting that VS mediates 
many forms of initial/early learning both with and without the provision of feedback, 
including reward learning (Camara, Rodriguez-Fornells, & Munte, 2008; A. A. 
MacDonald, Monchi, et al., 2013), stimulus-stimulus learning (P. A. MacDonald et al., 
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2011), motor learning (Feigin et al., 2003), sequence learning (Ghilardi et al., 2007), 
category learning (Hampshire et al., 2016; Shohamy, Myers, Geghman, Sage, & Gluck, 
2006), and list learning (A. A. MacDonald, Seergobin, et al., 2013).  
4.4.5 Conclusions 
The striatum is increasingly implicated in cognitive functions (P. A. MacDonald, Ganjavi, 
Collins, Evans, & Karama, 2014).  We found that DS activity correlates only with decisions 
and response selections requiring deliberation but not with late-stage, stimulus-response 
association learning.  Our results challenge the notion that the DS underlies the 
development of automaticity, integrating rather with a growing literature suggesting that 
DS—particularly the caudate nucleus—mediates decision making (Cincotta & Seger, 
2007; Little et al., 2006; Seger et al., 2010) when an element of deliberation is required 
(Atallah et al., 2007; Grahn et al., 2008; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014; Jessup & 
O'Doherty, 2011; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014; McDonald & Hong, 2004; Postle & 
D'Esposito, 1999; Smittenaar et al., 2012). 
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4.6 Supplemental Material: Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to objectively measure whether stimulus-response 
automaticity could be achieved following Phase 1 of Session 1, using our modified location 
Stroop task, which was shown to be a sensitive measure of stimulus-response automaticity 
in Session 3 of the Main Experiment.  The experimental protocol was identical to the Main 
Experiment, except that no fMRI measures were acquired and automaticity was assessed 
immediately after Phase 1 (i.e., Blocks 1-3) of Session 1 as well as at the end of Session 2 
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using a modified Stroop task.  In Experiment 2, we refer to this new block of location-
Stroop trials as Session 3A and the block of location-Stroop trials occurring after Sessions 
1 (i.e., 12 blocks) and 2 (i.e., 8 blocks) as Session 3B.    
4.6.1 Materials and Methods 
4.6.1.1 Participants 
Fifteen healthy, young adults participated in this experiment (5 males, 10 females).  
Subjects had a mean (SEM) age and level of education of 22.47 (0.50) and 16.33 (0.42) 
years, respectively.  Participants abusing prescription or illicit drugs, alcohol, or taking 
cognitive-enhancing medications including methylphenidate were excluded from 
participating in the experiment.  The Health Sciences Research Ethics Board of the 
University of Western Ontario approved this study.  All participants provided informed, 
written consent, according to the Declaration of Helsinki (2013).  
4.6.1.2 Procedures 
Experiment 2 was identical to the Main Experiment in nearly every respect.  All 
participants first learned explicitly to associate six abstract images with one of two button-
press responses prior to learning the associations implicitly in the presence (i.e., Session 1) 
and absence (i.e., Session 2) of feedback.  There was again a 20-minute distractor task 
performed between Sessions 1 and 2.  Session 3B was the final session in the experiment 
and was identical to Session 3 in the Main Experiment.  The stimuli, responses, trial 
number, and trial parameters were identical to what was described previously.  The only 
difference in Experiment 2 was that following Phase 1 (i.e., Blocks 1-3), Session 1 and 
before Phase 2 (i.e., Blocks 4-12), Session 1, participants performed Session 3A, a 
modified Stroop task identical in all respects to Session 3 of the Main Experiment (See 
Figure 4.2A and B).  
All sessions of Experiment 2 were performed using a 14.0′′ widescreen laptop (Lenovo 
T420; Lenovo, Morrisville, North Carolina, USA) running a resolution of 1600 × 900 on 
185 
 
the Windows 7 operating system.  The screen was placed at a distance of 50 cm in front of 
the participant and angled for optimal viewing. 
4.6.1.3 Behavioural Data Analysis 
An identical set of analyses was conducted on the Session 1 and 2 behavioural data.  To 
reiterate, changes in mean block RT, SD of RTs across blocks, and accuracy across 
Sessions 1 and 2 were analyzed using single-factor repeated measures ANOVAs with block 
(Session 1: 12 blocks; Session 2: 8 blocks) as the within-subject variable.  RT was the time 
between the onset of the abstract image and the button press by the participant measured 
in ms.  The number of correct “right” and “left” button-press responses recorded after each 
block was our estimate of accuracy.  In addition, t-tests were run on RT and accuracy data 
obtained in the last block of Session 1 and the first block of Session 2 to assess forgetting 
during the distraction period. 
Three conditions―congruent, incongruent, and control―were again created in Sessions 
3A and B.  Matching the Main Experiment, Sessions 3A and 3B each consisted of 48 
congruent, 48 incongruent, and 48 control trials that occurred in random order.  All old and 
new stimuli appeared equally often left and right of centre.  RTs were measured from the 
onset of the image until the button-press response in ms.  The control condition provided a 
baseline measure of accuracy and latency for providing a location response.  As in the Main 
Experiment, facilitation was calculated as mean RTs in the congruent condition minus 
those in the control condition and interference was calculated as mean RTs in the 
incongruent condition minus those in the control condition.  The incongruent minus 
congruent contrast was also completed to examine differences between incongruent and 
congruent trials.  One sample t-tests were run on facilitation and interference scores to 
assess if they were significantly different from zero.  Paired t-tests were performed on error 
rates between congruent and control trials, and incongruent and control trials.  Scores were 
assessed separately in Session 3A and Session 3B to investigate whether the stimulus-
response associations had been learned to the point that they were automatic after Phase 1 
of Session 1 (i.e., Session 3A) or after completing both Sessions 1 and 2 (i.e., Session 3B). 
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4.6.2 Results 
4.6.2.1 Behavioural Results 
Behavioural results for Sessions 1 and 2 of Experiment 2 are presented in Table 4.6 and 
Figure 4.9.  Results of Session 3 are presented in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.10.   
4.6.2.1.1 Session 1 
Results for Session 1 are shown with Phases 1 and 2 combined to illustrate the overall 
trends in RT, SD, and accuracy.  The mean RT, SD, and accuracy across Session 1 are 
shown in Figure 4.9A – C respectively.  Mauchly’s test was significant, indicating the 
assumption of sphericity was violated (p < 0.001).  Therefore, degrees of freedom were 
corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon for RT, SD, and accuracy single-factor 
repeated measures ANOVAs.   
Table 4.6 Significant pairwise comparisons for RT, SD, and accuracy differences by 
block in Session 1 of Experiment 2. 
Block A Block B RT SD Accuracy t stat p value t stat p value t stat p value 
1 2 3.79 0.001 3.57 0.004 - - 
 3 >3.79 <0.001 5.12 <0.001 2.01 0.032 
 4 >3.79 <0.001 4.97 <0.001 - - 
 5 >3.79 <0.001 4.88 <0.001 2.62 0.010 
 6 >3.79 <0.001 4.61 <0.001 2.10 0.027 
 7 >3.79 <0.001 5.00 <0.001 1.94 0.036 
 8 >3.79 <0.001 5.82 <0.001 2.62 0.010 
 9 >3.79 <0.001 6.34 <0.001 2.35 0.017 
 10 >3.79 <0.001 5.47 <0.001 1.93 0.037 
 11 >3.79 <0.001 6.37 <0.001 2.62 0.010 
 12 >3.79 <0.001 5.42 <0.001 1.98 0.034 
2 4 3.79 0.001 - - - - 
 5 2.74 0.008 - - - - 
 7 3.09 0.004 - - - - 
 8 >3.79 <0.001 - - - - 
 9 >3.79 <0.001 2.77 0.018 - - 
 10 >3.79 <0.001 - - - - 
 11 >3.79 <0.001 2.79 0.017 - - 
 12 >3.79 <0.001 - - - - 
3 4 1.85 0.043 - - - - 
 5 1.79 0.047 - - - - 
 8 2.19 0.023 - - - - 
 9 2.98 0.005 - - - - 
 10 2.26 0.020 - - - - 
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 11 >3.79 <0.001 - - - - 
 12 3.79 0.001 - - - - 
4 11 3.23 0.003 - - 1.99 0.033 
 12 2.32 0.018 - - - - 
7 11 2.12 0.026 - - - - 
 12 1.92 0.038 - - - - 
8 9 1.77 0.049 - - - - 
 11 2.01 0.032 - - - - 
Only significant (p < 0.05) comparisons are reported.  The left column labelled Block A lists the blocks that 
differ significantly from blocks listed in Block B.  RT – response time, SD – standard deviation. 
RTs were examined and revealed a main effect of block, F(3, 47) = 19.94, MSE = 34593.50, 
p < 0.001.  Deconstructing this effect using pairwise comparisons revealed significant RT 
differences between Blocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 versus other subsequent blocks (see Table 
4.6 and Figure 4.9A for specific significant comparisons).  No significant differences arose 
between Block 5, and 9-12 and other subsequent blocks.  Mean RTs decreased from 1100 
ms in Block 1 to 679 ms in Block 12. 
For SDs of RTs across blocks, a main effect of block was revealed, F(3, 36) = 5.72, MSE = 
45301, p < 0.001 with significant differences between Blocks 1 and 2 versus later blocks 
(See Table 4.6 and Figure 4.9B).  Mean SDs decreased from 372 ms in Block 1 to 167 in 
Block 12. 
The single factor repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy revealed a significant main 
effect of Block, F(4, 54) = 2.96, MSE = 37.36, p = 0.029.  This was explored further using 
pairwise comparisons (results presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.9C).  Significant 
differences existed between Blocks 1 and 4 versus other subsequent blocks in Session 1.  
No significant differences arose between blocks later than 4 with one another.  The average 
Block 1 score was 93.70%, which increased to 98.15% in Block 12. 
There was a trend in the RTs in the last block of Session 1 relative to those in the first block 
of Session 2 (t = 1.36, p = 0.097), with slower responding in Block 1, Session 2 than in 
Block 12, Session 1.  This replicates our finding that stimulus-response automaticity had 
not been achieved at the end of Session 1 in the Main Experiment.  Accuracy in the last 
block of Session 1 was not significantly different from accuracy in the first block of Session 
2 (t = -0.76, p = 0.77).  
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Figure 4.9 Mean response times, standard deviations, and accuracy across Sessions 1 and 
2 of Experiment 2. 
A) Mean response times (ms) in each block in Session 1.  B) Mean standard deviation (ms) in each block in 
Session 1.  C) Mean response accuracy (%) in each block in Session 1.  Session 1 was completed as two 
separate phases but are presented continuously to illustrate the changes in RT and accuracy.  Phase 1 
consisted of Blocks 1-3 and Phase 2 was composed of Blocks 4-12.  D) Mean response time (ms) in each 
block in Session 2.  E) Mean standard deviation (ms) in each block in Session 2.  F) Mean response accuracy 
(%) in each block in Session 2.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  Response time was 
measured from the onset of the abstract image to the button-press response made by the participant.  
Response accuracy is a percentage measure of the number of correct button-press responses in a block 
relative to total number of trials in the block.  Significant differences (p < 0.05) are indicated with an asterisk 
(*) and numbers listed next to the asterisk indicate the blocks from which each block differs significantly. 
4.6.2.1.2 Session 2 
Mean RT, SD, and accuracy across Session 2 are presented in Table 4.6 and Figures 4.9D–
F, respectively.  As in Session 1, single factor repeated measures ANOVAs were run to 
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investigate differences across Session 2.  There were no significant differences across 
blocks for RT (F < 1), SD (F < 1), or response accuracy (F < 1).   
4.6.2.1.3 Sessions 3A and B 
Results for Sessions 3A and B are presented in Figure 4.10 and Table 4.8.  To reiterate, 
Session 3A was completed immediately after Phase 1, Session 1 to investigate whether 
automatic responses had developed following Blocks 1-3, Session 1.  The error rate was 
3.29%.  Table 4.8 presents the mean RTs and error rates in each the congruent, incongruent, 
and control conditions.   
Table 4.8 Mean response times and error rates for the congruent, incongruent, and 
control conditions in Sessions 3A and B in Experiment 2. 
Condition Session 3A Session 3B 
Response Time 
(ms) Error Rate (%) 
Response Time 
(ms) Error Rate (%) 
Congruent 409.45 (25.07) 3.19 (0.45) 393.44 (19.48) 0.28 (0.28) 
Incongruent 403.02 (26.05) 3.75 (0.77) 402.37 (20.79) 0.28 (0.19) 
Control 424.13 (32.54) 2.92 (0.34) 390.13 (18.87) 0.00 (0.00) 
Mean (SEM) response times (ms) and error rates (%) are presented separately for Session 3A and B.  Session 
3A was completed immediately after Phase 1 of Session 1.  Session 3B occurred after Session 2 was 
completed.  In the congruent condition, an image appeared in a location that was consistent with the learned 
left or right button-press response.  In the incongruent condition, a stimulus appeared in a location that was 
inconsistent with the learned left or right button-press response.  In the control condition, six new images that 
were not previously presented in the experiment appeared to the left or right of centre. 
Paired t-tests were performed on error rates between congruent and control, and 
incongruent and control, trials.  One sample t-tests were performed on average facilitation 
and interference difference scores (Figure 2.10A).  There were no significant differences 
in terms of errors between congruent and control (t = -0.163, p = 0.563), and incongruent 
and control (t = -0.143, p = 0.612).  Facilitation (t = -1.66, p = 0.119) scores did not differ 
significantly from zero in terms of RTs.  The incongruent minus control difference score 
was significant (t = -2.65, p = 0.019).  However, the mean interference score was -21.11 
ms indicating faster responding for familiar yet incongruent items relative to novel control 
symbols (Figure 4.10A).   
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Session 3B was completed after 12 blocks of trials in Session 1 and eight blocks of trials 
in Session 2.  The error rate was low and similar to Session 3 of the Main Experiment 
(average incorrect responses: 0.19%).  Table 2.7 presents the mean RTs and error rates in 
each the congruent, incongruent, and control conditions of Session 3B.  Paired t-tests were 
performed on error rates between congruent and control, and incongruent and control trials.  
There were no significant differences in terms of errors between congruent and control (t 
= 1.00, p = 0.334), and incongruent and control (t = 1.47, p = 0.164).  One sample t-tests 
were performed on average facilitation and interference difference scores based on RT, as 
had been completed previously (Figure 2.10B).  Significant interference (t = 3.00, p = 
0.010) occurred.  Facilitation scores (i.e., congruent-control) did not differ significantly 
from zero (t = 0.93, p = 0.368).      
 
Figure 4.10 Mean facilitation and interference difference scores in Sessions 3A and B of 
Experiment 2. 
A) Mean (SEM) facilitation and interference difference scores for Session 3A.  B) Mean (SEM) facilitation and 
interference difference scores for Session 3B.  Session 3A was completed immediately following Phase 1 of 
Session 1 and Session 3B occurred after Session 2.  Facilitation was calculated as mean RTs in the congruent 
minus control condition and interference was calculated as mean RTs in the incongruent minus control 
condition.  Again, in the congruent condition stimuli were presented in the location that was consistent with 
the learned left or right button-press response learned in earlier sessions.  On incongruent trials, stimuli were 
presented in the location that was inconsistent with the left or right button-press response learned in earlier 
sessions.  The control condition consisted of new images that the participant had not previously associated 
with a right or left button-press response. *p<0.05. 
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Chapter 5 
5 General Discussion 
In three separate experiments, using fMRI, we investigated the role of the striatum in both 
early and late stimulus-response learning in patients with PD, patients with OCD, and in 
healthy participants.  In Chapter 2, in patients with PD, we found that dopaminergic therapy 
improved response accuracy related to enhanced DS BOLD signal.  In contrast, exogenous 
dopamine decreased the efficiency of stimulus-response learning, with corresponding 
attenuation of VS activity.  These results support the contention that DS mediates decision 
making and not early, stimulus-response learning whereas VTA-innervated VS supports 
stimulus-response association learning.  Combining PD, fMRI, and dopaminergic therapy 
that induces changes in a) behaviour and b) correspondingly in BOLD signal, allows 
greater confidence in suggesting that dopamine-mediated neural changes produce 
behavioural improvements and impairments.  In Chapter 3, patients with OCD evidenced 
impaired stimulus-specific response decisions and stimulus-response learning efficiency.  
Correspondingly, task-relevant DS activity during Stimulus-Response Decision Events and 
VS activity in Feedback Events were reduced.  Lastly in Chapter 4, we demonstrated that 
DS does not mediate late-stage habit learning toward automaticity but rather underlies 
deliberative response selections.   
5.1 The role of DS in stimulus-response learning 
There exists a rift in the literature regarding DS’ role in learning versus decision-making.  
There is a large literature implicating DS as a learning region, mediating both early, goal-
directed learning as well as habit formation (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Fouragnan, 
Retzler, & Philiastides, 2018; Hart, Leung, & Balleine, 2013; Salmi, Nyberg, & Laine, 
2018).  On the other side of the chasm, there is a competing literature supporting a role in 
decision making.  Few studies acknowledge these contradictory functions ascribed to DS, 
let alone aim to bridge this gap.  The aim of this thesis was to directly contrast tests of a) 
decision-making and b) stimulus-response learning functions, interleaved with one 
another in the same experimental paradigm, and in the same participants to directly 
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investigate the cognitive function(s) of DS particularly and of VS secondarily.  Resolving 
this discrepancy in the literature is of high importance because DS is impaired in many 
disease states including PD and OCD, as well as many others. 
Studies that suggest DS is a learning region often confound learning and decision-making.  
In many learning situations, decisions are made and feedback is provided to update 
decision accuracy.  In behavioural tasks, learning is often measured by accuracy of the 
decisions.  However, deficits in either learning from feedback or decision-making can yield 
impaired performance.  Secondly, in many fMRI experiments, decision-making and 
feedback-based learning are modelled together and all active brain areas are ascribed a role 
in learning.  Few studies attempt to separate decision-making from learning, which has 
perpetuated these discrepant views regarding DS’s role in cognition.  Consistent with our 
findings here, investigations that examine these processes separately have shown that DS, 
caudate nucleus (Nole M. Hiebert et al., 2014), putamen (Lam et al., 2016), or both 
(Francois-Brosseau et al., 2009), are recruited during decision-making and not learning.   
Upon closer review of the theories implicating DS in learning described in Chapter 1, 
considering common methodological confounds and the division of the striatum into DS 
and VS, each of these models can recast the role of DS as a decision-making region. 
5.1.1 DMS- and DLS-mediated Decision Making 
DMS- and DLS-mediated learning theories were originally proposed in the rodent literature 
with some corroboration in homologous regions in humans.  To reiterate, goal-directed 
learning is often ascribed to DMS, whereas DLS is purported to mediate habit learning.  In 
humans, this takes the form of learning behaviours to the point of automaticity.  VS, 
including NAcc, activity is clearly modulated by reward and there is strong evidence that 
this brain region mediates early stimulus-response learning.  Our research suggests that 
DMS and DLS mediate decision making.  Experiments in which DMS is lesioned in 
rodents often report the abolishment of goal-directed learning, leading to a release of 
habitual behaviours (Hernandez, Redgrave, & Obeso, 2015; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012; 
Macpherson, Morita, & Hikida, 2014; Redgrave et al., 2010; Voorn, Vanderschuren, 
Groenewegen, Robbins, & Pennartz, 2004).  Nishizawa et al. (2012) conducted a stimulus-
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response learning task involving auditory stimuli and lever-press responses for a food pellet 
reward in rats.  The task consisted of two phases.  Phase 1 involved learning to associate a 
lever (either right or left) with a specific auditory tone, one tone for each lever.  All rats 
were trained until a performance accuracy of at least 80% was reached.  Once performance 
accuracy reached greater than 80%, regions of the striatum were lesioned and after seven 
days, Phase 2 was completed.  In Phase 2, rats were required to perform the same stimulus-
response learning trials as Phase 1.  Lesions of DLS resulted in significantly reduced 
decision making accuracy during Block 1 of Phase 2.  Towards the end of Phase 2, DLS-
lesioned rats regained decision making accuracy comparable to control rats.  On a subset 
of rats, a second lesion was carried out either in DMS or NAcc and then Phase 2 was 
conducted.  Dual DLS and DMS lesions resulted in similar decision making trajectories, 
with significantly more errors early on and accuracy gradually increasing towards the end 
of Phase 2.  On the other hand, dual DLS and NAcc lesions resulted in impaired decision 
making that did not improve across Phase 2.  When all areas of DS were lesioned, decision 
making performance was impaired and never improved irrespective of new training.  
Associations could be re-learned through an intact NAcc, however, with response-
selections potentially being taken over by different parts of the striatum following a lesion.  
This would be supported by the fact that dual DLS and DMS lesions, even when NAcc was 
spared (i.e., re-learning and new learning was possible), accurate performance of lever 
selections related to tones could not be regained.      
In a study that examined DLS-mediated habit learning in humans using fMRI, Tricomi, 
Balleine, and O'Doherty (2009) found that an area of the putamen, that authors defined as 
DLS, was more active in participants who underwent habit learning compared to those 
whose learning remained goal-directed.  The authors concluded that this area of the 
striatum is specifically involved in stimulus-response habit learning.  These results would 
directly challenge our findings in Chapter 4 and our overall notions regarding DS’s role in 
cognition.  Upon closer examination of Tricomi et al., (2009), however, the area that was 
specifically preferentially activated in habit learning was actually located in a region of the 
ventral putamen that based on a number of approaches for distinguishing DS from VS 
would be considered a region of VS (Di Martino et al., 2008; Nole M. Hiebert et al., 2014; 
Jung et al., 2011; Kwak, Müller, Bohnen, Dayalu, & Seidler, 2012; P. A. MacDonald & 
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Monchi, 2011; Morris et al., 2012; Postuma & Dagher, 2006).  Depending on the definition 
that you have adopted for DS versus VS, these results could alternatively be interpreted as 
evidence that VS mediates late-stage habit learning.  
5.1.2 COVIS and SPEED Model 
COVIS and SPEED, two models proposed by Gregory Ashby (Ashby, 1998; Ashby, Ennis, 
& Spiering, 2007; Ashby, Turner, & Horvitz, 2010), aim to explain the neural correlates of 
early category learning, and category learning moving towards automaticity, respectively. 
To reiterate, the COVIS model suggests that stimulus-response learning─specifically 
category learning─involves two competing systems, (1) a verbal system that classifies 
stimuli into verbalizable categories, and (2) an implicit system that uses procedural learning 
(Ashby, 1998).  Both learning systems intersect with DS, and it is here where the 
competition takes place.  In any categorization task, Ashby (1998) contend that only one 
of the two systems will dominate and the DS is responsible for mediating and switching 
between the two systems, and more importantly, it is suggested that the DS mediates the 
stimulus-response association learning.  SPEED, on the other hand, postulates that the role 
of DS is to a) acquire stimulus-response associations and b) train cortical-cortical 
connections between higher order sensory and pre-motor areas (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie, 
Roeder, & Ashby, 2010; Soto, Waldschmidt, Helie, & Ashby, 2013).  The theory maintains 
that the head of the caudate nucleus mediates early learning (COVIS), and as the 
associations become more practiced, progressing toward automaticity, more posterior 
regions of the striatum, namely the body and tail of the caudate nucleus, are purported to 
underlie late stage learning (SPEED).  According to the SPEED account, once automaticity 
has been achieved, involvement of dorsal caudate nucleus ceases, and stimulus-specific, 
automatic behaviours become mediated by cortical regions (i.e. pre-motor, motor and 
visual cortices; Ashby, et al., 2007).  The experimental data that are cited as support for 
these theories a) only consider neural activity in stimulus-response events, neglecting a 
feedback event (DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007; Helie et al., 2010; Soto et al., 2013), or b) 
combine neural activity in stimulus-response and feedback events (Milton & Pothos, 2011; 
Nomura et al., 2007).  Helie et al. (2010) investigated neural substrates of automatization 
of responses in a rule-based categorization learning paradigm that included over 10,000 
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trials, across 20 separate learning sessions, with fMRI data obtained in Sessions 1, 4, 10, 
and 20.  They found that activity in DS was increased throughout Session 1, at the end of 
which high levels of response accuracy were ultimately achieved (i.e., 89.6%).  In 
subsequent sessions, DS activity was significantly attenuated (i.e., after Session 1) whereas 
cortical activation continued to correlate with accurate categorization performance events, 
even after extensive training.  Only stimulus-response or decision-making events (i.e. time 
period from the onset of the stimulus to the button-press response) were examined.  
Consistent with our claims, DS activation at the time of response selection and enactment 
could have arisen due to its involvement in decision-making processes that still require 
deliberation and not with association learning per se.     
5.1.3 Actor-Critic Model 
To reiterate, the actor-critic model states that stimulus-response learning consists of two 
separate components, a critic (i.e. the learner) which utilizes feedback to learn to predict 
future rewards, and an actor (i.e. the selector) which uses the information from the critic 
to make better decisions (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Sutton & Barto, 1998).  O'Doherty et al. 
(2004) scanned healthy participants using 3T MRI while they completed two versions of a 
stimulus-response learning task, one instrumental and the other Pavlovian.  The rationale 
for using an instrumental and Pavlovian task was to examine value predictions by the critic 
in the presence (i.e. instrumental task) and absence (i.e. Pavlovian task) of action selections 
by an actor.  The results showed that VS correlated strongly with the prediction error signal 
in both tasks, whereas DS correlated with prediction error only during the instrumental 
task.  Authors concluded that VS is the critic, coding for the prediction error signal and 
sending this information to the DS, or actor, where this information is used to learn the 
stimulus-response association and perform rewarding future responses.  In other words, 
VS is implicated in reward processing and motivation and DS is implicated in stimulus-
response learning and decision-making.  Our interpretation is that VS, named their critic, 
is responsible for stimulus-response learning and DS, the actor, mediates decision making.  
In  O'Doherty et al. (2004), the critic appears when feedback is presented, and received and 
processes feedback (i.e. learning), and the actor, is recruited prior to the response (i.e. 
during decision making). 
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With each of these models, the lack of agreement and/or distinction between DS and VS, 
as well as not separately examining decision making and learning, leads to confounds and 
controversies in the literature.  The aim of this thesis was to unite two opposing literatures 
implicating DS in learning versus decision making by discussing how many studies that 
implicate DS in learning may actually be doing so erroneously, and rather the function that 
DS is mediating is decision making.  
5.2 The role of VS in stimulus-response learning 
Initially, VS was considered a region specialized for reward learning and processing 
(Camara et al., 2010; Cools et al., 2002; Delgado et al., 2000; Delgado, 2007; Knutson and 
Cooper, 2005; O’Doherty, 2004; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Sesack and Grace, 2010).  
However, some recent studies implicate VS in learning situations that are devoid of reward, 
punishment, or any feedback at all, challenging this specialization (Feigin et al., 2003; 
Ghiladri et al., 2007; MacDonald et al., 2011; Reiss et al., 2005; Seo et al., 2010; Shohamy 
et al., 2004; Shohamy et al., 2006; Tremblay et al., 2010).  The results from Chapter 2 and 
3 support this view. 
5.3 Functions of DS and VS in Cognition  
Our research refutes DS`s role in learning, assigning it a function in selection and decision 
making.  Further, our findings suggest that VS mediates stimulus-response learning.  
Review of cytoarchitectural distinctions as well as dissimilarities in connectivity of DS and 
VS, explain how these regions are adapted to these different functions.  MSNs within DS 
have a much higher dopamine turnover rate compared to VS.  Specifically, DS MSNs have 
a higher concentration of dopaminergic afferents, as well as of DAT compared to VS.  A 
large number of dopaminergic afferents results quickly in high amplitude stimulation, 
whereas elevated DAT, responsible for synaptic clearance of dopamine, causes rapid drops 
in synaptic dopamine (Wickens, Horvitz, Costa, & Killcross, 2007).  The anatomical 
makeup of DS, with high concentrations of dopaminergic afferents and DAT, results in 
brief dopamine stimulation periods, almost binary (i.e., off or on) responding, with 
maximal stimulation achieved quickly, across a wide range of dopamine firing frequencies, 
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followed by rapid clearance of synaptic dopamine (Zhang et al., 2009).  These 
characteristics suit the DS to functions such as choosing between alternatives and decision 
making.  VS, on the other hand, consists of much smaller MSNs with more widely-spaced 
dendritic spines, lower concentration of both dopaminergic innervation and DAT.  
Accordingly, dopaminergic pulses stimulate VS much more slowly, for longer periods of 
time, and with more variable intensity compared to DS (Wickens et al., 2007).  These 
attributes are well suited to associating events or stimuli over time, for example in stimulus-
response learning.   
Secondly, the distinct cortical and limbic connections to DS and VS support their 
respective roles in decision making and learning.  DS reciprocally connects to the primary, 
supplementary, and pre-motor cortex, as well as to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), parietal association cortex, and somatosensory cortex (Leh, Chakravarty, & 
Ptito, 2008).  These cortical regions are largely effector areas as well as regions that aid in 
resolving response conflict, making DS ideally situated to perform functions such as 
deciding among alternatives and response selections.  Particularly, DS is implicated in 
decisions that require deliberation (DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007).  Deliberation manifests 
as DS a) disinhibits the cortical regions representing the correct stimulus-response 
association and b) inhibits activity in cortical regions representing alternative stimulus-
response associations (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie et al., 2010).  Deliberation decreases as 
the strength of cortical-cortical connections increases to the point that they no longer 
require DS to facilitate them and inhibit alternative stimulus-response connections.  We 
contend that stimulus-response automaticity is achieved when these selections become 
independent of DS.  
VS, on the other hand, is reciprocally connected to regions associated with encoding such 
as the hippocampus, amygdala, anterior cingulate, as well as to orbitofrontal (OFC), 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), and anterior temporal and insular cortices 
(Kincaid, Zheng, & Wilson, 1998).  VS projects directly to DS and has significant 
projections to VTA and SNc.  VS is ideally suited for stimulus-response learning.  
Connections between cortical representations of stimuli and of responses are learned and 
also strengthened by VS.  Projecting directly, and via spiraling connections through VTA 
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and SNc, to DS, VS biases DS to select particular responses (Haber, 2014; 2016; Choi et 
al., 2017).  When the consequence of a stimulus-response sequence is rewarding, 
represented neurally by a dopaminergic pulse in VTA to VS, VS strengthens this 
connection.  When the consequence is negative, represented by silencing of dopaminergic 
neurons in VTA projecting to VS, VS lessens connections.  As stimulus-response-outcome 
associations becomes well-learned, VTA responding becomes neutral unless there is a 
violation of this expected pattern at which time new learning that implicates the VS begins 
again.  
Synthesizing the above paragraphs with our results from Chapters 2-4 below, we outline 
our proposed model for the flow of information from novel stimuli and responses, to the 
establishment of stable, automatic stimulus-response pairings.  In the formation of 
stimulus-response associations, DS and VS are points of convergence between extra-
striatal regions and serve to link and facilitate connections between far reaching cortical 
areas.  Prefrontal cortical areas, specifically the ventrolateral prefrontal and orbitofrontal 
cortices seem to be involved in storing stimulus-response pairings in working memory, and 
storing outcome and motivational information, respectively (Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005; 
Choi, Ding, & Haber, 2017).  VS serves as the hub for this information, and when the 
correct action is performed and subsequently rewarded, a phasic dopamine signal is sent 
from VTA to VS and evidence suggests that this influx of dopamine begins to facilitate 
connections between VLPFC and OFC through long term potentiation (Choi et al., 2017).  
Therefore, this suggests that VS is instrumental in enabling the learning of stimulus-
response associations.  In Chapters 2 and 3, activity in VS peaked early on when stimulus-
response associations were first being formed.  Additionally, high baseline dopamine 
levels, as in the case of patients with OCD and PD patients tested in the ON state, impaired 
learning, likely via impairments in the phasic dopamine response in VS.   
Early in learning, DS is not biased in its selections and only becomes so with input from 
VS.  This bias can only occur once stimulus-response associations are beginning to be 
learned, typically in later blocks of stimulus-response learning, as evidenced in Chapter 4.   
Input from VS comes in the form of reciprocal, spiraling, feedforward loops that link VS 
and DS through the dopaminergic midbrain (Haber, 2014).  The increase in VS activity is 
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transmitted through VTA/SNc and facilitates a dopaminergic pulse to DS.  While the 
stimulus-response association is being practiced, there are reports that DLPFC monitors 
the relations and goal-relevant information (i.e. changes in outcomes) and is attuned to 
stimulus-response ambiguities (Barber, Caffo, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2013; Blumenfeld, 
Nomura, Gratton, & D'Esposito, 2013).  This information in DLPFC, along with the 
learned response biases from VS, converge in DS and are used in decision making carried 
out by reciprocally connected effector regions such as, premotor, supplementary motor, 
and primary motor cortices (Barber et al., 2013; Blumenfeld et al., 2013; Haber, 2014).  As 
practice continues and the response requires less and less consideration, the influence of 
DS on cortical areas storing the stimulus, response gradually lessens.  Finally, as 
deliberation ceases, cortical-cortical connections are strengthened to the point where they 
can operate in the absence of DS, as supported in Chapter 4 (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie et 
al., 2010; N. M. Hiebert, Owen, Seergobin, & MacDonald, 2017).    
5.4 Implications for PD 
Cognitive dysfunction is an undisputed symptom of PD that leads to significant impairment 
in quality of life (Barone et al., 2009; Schrag et al., 2000).  The etiology of cognitive 
impairments in PD is complex, but it is now clear that at least a subset of these symptoms 
arise from dysfunction of the striatum itself (Ray and Strafella, 2012).  In PD, DS-mediated 
functions are compromised at baseline, and improved by dopamine replacement therapy.  
Conversely, VS functions are relatively spared off medication, and worsened by 
dopaminergic therapy, most notably at early stages of the disease (MacDonald and Monchi, 
2011).  Understanding VS- and DS-mediated cognitive functions, therefore, informs at 
least some cognitive symptoms in PD, and has implications for treatment.  Currently, 
dopaminergic therapy is titrated to relieve DS-mediated motor symptoms, without taking 
into account the potential overdose of VTA-innervated regions.  Ultimately, this greater 
understanding will prompt clinicians to formulate medication strategies that consider both 
motor and cognitive symptoms, as well as individual patient needs. 
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5.5 Implications for OCD 
The role of the striatum in OCD is only starting to be elucidated and studies like Chapter 3 
aim to clarify the specific roles of DS and VS.  The results from Chapter 3 indicate that 
patients with OCD have task-related reductions in DS and VS function shown with 
corresponding behavioural and fMRI measures.  In contrast, at rest or baseline, high 
baseline VS and low basal DS activity occurred relative to healthy controls.  When 
performing stimulus-specific responses in a stimulus-response learning task, patients with 
OCD were impaired both during decision making and learning.  Therefore, too low and too 
high activity both yielded the same result; impaired function. 
With respect to symptomatology, Chapter 3 results support a role of VS in compulsive 
behaviours, specifically those patients with high baseline VS activity score lower on the 
compulsions sub-score of the YBOCS.  To reiterate, the YBOCS is designed to characterize 
the presence and severity of obsessions and compulsions in patients with OCD (Kim, 
Dysken, & Kuskowski, 1990).  Evidence suggests that OCD may be characterized by a 
dysfunctional reward system, reacting strongly to symptom-provoking stimuli and the 
completion of compulsive actions, but blunted responses to natural rewards (Figee et al., 
2016; Figee et al., 2011).  Within the OCD population, Chapter 3 results suggest that if 
baseline VS is too high, completion of compulsions is seen as less rewarding in these 
patients.  The VS operates through graded potentials stimulated by dopamine  
dopaminergic neurons in the VTA (Wickens et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2009).  Typically, 
the dopaminergic pulse increases activity above baseline in VS to signal the receipt of a 
reward (Wolfram Schultz, 1998, 2015; W. Schultz, Apicella, Scarnati, & Ljungberg, 1992).  
In patients with OCD, the high baseline VS activity potentially obscures the positive graded 
potentials that result from natural rewards, or even from the rewarding experience of 
anxiety reduction that temporarily follows enactment of a compulsive behaviour (Figure 
5.1). In this way, high baseline VS impairs learning, as well as  the experience of natural 
and even  maladaptive rewards (Figee et al., 2016; Figee et al., 2011).   
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Figure 5.1 Theoretical effect of VS hyperactivity on reinforcing actions. 
There is evidence to suggest the VS is hyperactive at rest in patients with OCD compared to healthy 
controls.  This high baseline VS activity impairs the patient’s ability to respond to phasic dopaminergic 
pulses leading to impaired reinforcement learning.  In healthy controls, receiving a reward is followed by a 
burst of dopamine sent from the VTA to VS leading to a phasic rise in VS activity (purple line).  The large 
magnitude phasic increase results in reinforcement learning and subsequently the healthy control will 
choose that response again.  In OCD patients (blue line), the high baseline VS activity leaves little room for 
the phasic increase in activity, and the result may be impaired reinforcement learning.  Clinically, performing 
compulsions may result in a phasic dopamine release into VS, reinforcing the action and making it more 
likely to be completed in the future.  OCD patients that do not suffer from strong compulsions may have a 
high baseline VS compared to OCD patients with compulsions, and the even more diminished phasic 
response could result in unrewarded compulsive actions that do not continue. 
The role of dopamine in OCD is currently an active area of research with much left to 
understand.  This elucidation could lead to alternative treatments for OCD.  As stated 
previously, SSRIs are the gold standard in treating OCD, pharmacologically.  Typically 
SSRIs are prescribed as an adjunct therapy to CBT (Hirschtritt, Bloch, & Mathews, 2017).  
SSRIs method of action points to reducing symptoms of anxiety and depression related to 
OCD symptoms by raising the synaptic level of serotonin (Insel, 1981), and may not 
specifically be addressing the mechanisms of OCD symptoms, namely striatal deficits.  
Indeed, approximately 30-40% of OCD patients do not respond to current therapies 
(Atmaca, 2016), supporting the contention that current therapies may not be treating the 
core deficits of the disorder.  In Chapter 2, it was determined that exogenous dopamine can 
simultaneously increase neural signal in DS and attenuate neural signal in the VS.  
Considering the baseline hypoactivity of DS and hyperactivity of VS at baseline in OCD, 
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this presents the intriguing possibility that exogenous dopamine might be helpful in 
bolstering DS, and perhaps decision making, response inhibition, and behavioural 
flexibility, while simultaneously diminishing the pathological hyperactivity in VS that 
seems related to obsessional thought (Rauch, Jenike, Alpert, & et al., 1994).  There have 
been only very few studies investigating dopaminergic therapy in treating OCD 
(Ceccherini-Nelli & Guazzelli, 1994; Stryjer et al., 2014).  Ceccherini-Nelli and Guazzelli 
(1994) administered bromocriptine, a dopamine agonist, in four patients with treatment 
refractory OCD.  Three out of the four saw dramatic improvements in OCD symptoms.  
Delle Chiaie, Scarciglia, Pasquini, Caredda, and Biondi (2011) tested the efficacy of 
aripiprazole, an atypical antipsychotic and partial dopamine agonist, as an adjunct to SSRI 
or clomipramine therapy in treatment-resistant OCD patients.  20 subjects completed the 
12-week study and at the end of the study, authors saw a significant reduction in YBOCS 
scores in 18/20 patients.  The authors conclude that the partial agonism of dopamine 
receptors can aid in the treatment of OCD patients who are resistant to SSRI monotherapy 
(Delle Chiaie et al., 2011).  Further research into this area is warranted and a direct follow 
up of this is planned presently.  
5.6 Limitations 
There are several limitations in Chapters 2-4.  Firstly, it is difficult recruiting and testing 
representative samples of patient populations, and ensuring control groups are adequately 
matched.  Patients with neurological or psychiatric disorders are highly variable, both in 
terms of severity of the disease and co-morbidities.  In Chapters 2 and 3, several steps were 
taken to reduce the variability due to noise between patients to facilitate accurate 
conclusions drawn from the data.  Patients tested must: 1) be diagnosed with the disease of 
interest by a licensed physician, 2) be free of other neurological and psychiatric disorders 
or other serious health concerns, 3) not taking cognitive-enhancing medications, and 4) 
have no history of abusing alcohol, prescription medications or illegal drugs.  Additionally, 
control participants were age- and education-matched to patients, and had similar scores 
on measures of cognitive health, such as MoCA, ANART, and verbal fluency.  Recruiting 
control participants that match on as many different aspects as possible yields more 
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defendable results.  In all experiments, these standard measures of cognitive health were 
used to ensure all participants were cognitively intact, and able to complete the experiment.  
Secondly, the spatial resolution of the neuroimaging data creates difficulty in 
understanding fully the functional specificity of different brain regions.  Brain tissue 
contains many different small structures, such as receptors, neurons, and support cells, and 
3T neuroimaging is unable to differentiate these structures or understand how they work 
together to perform specific functions.  For example, in each of the studies the voxel size 
was 2.5 mm3 which is orders of magnitude larger than single neurons.  Therefore, imaging 
each voxel averages across many structures and neurons.  There are many tradeoffs when 
parameters are chosen for neuroimaging experiments.  Decreasing the size of the voxels 
can grant increased spatial resolution, but it also increases the total number of voxels as 
well as the number of brain slices required to capture the whole brain.  This results in a 
decreased temporal resolution because it requires a much longer TR (i.e. the time required 
to take one whole-brain picture).  The voxel size chosen in this thesis and the corresponding 
TR maximizes spatial and temporal resolution in the experiments.   
Lastly, fMRI is correlational in nature and generally it is difficult to establish or claim true 
causality.  To reiterate, fMRI examines changes in blood flow and not neuronal activity.  
Action potentials require a significant amount of energy in the form of oxygen and glucose 
and because neurons are unable to efficiently store these molecules, they must be obtained 
from oxygenated blood (Yablonskiy & Haacke, 1994).  As a result, when a neuron fires, 
an increase in deoxygenated blood surrounds the neuron to facilitate the action potential, 
causing an influx of oxygenated blood, and it is this change in blood flow that is imaged in 
fMRI (Yablonskiy & Haacke, 1994).  This concept is almost wholly accepted in the 
neuroimaging community and causality is often inferred from BOLD changes.  
Nevertheless, pharmacological manipulation in a disease state such as PD facilitates 
stronger inferences.  The neuropathology of PD and the effect of dopaminergic therapy on 
patients with PD is well-understood and this knowledge is combined with the 
neuroimaging results.  For example, it is understood that DS is dopamine deplete and 
impaired at baseline and dopamine administration remediates this impairment.  If decision-
making performance is impaired at baseline and improved with dopamine therapy, along 
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with an increase in BOLD signal in DS, it can be said with more certainty that DS mediates 
decision making. 
5.7 Conclusions 
We completely refute the prevalent contention that DS mediates early (Boettiger & 
D'Esposito, 2005; Brovelli, Laksiri, Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2008; Delgado, 
Miller, Inati, & Phelps, 2005; Foerde, Knowlton, & Poldrack, 2006; Brian Lau & Glimcher, 
2007; B. Lau & Glimcher, 2008; R. A.  Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999; 
Thompson, 1959; Thompson RL, 1963; Xue, Ghahremani, & Poldrack, 2008), and late-
stage, learning with or without feedback (Helie et al., 2010; R. A. Poldrack et al., 2005; 
Soto et al., 2013; Yamamoto, Kim, & Hikosaka, 2013; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  Our 
research suggests rather that VS mediates early stimulus-response learning.  In contrast, 
our findings strongly support a role for DS in decision making (Atallah, Lopez-Paniagua, 
Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007; Nole M. Hiebert et al., 2014; Brian Lau & Glimcher, 2007; B. 
Lau & Glimcher, 2008; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014; P. 
A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; Smittenaar et al., 2012; Wunderlich, Dayan, & Dolan, 
2012), when there is ambiguity, and deliberation is required (Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, & 
Price, 2010; Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Daniel et al., 2010; DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007; 
P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Ohira et al., 2010; Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Owen, & 
MacDonald, 2015).  
DS is a region implicated in many disorders ranging from Parkinson’s disease, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and addiction.  Elucidating the function(s) of DS is integral to 
developing cognitive and symptom profiles of these diseases, as well as in identifying 
and understanding new targets for therapy and potentially new therapeutic approaches.  
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in Parkinson’s disease using 3T MRI. Poster presented at the 4th World Parkinson 
Congress, Portland, Oregon, United States of America.   
 
Hiebert NM, Owen, AM, Seergobin KN & MacDonald PA (2016, May) The effect 
of dopaminergic therapy on stimulus-response learning and decision-making in 
Parkinson’s disease using 3T MRI. Poster presented at the Canadian Association for 
Neuroscience conference, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
 
Hiebert NM, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, & MacDonald PA (2015, March) Does 
Dorsal Striatum Mediate Habit Learning or Decision-making?  Platform 
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Leadership Experience during University 
 
Sept. 2013 – May 
2018  
 
Senior Lab Member, Dr. Penny MacDonald’s Lab 
University of Western Ontario 
• Assisted in the supervision of a three undergraduate and 
one medical student. 
• Taught basic research methods such as proper data 
collection and data management, as well as more 
sophisticated methods such as collection and analysis of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging data. 
• Reviewed and edited manuscripts and presentations before 
submission to supervisor.  
May 2013 – May 
2014 
Society of Graduate Students Representative for the 
Physiology and Pharmacology Graduate Student Council, 
University of Western Ontario 
• Debate and vote on issues pertaining to the student body 
of the University of Western Ontario 
• Disseminate information obtained at Society of Graduate 
Student meetings to the Physiology and Pharmacology 
Graduate Student Council 
	
	
	
	
	
	
